One way or another, you will hear about the latest FATF advisories in Canada

Both FINTRAC and OSFI posted copies of the latest FATF pronouncements about deficient jurisdictions (OSFI links to FINTRAC's advisory). Here's the meat of the advisory – kind of lengthy, but that's because there are a significant number of short sections:

Financial transactions related to countries identified by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

In order to protect the international financial system from money laundering and terrorist financing risks, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) issued two statements on October 23, 2015.

Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

In its October 23, 2015 public statement, FATF reaffirmed its particular and exceptional concerns about Iran’s failure to address the risk of terrorist financing and the serious threat this poses to the integrity of the international financial system. FATF also reaffirmed its concerns about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) failure to address the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combatting the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the serious threat this poses to the integrity of the international financial system. FATF reaffirmed the call on its members to apply effective preventive measures to protect their financial sectors from such risks.

Accordingly, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) is reiterating to all reporting entities subject to the requirements of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA) the risks of doing business with individuals and entities based in, or connected to, Iran and the DPRK.

FINTRAC is advising that reporting entities should consider the above when deciding whether to file a suspicious transaction report in respect of financial transactions or attempted financial transactions emanating from, or destined to, Iran or the DPRK. Reporting entities are also encouraged to undertake enhanced customer due diligence with respect to clients and beneficiaries involved in such financial transactions or attempted financial transactions.

Jurisdictions representing a risk arising from deficiencies

In its October 23, 2015 public statement, FATF calls on its members to consider the risks arising from the strategic AML/CFT deficiencies associated with the following jurisdiction that has not made sufficient progress in addressing the deficiencies: Burma (Myanmar).

FINTRAC is advising that reporting entities should consider giving special attention to financial transactions or attempted financial transactions related to Burma (Myanmar).

Other jurisdictions

In its October 23, 2015 compliance document, FATF brought to the attention of its members several jurisdictions that have strategic AML/CFT deficiencies. The following jurisdictions have developed an action plan with FATF to address identified deficiencies and demonstrated some progress with the execution of their plans: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guyana, Iraq, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Syria, Uganda and Yemen.

FATF is not yet satisfied that Lao PDR has made sufficient progress on its action plan agreed upon with FATF. If this jurisdiction does not take sufficient action to implement significant components of its action plan by February 2016, then FATF will identify Lao PDR as being out of compliance with its agreed action plan and will take the additional step of calling upon its members to consider the risks arising from the deficiencies associated with Lao PDR.

Ecuador and Sudan no longer subject to FATF monitoring process

FATF welcomed the significant progress of Ecuador and Sudan in improving their AML/CFT regimes. The jurisdictions have met their commitments in their action plans regarding the strategic deficiencies that FATF had identified. Ecuador and Sudan are therefore no longer subject to FATF’s monitoring process.

The FATF October 23, 2015 statements can be found at the following website: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/

Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) public statement

Reporting entities should take note that, on November 26, 2015, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), under a process that is separate and distinct from the FATF monitoring process, issued for the first time a public statement regarding the strategic AML/CFT deficiencies of Suriname.

Suriname has not made sufficient progress in addressing their significant AML/CFT deficiencies, including making certain legislative reforms. If specific steps have not been made by May 2016, then CFATF will identify Suriname as not taking sufficient steps to address its AML/CFT deficiencies. CFATF members will then be called upon to consider implementing counter measures to protect their financial systems from the ongoing money laundering and terrorist financing risks emanating from Suriname. Further, CFATF will consider referring Suriname to the FATF International Cooperation Review Group (ICRG).

FATF action on the terrorist group Islamic State Footnote 1

FINTRAC would like to reiterate the preceding statements issued by FATF, expressing its deep concern with the financing generated by, and provided to, the terrorist group the Islamic State (IS).

On September 22, 2014, the Government of Canada updated the Criminal Code list of terrorist entities to include the IS, which was previously listed as Al Qaeda in Iraq.

