On January 30th, Finnish regulators provided notice of the following EU sanctions decisions and regulations regarding sanctions on Tunisia:
JCPOA Implementation Day Guidance: Section VII (US Legal Authorities Post-Implementation Day)
Or… “What's left of US sanctions on Iran”…
VII.
Key U.S. Legal Authorities That Remain in Place After Implementation Day
A number of U.S. legal authorities that are outside the scope of the JCPOA and are directed
toward, or have been used to address, U.S. concerns with respect to, Iran remain in place after
Implementation Day. A non-exhaustive list of such authorities is set out below:A. Trade Sanctions
1. Trade Embargo: The U.S. domestic trade embargo imposed on Iran under the
national emergency declared in E.O. 12957, as implemented through the ITSR, also referred to as U.S. primary sanctions, remains in place following Implementation Day. Pursuant to the ITSR and with limited exceptions,
persons, as defined in section 560.314 of the ITSR, continue to be broadly
prohibited from engaging in transactions or dealings directly or indirectly with
Iran or its government. In addition, non-U.S. persons continue to be prohibited
from knowingly engaging in conduct that seeks to evade U.S. restrictions on
transactions or dealings with Iran or that causes the export of goods or services
from the United States to Iran
Please note that, under the ITSR, the clearing of transactions involving Iran
through the U.S. financial system, including foreign branches of U.S. financial
institutions continues to be prohibited
2. Export Controls: U.S. controls on the exportation or reexportation of goods,
technology, and services to Iran imposed pursuant to the ITSR, including sections
560.204 and 560.205, as well as the Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R.
parts 730-774 (EAR), and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 CFR
parts 120-130 (ITAR), remain in place. Pursuant to these authorities and unless
exempt from regulation or authorized under the relevant regulations, the
exportation or reexportation by a U.S. person or from the United States to Iran or
the Government of Iran, as well as the reexportation by non-U.S. persons of items
that contain 10 percent or more U.S.-controlled content with knowledge or reason
to know that the reexportation is intended specifically to Iran or the Government
of Iran, generally requires a license
B. Designation Authorities and Blocking Sanctions
In addition, the United States retains a number of authorities that are directed toward, or have
been used to address, U.S. concerns with respect to Iran. Generally, these authorities provide for
the imposition of blocking sanctions on persons meeting certain criteria or engaging in specified
conduct, as well as their support networks.
Designation authorities:
The activities targeted by these authorities include:
1. Support for terrorism: E.O. 13224 (blocking property and prohibiting transactions
with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism);2. Iran’s human rights abuses:
- E.O.s 13553 and 13628 (implementing sections 105, 105A, and 105B of
CISADA (related to persons who are responsible for or complicit in
human rights abuses committed against the citizens of Iran; transfers of
goods or technologies to Iran that are likely to be used to commit serious
human rights abuses against the people of Iran; and persons who engage in
censorship or similar activities with respect to Iran)); and- E.O. 13606 (relating to the provision of information technology used to
further serious human rights abuses)
3. Proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, including ballistic missiles: E.O.s 12938 and 13382
4. Support for persons involved in human rights abuses in Syria or for the
Government of Syria: E.O.s 13572 and 13582
5. Support for persons threatening the peace, security, or stability of Yemen: E.O.
13611
6. Transactions or activities described in section 1244(c)(1)(A) of IFCA if the
transaction involves any person on the SDN list (other than an Iranian financial
institution whose property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to
E.O. 13599): Section 1244(c)(1) of IFCA
7. Diversion of goods intended for the people of Iran: CISADA 105C, as added by
section 1249 of IFCA (relating to the diversion of goods, including agricultural
commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices, intended for the people of
Iran, or the misappropriation of proceeds from the sale or resale of such goods)
8. Knowingly and directly providing specialized financial messaging services to, or
knowingly enabling or facilitating direct or indirect access to such messaging
services for a financial, institution whose property or interests in property are
blocked in connection with Iran's proliferation of WMD or their means of 97
delivery, or Iran's support for international terrorism: Section 220 of the TRA;
9. Officials, agents, and affiliates of the IRGC: Section 301 of the TRA98 (providing
for the designation of officials, agents, or affiliates of the IRGC); and
10. Foreign sanctions evaders: E.O. 13608 (authorizing the imposition of prohibitions
on transactions or dealings by U.S. persons involving persons determined to have:
(i) violated, attempted to violate, conspired to violate, or caused a violation of
U.S. sanctions with respect to Iran or Syria (including sanctions imposed under
counter-proliferation or counter-terrorism authorities); or (ii) facilitated deceptive
transactions for or on behalf of any person subject to U.S. sanctions concerning
Iran or Syria).99
Blocking authorities:
The persons targeted by these authorities include:
1. The Government of Iran and Iranian Financial Institutions: E.O. 13599, section
217(a) of the TRA, section 560.211 of the ITSR; and
2. Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting and its president under section 105(c) of
CISADA: Section 1248 of IFCA.
C. Correspondent and Payable-through Account Sanctions
After Implementation Day, FFIs may be subject to correspondent or payable-through account
secondary sanctions for:
1. Knowingly facilitating a significant financial transaction with designated Iranian
financial institutions that remain or are placed on the SDN List (section 1245(d)
of NDAA 2012);
2. Knowingly facilitating a significant financial transaction on behalf of any Iranian
persons that remain or are placed on the SDN List (section 1247(a) of IFCA);
3. Knowingly facilitating a significant financial transaction or providing significant
financial services for any other person on the SDN List with the “[IFSR]â€
identifying tag (i.e., the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and any of its
designated officials, agents, or affiliates; individuals and entities designated
pursuant to E.O. 13382 in connection with Iran’s proliferation of WMD or their
means of delivery; and individuals and entities designated pursuant to E.O. 13224
in connection with Iran’s support for international terrorism) (section 104(c)(2)(E)
of CISADA);
4. Knowingly facilitating a significant financial transaction for the sale, supply, or
transfer to or from Iran of significant goods and services used in connection with
the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran where the transactionsinvolve persons who remain or are placed on the SDN List (section 1244(d)(2) of
IFCA); or
5. Knowingly conducting or facilitating a significant financial transaction for the
sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of graphite, raw or semi-finished metals
such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes
that have been determined pursuant to section 1245(e)(3) of IFCA to be used as
described in that section if the transactions involve (i) persons on the SDN List;
(ii) the sale, supply, or transfer of materials described in section 1245(d) of IFCA
that have not been approved by the procurement channel established pursuant to
paragraph 16 of UNSCR 2231 and section 6 of Annex IV of the JCPOA, in cases
in which the procurement channel applies; or (iii) the sale, supply, or transfer of
materials described in section 1245(d) of IFCA if the material is sold, supplied, or
transferred, or resold, retransferred, or otherwise supplied directly or indirectly,
for use in connection with the military or ballistic missile program of Iran (section
1245(c) of IFCA).
D. Menu-based Sanctions
After Implementation Day, menu-based secondary sanctions continue to attach to:
1. Persons who materially assist, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or
technological support for, or goods or services in support of: the IRGC or any of
its officials, agents, or affiliates blocked pursuant to IEEPA; persons that engage
in significant transactions with (i) any of the foregoing or (ii) persons subject to
financial sanctions pursuant to the UNSCRs that impose sanctions with respect to
Iran, or a person acting for or on behalf of, or owned or controlled by, such person
(section 302(a) of the TRA);
2. Non-U.S. persons who engage in transactions or activities described in sections
1244(d)(1) and 1246(a) of IFCA if the transactions involve persons on the SDN
List; and
3. Non-U.S. persons who sell, supply, or transfer directly or indirectly to or from
Iran graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and
software for integrating industrial processes that have been determined pursuant
to section 1245(e)(3) of IFCA to be used as described in that section if the
transactions involve (i) persons on the SDN List; (ii) the sale, supply, or transfer
of materials described in section 1245(d) of IFCA that have not been approved by
the procurement channel established pursuant to paragraph 16 of UNSCR 2231
and section 6 of Annex IV of the JCPOA, in cases in which the procurement
channel applies; or (iii) the sale, supply, or transfer of materials described in
section 1245(d) of IFCA if the material is sold, supplied, or transferred, or resold,
retransferred, or otherwise supplied directly or indirectly, for use in connection
with the military or ballistic missile program of Iran (section 1245(a) of IFCA).
