Counterterrorism Guide - National Counterterrorism Center

INTERACTIVE

First-response planners can gain insight into what might occur if terrorists employ one or more IEDs in their jurisdiction by considering key IED production and targeting factors and examining previous IED attacks. In IED attacks, terrorists can manipulate the most important factors that induce casualties and damage: These include quantity and type of explosive charge IED design and employment strategy, and inclusion of fragmentation items (ball bearings, nails, etc.).

Bomb Threat Stand-Off Evacuation Distances

Mandatory

Device	Distance
Pipe Bomb	70 ft/21 m
Suicide Vest	110 ft/34 m
Briefcase/Suitcase	150 ft/46 m
Sedan	320 ft/98 m
SUV/Van	400 ft/122 m
Small Delivery Truck	640 ft/195 m
Container Truck	860 ft/263 m
Semi-Trailer	1,570 ft/479 m

Preferred

Device	Distance
Pipe Bomb	1,200 ft/366 m
Suicide Vest	1,700 ft/518 m
Briefcase/Suitcase	1,850 ft/564 m
Sedan	1,900 ft/580 m
SUV/Van	2,400 ft/732 m
Small Delivery Truck	3,800 ft/1,159 m
Container Truck	5,100 ft/1,555 m
Semi-Trailer	9,300 ft/2,835 m

Pipe Bomb/Pressure Cooker

Mandatory Evacuation distance: 70 feet
Preferred Evacuation distance: 1,200+ feet

Severe injury/death

Person-Borne IED Suicide Vest or Briefcase

Mandatory Evacuation distance: 110 feet
Preferred Evacuation distance: 1,700 feet

Possibility of building collapse, severe injury/death

Vehicle-Borne IED (Car)

Mandatory Evacuation distance: 320 feet
Preferred Evacuation distance: 1,900 feet

Building collapse, severe injury/death

NOTE: The preferred evacuation range rings for person- and vehicle-borne IEDs are beyond the distances represented on this graphic and are therefore not shown.

Mandatory Evacuation Distance

All personnel must evacuate
(inside of buildings and out)

Preferred Evacuation Distance

Preferred area for evacuation of people in buildings and mandatory for people outdoors

Shelter-in-Place Zone

All personnel in this area should seek shelter immediately inside a buiding away from windows and exterior walls. Avoid having anyone outside—including those evacuating—in the area

Anthrax is a serious illness caused by Bacillus anthracis (B. anthracis), an encapsulated, spore-forming, large, gram-positive, aerobic (grows in the presence of air), nonmotile (unable to move independently), rod-shaped bacterium. It is primarily a disease of plant-eating animals (herbivores); cattle, sheep, goats, horses, and swine are the usual hosts. The bacteria grow within the host, and sporulation occurs when the bacteria are exposed to oxygen or adverse growing conditions. Virulent strains of B. anthracis produce a protective capsule, composed of poly-D glutamic acid, and two protein exotoxins (called the lethal and the edema toxins).

Three dimensional image of human figure with arms spread out

Inhalation effects

Intestinal effects

Cutaneous effects

Complex Operating Environment—Hotel High-Rise

The physical characteristics of the estimated 52,000 hotels in the Homeland create a complex environment for emergency personnel responding to a call for service in the event of a terrorist attack. From chain properties to luxury resorts, hotels in the Homeland are diverse and may include multi-use facilities, restaurants, casinos, entertainment venues, and conference spaces. These characteristics, compounded by the fact that hotels are open and welcoming facilities with a large transient population, create complex challenges for prevention, security and response.

LAW ENFORCEMENT NEEDS TO CLEAR EVERY FLOOR AND EVERY ROOM
INCREASING AMOUNT OF TIME AND MANPOWER; ONCE EACH FLOOR IS CLEARED THEY HAVE TO BE SECURED SO THAT SUSPECTS ARE UNABLE TO REENTER THE AREA.

Active/Unsecure Area

UNRESTRAINED ATTACKER(S), HIGH RISK TO FIRST RESPONDERS AND CIVILIANS

Cleared/unsecure area

INITIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SWEEP COMPLETE; ATTACKER(S) RETURN POSSIBLE; POSSIBLE BLAST/STRUCTURAL DAMAGE - FIRE,SMOKE-UNEXPLODED IEDS REMAIN A CONCERN

Secure Area

CLEARED BY LAW ENFORCEMENT, SECURITY MEASURES IN PLACE, AREA MONITORED

Security Planning

Development of an appropriate security presence for rapid and comprehensive emergency response is contingent upon interagency coordination and private sector partnerships. While developing the plan, current terrorist tactics and trends must be taken into account. The ability of multi-disciplined, multi-jurisdictional agencies to train together for these types of incidents can greatly enhance preparedness and increase early incident stabilization. Planning should also include transition from emergency response to investigation, as well as the continuation of local and regional emergency services.

On-scene Capabilities

Large incidents may rapidly deplete local/regional resources, stress even robust incident command structures, and overwhelm emergency medical services. Medical response planning must address on-scene capabilities such as ambulance routes and casualty collection points, as well as local hospital surge capacity and special population needs.

Training

It is critically important that law enforcement, fire, emergency medical services and the private sector train together whenever possible to develop the best potential response scenarios. State, local and city officials recognize that the private sector plays a significant role in solving communication, transportation and utility challenges. While private sector entities and utility companies have access to Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) in natural disasters, they are not always considered in other crisis staffing plans.

HISTORIC TIMELINE

SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

On September 11, 2001, 19 al-Qa‘ida suicide attackers hijacked and crashed four US commercial jets—two into the World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon near Washington, D.C., and a fourth into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania—leaving nearly 3,000 people dead.