Accordingly, FINTRAC is reminding all reporting entities subject to the requirements of the PCMLTFA, of their obligations

Footnote

2 to submit a terrorist property report if:

    • they know of the existence of property in their possession or control that is owned or controlled by or on behalf of a terrorist or terrorist group; and
    • they have information about a transaction or proposed transaction in respect of property referred to above.

In this context, property includes any type of real or personal property. This also includes any deed or instrument giving title or right to property, or giving right to money or goods. A terrorist property report includes information about the property as well as any transaction or proposed transaction relating to that property.

FINTRAC is advising that reporting entities should consider the above when deciding whether to file a suspicious transaction report in respect of financial transactions or attempted financial transactions emanating from, or destined to, the jurisdictions under IS control and the surrounding jurisdictions. Reporting entities are also encouraged to undertake enhanced customer due diligence with respect to clients and beneficiaries involved in such financial transactions or attempted financial transactions.

On October 23, 2015, FATF also noted that terrorists financing remains a top priority given the terrorist threats posed most notably by IS and foreign terrorist fighters.

Links:

OSFI Notice

FINTRAC Notice

 

FINTRAC fines Countrywide Generations Realty $11,400 for AML failures

Here's the short, but sweet, press release:

FINTRAC imposes an administrative monetary penalty on Countrywide Generations Realty Ltd., in Pickering, Ontario

September 11, 2015 – Ottawa, ON – Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada

Countrywide Generations Realty Ltd., a real estate broker in Pickering, Ontario, was imposed an administrative monetary penalty of $11,440 on July 3, 2015, for violating the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA) and the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations (PCMLTFR).

Countrywide Generations Realty Ltd. was found to have the following deficiencies:

    • Incomplete written compliance policies and procedures;
    • Failure to assess and document the risks related to money laundering and terrorist financing;
    • Failure to develop and maintain a written ongoing compliance training program for employees/agents;
    • Incomplete record keeping in respect of client information records;
    • Failure to ascertain client identity for every person for whom a client information record is required; and
    • Failure to take reasonable measures to determine whether the client is acting on behalf of a third party.

Link:

FINTRAC Notice

 

Canada proposes changes to PCMLTFR

The Canadian government has proposed a number of amendments to the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations. They have published the proposed amendments and a regulatory impact statement in the Canada Gazette and have invited comment. All the items out for consultation are listed on Finance Canada's “Consulting with Canadians” page.

Here are the amendments, handily summarized in the Canada Gazette:

The following suite of regulatory amendments is proposed as part of the Government of Canada’s efforts to strengthen Canada’s anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing regime.

The proposed amendments to the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations would update due diligence requirements regarding customers when dealing with politically exposed persons.

    • An amendment would prescribe the circumstances under which a reporting entity must make a determination that a client is a domestic politically exposed person or the head of an international organization, or a close associate or family member of such a person, and the measures to be taken as a result (such as obtaining information on sources of funds and requiring senior management approval to keep an account open). The prescribed circumstances include account openings and, where no account exists, very large specified transactions that are deemed to be of higher potential risk, such as lump-sum payments of $100,000 or more for the purchase of life insurance policies or annuities. The Regulations currently contain requirements with respect to politically exposed foreign persons.
    • An amendment would require reporting entities to periodically determine whether existing account holders are politically exposed foreign persons, where such a determination has not already been made. This amendment will align with the design of the new measures for politically exposed domestic persons and heads of international organizations.
    • An amendment would extend the time within which a reporting entity must make a determination that a client is a politically exposed foreign person from 14 days to 30 days. This amendment will align with the design of the new measures for politically exposed domestic persons and heads of international organizations.

The proposed amendments to the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations would clarify the type of customer information that reporting entities must obtain and keep as part of the due diligence process regarding customers.