E. Non-Proliferation Sanctions
On Transition Day, the United States will seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to
terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the nuclear proliferation-related statutory
sanctions set forth in paragraph 4.9 of Annex II of the JCPOA, including sanctions under the
Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act on the acquisition of nuclear-related
commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in the JCPOA, to be consistent with
the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons. The JCPOA does not address the application of a number of generally-
applicable non-proliferation statutes related to transfers of proliferation-sensitive equipment and
technology, or statutes that provide for sanctions for activities that would be outside the scope of
the JCPOA.
F. Terrorism List Sanctions
Iran remains designated as a state sponsor of terrorism under relevant laws (section 6(j) of the
Export Administration Act; section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act; and section 620A of the
Foreign Assistance Act), and the JCPOA does not alter that designation. A number of different
sanctions laws and restrictions are keyed to this designation, including restrictions on foreign
assistance (22 U.S.C. § 2371), a ban on defense exports and sales (22 U.S.C. § 2780), controls on
exports of certain sensitive technology and dual-use items (50 U.S.C. App. § 2405), and various
financial and other restrictions.
OFAC Enforcement Action: Johnson & Johnson gets Finding of Violation
Finding of Violations are the least frequent of all OFAC enforcement actions. They seem to be used as educational tools for the rest of us, either to remind us of existing requirements that perhaps we give short shrift, or to set a new compliance bar based on the shortcomings of the firm being highlighted.
In this case, it’s Johnson & Johnson. A US division was involved in 5 shipments of goods (total value $227,818) in 2010 from an Egyptian subsidiary to Sudan, partly due to the lack of adequate sanctions training for the General Manager of the US division.
Here is OFAC’s calculus of how they decided not to go beyond a Finding of Violation:
OFAC considered the following to be aggravating factors:
- JJME acted with reckless disregard for U.S. sanctions requirements when it made two exports to Sudan after being made aware that it might be subject to restrictions under U.S. sanctions;
- JJME’s General Manager for Emerging Markets in the Middle East and North Africa was both aware of and involved in the conduct giving rise to the violations;
- JJME is part of a large, sophisticated corporation with extensive experience in international trade; however, it did not properly take into consideration the implications of OFAC regulations when it restructured its consumer business and placed a U.S. company in charge of sales to Sudan; and
- JJME’s OFAC compliance program did not include any training on OFAC regulations for its General Manager, who was responsible for sales to Sudan.
OFAC considered the following to be mitigating factors:
- JJME took remedial action including conducting an internal investigation of the violations and instituting additional compliance training;
- the harm to sanctions programs objectives was limited because the products exported, while not authorized by OFAC, were consumer hygiene products;
- JJME has no prior OFAC sanctions history, including no penalty notice or Finding of Violation in thefive years preceding the date of the earliest transaction giving rise to the violations; and
- JJME cooperated with OFAC’s investigation, including by providing detailed and well-organized information.
OFAC made sure everyone knew there was a lesson to be learned:
This enforcement action highlights the need for U.S. companies, particularly large, sophisticated entities dealing primarily in international transactions, to ensure that their employees are properly trained on OFAC regulations, especially managers who oversee sales to regions that pose a particularly high risk for violations of the sanctions programs administered by OFAC.