    • An amendment would clarify the records that must be kept with respect to a client’s credit file (i.e. a file related to a lending product). The existing wording in the Regulations could be interpreted narrowly. The Regulations currently define the term “client credit file” as containing specific types of information, some of which may not be applicable to certain types of credit arrangements. In the past, this has led to some reporting entities interpreting that in cases where only certain information listed in the definition of a “credit file” is available (i.e. the file is incomplete), there is no obligation to maintain any of the information nor provide it to FINTRAC in an examination. The amendment is needed to ensure there is a positive obligation for reporting entities to collect specific information that must be included in a credit file, information which would have to be provided to FINTRAC if asked in a compliance examination. Specifically, the amendment would repeal the defined term “client credit file” and instead list the relevant types of information that must be maintained, when they are relevant to the client credit arrangement under consideration.
    • An amendment would update the existing list of methods that reporting entities must use to verify the identity of their clients. The new methods would be more flexible and allow for a broader range of reliable and independent sources to be used. In particular, the amendment would identify the specific types of sources that are deemed reliable enough to be used on a standalone basis (e.g. government-issued photo identification documents), and broadly allow other types of sources that are reliable and independent to be referred to on a dual-method basis (i.e. in combination). Since the latter category is not prescriptive, it will provide flexibility for reporting entities to consider various sources that are not currently accepted (e.g. a Notice of Assessment issued by the Canada Revenue Agency). FINTRAC would provide guidance on the methods that could be considered under these new provisions.
    • An amendment would expand the definition of a signature to more broadly include electronic signatures, which would facilitate account openings in a non-face-to-face environment.

The proposed amendments to the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations would limit the duplication of identity verification efforts.

    • An amendment would extend the existing exemption from ascertaining the identity of a client where the client is recognized by voice (e.g. telephone) or sight (e.g. in person or through video conferencing) to more broadly capture other forms of recognition (such as digitally, where a client logs in online).
    • An amendment would clarify that a reporting entity that relies on an agent (e.g. deposit broker) to verify client identity on its behalf could use identification measures that were previously undertaken by that agent on behalf of another reporting entity or itself with respect to the same client. This would only apply where the client’s identity was ascertained in accordance with the requirements of the Regulations and the identification document remains unexpired and valid.

The proposed amendments to the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations would close gaps in Canada’s anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing regime.

    • Paragraph 71(c) of the Regulations lists the elements that should be considered in a reporting entity’s risk assessment. An amendment would add an element to this list that requires reporting entities to assess and document the risks posed by the impacts of new developments and technologies on the existing risk assessment criteria (business relationships, products, delivery channels or geographic locations). This would ensure Canada’s anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing regime is consistent with the Financial Action Task Force’s Recommendation 15 on the risks of new technologies. (see footnote 2)
    • An amendment would clarify reporting obligations to improve the financial intelligence that FINTRAC receives. In particular, it would repeal exemptions regarding reporting cash transactions of $10,000 or more in the life insurance sector for product purchases where the source of funds is not easily identifiable.

The proposed amendments to the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations and the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Administrative Monetary Penalties Regulations would improve compliance, monitoring and enforcement efforts.

    • An amendment would require reporting entities to keep a record of any “reasonable measures” they have taken (as required under the Regulations) in cases where they were unable to ascertain, establish or determine the information specified.
    • Since 2008, FINTRAC can impose administrative monetary penalties (AMPs) when reporting entities fail to comply with their obligations. An amendment would update the existing list of provisions for which FINTRAC can issue an AMP to ensure that new or modified requirements that were passed through the Economic Action Plan 2014 Act, No. 1, and other requirements that came into force in February 2014, have a corresponding AMP related to them. For example, reporting entities have traditionally been prohibited from entering into a correspondent banking relationship with a shell bank, but this prohibition was expanded in the Economic Action Plan 2014 Act, No. 1 to more comprehensively prohibit them from “having” such a relationship. Since the existent AMP description reflects the former prohibition, it is being updated to more accurately reflect the revised prohibition.