Links:
February 12, 2016: HMT renews TAFA Final Designation for EUZKADI TA ASKATASUNA
On Friday, Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) renewed a Final Designation made under the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act of 2010 for another year:
EUZKADI TA ASKATASUNA
a.k.a: (1) Basque Fatherland and Liberty(2) ETA
Other Information: UK listing only Group ID: 7083.
Link:
JCPOA Implementation Day Guidance: Section VI (Waivers)
And this is how it's all going to get done – and to enable the “snap-back” if Iran breaks its side of the deal:
VI. Waivers
Commitment:
Pursuant to the U.S. commitment in section 11 of Annex V of the JCPOA, on Adoption Day, the
Secretary of State issued waiver determinations and made findings with respect to certain
statutory sanctions provisions set out in section 4 of Annex II of the JCPOA.87 By their terms,
these waivers and findings were contingent in nature; they only took effect upon confirmation by
the Secretary of State that Iran had implemented the nuclear-related measures specified in
sections 15.1 to 15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA, as verified by the IAEA (i.e., upon
Implementation Day).88
These waivers and findings, effective on January 16, 2016, waive the imposition of sanctions
under specified provisions of NDAA 2012 and IFCA and find it is vital to the national security
interests of the United States to issue waivers regarding the application of sanctions under
specified provisions of ISA and the TRA, all with respect to certain transactions and activities by
non-U.S. persons89 involving Iran, as set forth in section 4 of Annex II of the JCPOA and
described in section II above. In addition, the waiver determination under sections 1244(c)(1)
and 1246(a) of IFCA waives the imposition of sanctions with respect to transactions by U.S.
persons for the export, reexport, sale, lease, or transfer of commercial passenger aircraft and
related parts and services to Iran exclusively for commercial passenger aviation as set forth in
section 5.1.1 of the JCPOA, provided that OFAC has issued any required licenses.
Implementation:
To implement the U.S. commitments with respect to sanctions described in sections 17.1 to 17.3
and 17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA, effective Implementation Day, the USG is waiving the
(i) sanctions under IFCA and NDAA 2012 and (ii) application of sanctions under TRA and ISA,
to the extent necessary to implement the JCPOA and excluding any transactions involving
persons on OFAC’s SDN List:
A. IFCA
1. Section 1244(c)(1) – to the extent required for transactions by non-U.S. persons (and, in
the case of commercial passenger aviation activities described in section IV.A above, U.S.
persons, provided that OFAC has issued any required licenses) on behalf of, or for the
benefit of: (i) a person determined to be part of the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran, (ii) a person determined to operate a port in Iran; or (iii) Iranian
individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II of the JCPOA;902. Section 1244(d) – to the extent required for transactions by non-U.S. persons for the sale,
supply, or transfer to or from Iran of goods or services used in connection with the 91
energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran, including NIOC, NITC, and IRISL;
3. Section 1244(h)(2) – to the extent required for FFIs to conduct or facilitate transactions
for the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of natural gas;
4. Section 1245(a)(1)(A) – to the extent required for transactions by non-U.S. persons for
the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of precious metals;
5. Section 1245(a)(1)(B)– to the extent required for transactions by non-U.S. persons for the
sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of materials described in section 1245(d) of IFCA
(graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for
integrating industrial processes) determined to be (i) used by Iran as a medium for barter
swap, or any other exchange or transaction or (ii) listed as assets of the Government of
Iran for purposes of the national balance sheet of Iran;92
6. Section 1245(a)(1)(C) – to the extent required for transactions by non-U.S. persons for
the sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of materials described in section 1245(d) of
IFCA (graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and
software for integrating industrial processes) if the material is (i) to be used in connection
with the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran, or resold, retransferred, or
otherwise supplied to an end user in one or more such sectors; (ii) sold, supplied, or
transferred to any individual or entity blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13599, or resold,