The proposed amendments to the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations would strengthen information sharing in the regime. They would

    • repeal any identifying information of reporting entity employees from the reporting form schedules;
    • require reporting entities in a financial conglomerate to take into consideration the risks resulting from the activities of their affiliates as part of their compliance programs; and
    • expand the designated information that FINTRAC can disclose to disclosure recipients, once relevant thresholds are met, to include information about references that were used to ascertain the identity of an individual (such as type of source, a reference number, place of issue and expiry date of relevant documents). FINTRAC’s disclosure recipients include law enforcement, intelligence, and foreign bodies.

A proposed amendment to the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations would clarify that, where a securities dealer is a reporting entity under the Act, any brokers employed by that securities dealer would not be considered reporting entities in their own right. Therefore, although the brokers would be required to abide by the compliance program of their securities dealer employer, they would not be required to maintain their own compliance program.

In addition, various amendments to the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations and the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Suspicious Transaction Reporting Regulations would address technical issues that have been identified through regime reviews and stakeholder comments. The following are examples of these amendments:

    • an amendment would ensure the existing definition of “casino” is updated to align with a legislative amendment in the Economic Action Plan 2014 Act, No. 1 that clarified the types of entities that are subject to the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act when they conduct and manage a lottery scheme or game;
    • an amendment would update the circumstances under which an entity is considered to be affiliated with another entity to align with a similar legislative amendment that was made in the Economic Action Plan Act 2014 Act, No. 1;
    • an amendment would replace the existing French term for money services business with an updated term (i.e. “entreprise de transfert de fonds ou de vente de titres négociables” with “entreprise de services monétaires”). The existing term creates confusion as it is not commonly used by stakeholders and it fails to encompass foreign currency exchange and virtual currency dealing;
    • an amendment would correct an inaccurate reference to the title of a Quebec law in the “Financial services cooperative” definition;
    • an amendment would update the definition of “public body” to correct a discrepancy between the English and French versions and provide greater certainty, for the purposes of the Act, that cities, towns and other municipal districts are only included in the definition of “public body” when they are located in Canada;
    • an amendment would update the provision dealing with foreign currency conversion to ensure it is done “using” an exchange rate rather than “based” on an exchange rate, to ensure no other factors are being considered when converting currency; and
    • an amendment would update the definition of “funds” to better align the concept of entitlement as referenced under the Civil Code.

The rest of the regulatory impact statement is really fascinating reading. For one, it estimates the rough costs of these changes on businesses (around $700K or so) – apparently, there is an exemption for small businesses (call the “small business lens”, which Mr. Watchlist will now research) that actually will not apply here. It notes where the compliance burden will actually decrease, lays out some of the history behind these changes, as well as the rationale behind making them.

Links:

Finance Canada “Consulting with Canadians”

Proposed amendments and regulatory impact statement (Canada Gazette)

 

July 3, 2015: FINTRAC fines Coin Co International for AML failures

From the press release:

FINTRAC imposes an administrative monetary penalty on Coin Co International PLC, also operating as Coinco International PLC, in Burgess Hill, West Sussex, United Kingdom

July 3, 2015 – Ottawa, ON – Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada

Coin Co International PLC, also operating as Coinco International PLC, a money services business in Burgess Hill, West Sussex, United Kingdom, was imposed an administrative monetary penalty of $149,200 on July 21, 2014, for violating the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA), the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations (PCMLTFR) and the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Registration Regulations (Registration Regulations).

Coin Co International PLC was found to have the following deficiencies:

    • Failure to report a large cash transaction within 15 days after the transaction;
    • Failure to report large cash transactions, together with the prescribed information;
    • Failure to assess and document the risks related to money laundering and terrorist financing;
    • Failure to institute and document the prescribed review;
    • Failure to ascertain client identity for foreign exchange transactions of $3,000 or more; and
    • Failure to submit a notification of a change to its money services business registration.
Quick Facts
    • A number of business sectors in Canada are required, under the PCMLTFA, to keep certain records, identify clients, maintain a compliance regime, and report financial transactions to FINTRAC.
    • Sectors covered under the legislation include accountants, British Columbia notaries, casinos, dealers in precious metals and stones, financial entities, life insurance, money services businesses, real estate, and securities dealers.
    • Administrative monetary penalties are issued to encourage change in the non-compliant behaviour of reporting entities.
Quote

“Canada’s anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing regime is dependent on the dedicated efforts of Canada’s businesses on the front lines of the legitimate economy. Our compliance efforts are meant to ensure they fulfill their legal obligations and send us the information that we need to produce actionable financial intelligence for our law enforcement and national security partners.”