retransferred, or otherwise supplied to such an individual or entity; or (iii) determined
pursuant to section 1245(e)(3) of IFCA to be used as described in that section, or resold,
retransferred, or otherwise supplied for use in the nuclear program of Iran, provided that
the transactions do not involve:
(a) the sale, supply, or transfer of materials described in section 1245(d) that have
not been approved by the procurement channel established pursuant to paragraph 16 of UNSCR 2231 and section 6 of Annex IV of the JCPOA, in cases in which
the procurement channel applies; or
(b) the sale, supply, or transfer of materials described in section 1245(d) if the
material is sold, supplied, or transferred, or resold, retransferred, or otherwise
supplied directly or indirectly, for use in connection with the military or ballistic
missile program of Iran;93
7. Section 1245(c) – to the extent required for FFIs to conduct or facilitate transactions that
are within the scope of the waivers under section 1245(a)(1) of IFCA, as described in
sections VI.A.4-VI.A.6 above;
8. Sections 1246(a)(1)(A) – to the extent required for non-U.S. persons to provide
underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance in connection with activities involving
Iran that are within the scope of the JCPOA (as described in sections 17.1 to 17.2 and
17.5 of Annex V of the JCPOA);
9. Section 1246(a)(1)(B)(i) – to the extent required for non-U.S. persons to provide
underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance with respect to, or for the benefit of,
any activity in the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors of Iran for which sanctions
are imposed under IFCA;
10. Section 1246(a)(1)(B)(ii) – to the extent required for non-U.S. persons to provide
underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance for transactions that are within the
scope of the waivers under section 1245(a)(1)(B) and (C) of IFCA as described in
paragraphs VI.A.5-VI.A.6 above;
11. Section 1246(a)(1)(C) – to the extent required for non-U.S. persons to provide
underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance with respect to or for any Iranian
person whose property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to E.O.
13599 and section 560.211 of the ITSR, including Iranian individuals and entities set
forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II of the JCPOA;
12. Section 1246(a) – to the extent required for U.S. persons to provide underwriting services
or insurance or reinsurance in connection with commercial passenger aviation activities
described in section IV.A above, provided that OFAC has issued any required licenses;
and
13. Section 1247(a) – to the extent required for FFIs to facilitate transactions on behalf of
Iranian individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to Annex II of the JCPOA;
B. NDAA 2012
1. Section 1245(d)(1) – to the extent necessary to implement the JCPOA, including for FFIs
to conduct or facilitate transactions with the CBI covered by the U.S. commitments with
respect to sanctions described in sections 17.1 to 17.2 of Annex V of the JCPOA;94
C. TRA
1. Section 212(a) – to the extent required for transactions by non-U.S. persons95 for the
provision of underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance for NIOC, NITC, or a
successor entity to either company, in cases where the transactions are for activities
described in sections 4.2.1, 4.3, and 4.4 of Annex II of the JCPOA;
2. Section 213(a) – to the extent required for transactions by non-U.S. persons for the
purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of sovereign debt of the
Government of Iran or debt or equity of an entity owned or controlled by the Government
of Iran, in cases where the transactions are for activities described in section 4.1.5 and
4.1.7 of Annex II of the JCPOA; and
D. ISA
1. ISA section 5(a) – to the extent required for transactions by non-U.S. persons related to:
(i) the development of petroleum resources of Iran; (ii) the production of refined
petroleum products in Iran; (iii) the exportation of refined petroleum products to Iran;
(iv) joint ventures with Iran relating to the development of petroleum resources outside of
Iran; (v) support for the development of petroleum resources and refined petroleum
products in Iran; (vi) the development and purchase of petrochemical products from Iran;
(vii) the transportation of crude oil from Iran; or (viii) the ownership, operation, or
control of a vessel used in a manner that conceals the Iranian origin of crude oil or
refined petroleum products transported on the vessel, in cases where the transactions are
for activities described in sections 4.2.1, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.4, and 4.3.6 of Annex II of the
JCPOA.