Gérald Cossette

Director, Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada

    Associated Links

    This is FINTRAC's second civil monetary policy this year.

    Link:

    FINTRAC Notice

     

    March 26, 2015: FINTRAC issues advisory for FATF-identified countries

    On March 26th, OSFI notified the public about an advisory issued by FINTRAC regarding dealings with countries with identified AML deficiencies. The notice summarized the measures firms are required to undertake regarding dealings with Iran and North Korea under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA):

    • Continue to classify clients, banks and other financial institutions based in, or connected to Iran or the DPRK as high risk (including branches and subsidiaries of such entities based in countries outside Iran or the DPRK);
    • Continue to apply enhanced customer due diligence measures with respect to such clients and entities; and
    • Continue to take the FATF’s concerns into account when monitoring financial transactions emanating from, or destined to Iran or the DPRK.

    In addition, FINTRAC stated that they “expected” firms to take identified AML deficiencies into account when dealing with the following countries:

    • Algeria
    • Myanmar
    • Ecuador
    • Afghanistan
    • Angola
    • Guyana
    • Indonesia
    • Iraq, Lao PDR
    • Panama
    • Papua New Guinea
    • Sudan
    • Syria
    • Uganda
    • Yemen
    • Bosnia and Herzegovina (identified by MONEYVAL, not FATF)

    Link:

    OSFI Notice

    FINTRAC Advisory

     

    FINTRAC release AML typologies for Mass Marketing Fraud

    FINTRAC, the Canadian FIU (Financial Intelligence Unit), has released a report on the money laundering methods used in mass marketing fraud. The highlights section:

      • Mass marketing fraud is a crime that results in substantial losses to individuals in Canada and in many other countries. FINTRAC's data indicates that certain categories of mass marketing fraud also results in substantial losses for businesses;
      • Most mass marketing fraud observed by FINTRAC is based in Ontario and Quebec. The analysis also revealed that in nearly all cases, the mass marketing fraud operated primarily from an urban area. These observations are consistent with the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre's statistics which indicates that Ontario, and primarily the Greater Toronto Area, is the most important area of mass marketing fraud operations in Canada. FINTRAC's data indicates that United States residents are a significant target of mass marketing fraud operations based in Canada;
      • Mass marketing fraud operations make considerable use of businesses to launder illicit proceeds. Businesses are involved in nearly all cases where suspected mass marketing fraud perpetrators show a minimum degree of sophistication;
      • Businesses in the automotive sector, one of the main sectors suspected to be used to launder the proceeds of mass marketing fraud, have used trade-based money laundering techniques to launder funds. It has also been observed that considerable use appears to be made of money services businesses, not only to receive funds from victims, but to launder mass marketing fraud proceeds.

    When FIUs produce these (FinCEN does, too), they are very useful in keeping on top of current trends in financial frauds and crimes, and the methods for attempting to hide them from financial firms and regulators.

    Link:

    FINTRAC Mass Marketing Fraud: Money Laundering Methods and Techniques – HTML, PDF

     

    April 9, 2014: FINTRAC publishes SEMA expansion

    On Wednesday, the Canadian regulator formally announced the enactment of the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA) regulations against Ukraine and Russia. The regulations were actually both enacted on March 17th and each since amended at least once (Russia sanctions twice), but this is the first formal announcement.

    Links:

    FINTRAC Notice

    SEMA (Russia) Regulations

    SEMA (Ukraine) Regulations