February 11-12: UN, OSFI, DFAT update Salah Eddine Gasmi terror listing
Late last week, Canadian and Australian regulators implemented the following change, based on action taken by the UN ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee:
QDi.251 Name: 1: SALAH EDDINE 2: GASMI 3: na 4: na
Name (original script): Ø³Ø§Ù„Ø Ù‚Ø§Ø³Ù…ÙŠ
Title: na Designation: na DOB: 13 Apr. 1971 POB: Zeribet El Oued, Wilaya (province) of Biskra, Algeria Good quality a.k.a.: Abou Mohamed Salah Low quality a.k.a.: Bounouadher Nationality: Algerian Passport no.: na National identification no.: na Address: Algeria Listed on: 3 Jul. 2008 (amended on 24 Mar. 2009, 15 Nov. 2012, 14 Mar. 2013, 11 February 2016) Other information: Belongs to the leadership and is in charge of information committee of the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014). Mother’s name is Yamina Soltane. Father’s name is Abdelaziz. Associated with Abdelmalek Droukdel (QDi.232). Arrested in Algeria on 16 Dec. 2012. Incarcerated at the El-Harrach prison in Algiers, as of August 2015.
Links:
February 11, 2016: 3 ISIL members added to OFAC SDN LIst
Yesterday, OFAC added the following 3 individuals linked to ISIL/ISIS/Da’esh:
AL-BINALI, Turki Mubarak Abdullah Ahmad (a.k.a. AL BINALI, Turki Mubarak Abdullah; a.k.a. AL-BENALI, Turki; a.k.a. AL-BIN’ALI, Turki; a.k.a. AL-BIN’ALI, Turki Mubarak; a.k.a. “ABU DERGHAM”; a.k.a. “AL-ATHARI, Abu Human”; a.k.a. “AL-ATHARI, Abu Human Bakr ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz”; a.k.a. “AL-ATHARI, Abu-Bakr”; a.k.a. “AL-BAHRAYNI, Abu Hudhayfa”; a.k.a. “AL-MUDARI, Abu Khuzayma”; a.k.a. “AL-SALAFI, Abu Hazm”; a.k.a. “AL-SULAMI, Abu Sufyan”); DOB 03 Sep 1984; POB Al Muharraq, Bahrain; nationality Bahrain; Passport 2231616 (Bahrain) issued 02 Jan 2013 expires 02 Jan 2023; alt. Passport 1272611(Bahrain) issued 01 Apr 2003; Identification Number 840901356 (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT).AL-ZAHRANI, Faysal Ahmad ‘Ali (a.k.a. AL ZAHRANI, Faysal Ahmad Bin Ali; a.k.a. ALZAHRANI, Faisal Ahmed Ali; a.k.a. “AL-JAZRAWI, Abu-Sara”; a.k.a. “AL-SAUDI, Abu Sarah”; a.k.a. “AL-ZAHRANI, Abu-Sarah”; a.k.a. “ZAHRANI, Abu Sara”); DOB 19 Jan 1986; alt. DOB 18 Jan 1986; nationality Saudi Arabia; Passport K142736 (Saudi Arabia) issued 14 Jul 2011; alt. Passport G579315 (Saudi Arabia) (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT).JUAYTHINI, Husayn (a.k.a. ALJEITHNI, Hussein Mohammed Hussein; a.k.a. AL-JU’AITNI, Abu Mu’ath; a.k.a. AL-JU’AYTHINI, Husayn Muhamad Husayn; a.k.a. AL-JU’AYTHINI, Husayn Muhammad; a.k.a. AL-JU’AYTHINI, Husayn Muhammad Husayn; a.k.a. JU’AYTHINI, Husayn Muhammad Husayn); DOB 03 May 1977; POB Al-Nusayirat refugee camp, Gaza; Passport 0363464 (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT).
to the SDN List under the anti-terrorism sanctions program.
Link: