SECO lifts FRY sanctions

Swiss regulators announced today that, as of tomorrow (April 1, 2015), the sanctions on individuals from the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) will be lifted. There were only 13 persons left on that list since it was last revised in 2001.

Google Translate provides the following for the SECO announcement:

Bern, 24.03.2015 – The Federal Council repealed on March 6, 2015, the Regulation on measures against certain persons from the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These included since the end of 2001, only more financial sanctions against 13 individuals, including former President Slobodan Milosevic. The repealing Regulation shall enter into force on 1 April 2015.

Currently, there are no longer any reason to continue the financial sanctions against certain persons from the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The EU has the remaining sanctions against Slobodan Milosevic and his entourage people end October 2014 also canceled.

The Federal Council decided Regulation of 23 June 1999 on measures against certain persons be-from the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in response to the Kosovo crisis and in line with the sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU). The Regulation originally covered deep trade and financial restrictions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. As a result of political development and in compliance with the sanctions imposed by the EU Regulation or its annexes have been adapted several times. Since late 2001, the Regulation provides only before the blocking of funds and the payment of 13 individuals. These are former President Slobodan Milosevic, his family and his closest people environment. The State Secretariat for Economic Affairs SECO have been reported not blocked assets of these persons.

Links:

FINMA Notice

SECO Announcement

 

All together now: Expanded DFAT sanctions on Russia, Crimea, Sevastopol start

Expanded Australian sanctions were initially announced on September 1st of last year, but weren't in force until today. They include the following restricted activities:

    • the export to and import from Russia of arms and related materiel;
    • the export to Russia of specified items for use in petroleum exploration and production;
    • the export to Crimea and Sevastopol of specified items for use in the energy and minerals sector;
    • commercial dealing with certain capital financial market instruments issued by certain Russian state-owned entities; and
    • Australian investment in Crimea and Sevastopol related to infrastructure, transport, telecommunications, energy, oil, gas and minerals sectors.

For individuals and firms with existing legal obligations that run afoul of the restrictions, they can apply for authorization on the Online Sanctions Administration System (OSAS).

DFAT has also released the public consultation report on these expanded sanctions.

As for the title of the post, the notice states that the expanded sanctions “closely match” those of the EU, US and Canada. Makes the boat go faster when all the oars all pull the same direction at the same speed..

Links:

DFAT Sanctions: Crimea and Sevastopol, Russia, Ukraine

Online Sanctions Administration System

Public Consultation Report

 

March 18, 2015: SECO adds to Syrian sanctions listings

On March 18th, Swiss regulators added the following seven individuals:

SSID: 200-30613 Name: Bayan Bitar

Good quality a.k.a.: Dr Bayan Al-Bitar Address: P.O.Box 11037, Damascus, Syrian Arab
Republic
Nationality: Syrian Arab Republic

Justification: a) Managing Director of the Organisation for Technological Industries (OTI),
and the Syrian Company for Information Technology (SCIT), which are both subsidiaries of
the Syrian Ministry of Defence, which has been designated.
b) OTI assists in the production
of chemical weapons for the Syrian regime.
Relation: a) Managing Director of the
Organisation for Technological Industries (OTI) (SSID 200-30694)
b) Managing Director of
the Syrian Company for Information Technology (SCIT) (SSID 200-30703)
Other
information:
As Managing Director of OTI and the SCIT Bayan Bitar provides support to the
Syrian regime. Due to his role in the production of chemical weapons, he also shares
responsibility for the violent repression against the Syrian population. In view of his senior
position in these entities, he is also associated with the designated entities OTI and SCIT.
Modifications: Listed on 18 Mar 2015

SSID: 200-30620 Name: Ghassan Abbas

Title: Brigadier General Address: a) CERS, Centre d’Etude et de Recherche Scientifique,
Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic
b) SSRC, Scientific Studies and Research Center; Centre
de Recherche de Kaboun Barzeh Street, P.O.Box 4470, Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic
Justification: a) Manager of the branch of the designated Syrian Scientific Studies and
Research Centre (SSRC/CERS) near Jumraya/Jmraiya.
b) He has been involved in the
proliferation of chemical weapons and the organisation of chemical weapons attacks,
including in Ghouta in Aug 2013. He therefore shares responsibility for the violent repression
against the Syrian population.
c) As manager of the SSRC/CERS branch near
Jumraya/Jmraiya, Ghassan Abbas provides support to the Syrian regime.
d) As a result of
his senior position in the SSRC, he is also associated with the designated entity SSRC.
Relation: Manager of the Centre d’études et de recherches syrien (CERS) (SSID 200-
12445)
Modifications: Listed on 18 Mar 2015

SSID: 200-30629 Name: Wael Abdulkarim

Good quality a.k.a.: Wael Al Karim Address: a) Pangates International Corp Ltd, Sharjah
Airport International Free Zone, United Arab Emirates
b) Al Karim for Trade and Industry,
P.O.Box 111, Damascus, 5797, Syrian Arab Republic
c) Morgan Additives, Office No 2206,
22nd Floor, Jafza View 19, Besides Jafza View 18, Sheikh Zayed Road, Jebel Ali Free Zone
Authority, United Arab Emirates

Justification: a) Managing Director of the designated entity Pangates International Corp
Ltd, which acts as an intermediary in the supply of oil to the Syrian regime.
b) As Managing
Director of Pangates, Wael Abdulkarim provides support to, and benefits from, the Syrian
regime. He also holds a senior position in the designated entity Al Karim Group, which is
Pangates’ parent company.
c) As a result of his senior positions in Pangates and Al Karim
Group, he is also associated with these designated entities.
Relation: Managing Director of
Pangates International Corp Ltd (SSID 200-29924)
Modifications: Listed on 18 Mar 2015

SSID: 200-30640 Name: Ahmad Barqawi

Good quality a.k.a.: Ahmed Barqawi Address: a) Pangates International Corp Ltd, Sharjah
Airport International Free Zone, United Arab Emirates
b) Al Karim for Trade and Industry,
P.O.Box 111, Damascus, 5797, Syrian Arab Republic
c) Morgan Additives, Office No 2206,
22nd Floor, Jafza View 19, Besides Jafza View 18, Sheikh Zayed Road, Jebel Ali Free Zone
Authority, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Justification: a) General Manager of Pangates International Corp Ltd, which acts as an
intermediary in the supply of oil to the Syrian regime, and manager of Al Karim Group. Both
Pangates International and Al Karim Group have been designated.
b) As General Manager
of Pangates and a manager of Pangates’ parent company, Al Karim Group, Ahmad Barqawi
provides support to, and benefits from the Syrian regime. Given his senior position in
Pangates and Al Karim Group, he is also associated with the designated entities Pangates
International and Al Karim Group.
Relation: a) General Manager of Pangates International
Corp Ltd (SSID 200-29924)
b) Manager of Abdulkarim Group (SSID 200-29931)
Modifications: Listed on 18 Mar 2015

SSID: 200-30651 Name: George Haswani

Good quality a.k.a.: a) Heswani b) Hasawani c) Al Hasawani Address: Al Jalaa St,
Yabroud, Damascus Province, Syrian Arab Republic

Justification: a) Prominent Syrian businessman, co-owner of HESCO Engineering and
Construction Company, a major engineering and construction company in Syria. He has
close ties to the Syrian regime.
b) George Haswani provides support and benefits from the
regime through his role as a middleman in deals for the purchase of oil from ISIL by the
Syrian regime.
c) He also benefits from the regime through favourable treatment including
the award of a contract (as a subcontractor) with Stroytransgaz, a major Russian oil
company.
Modifications: Listed on 18 Mar 2015

SSID: 200-30662 Name: Emad Hamsho

Good quality a.k.a.: a) Imad b) Hmisho c) Hamchu d) Hamcho e) Hamisho f) Hmeisho g)
Hemasho Address: Hamsho Building, 31 Baghdad Street, Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic
Justification: a) Occupies a senior management position in Hamsho Trading. b) As a result
of his senior position in Hamsho Trading, a subsidiary of Hamsho International, which has
been designated, he provides support to the Syrian regime. He is also associated with a
designated entity, Hamsho International.
c) Emad Hamsho funds Shabiha militias who in
turn collect steel from the areas destroyed by the Syrian regime armed forces and militias
and melt it down in local Syria Steel (Hmisho Steel) factories. He is also vice-president of the
Syrian Council of Iron and Steel alongside designated regime businessmen such as Ayman
Jaber. He is also an associate of Bashar Al-Assad.
Relation: Associated with Hamcho
International (SSID 200-12352)
Modifications: Listed on 18 Mar 2015

SSID: 200-30676 Name: Samir Hamsho

Good quality a.k.a.: a) Samer b) Sameer c) Hmisho d) Hamchu e) Hamcho f) Hamisho g)
Hmeisho h) Hemasho Address: Hamsho Building, 31 Baghdad Street, Damascus, Syrian
Arab Republic

Justification: a) Samir Hamsho is a prominent Syrian businessman benefiting from and
supporting the regime. He is the owner and chairman of Al Buroj and Syria Steel/Hmisho
Steel, subsidiaries of Hamsho Trading, a subsidiary of Hamsho International, which has
been designated.
b) Appointed to the Homs Chamber of Commerce in Mar 2014 by the
Minister of Industry. Therefore, he provides support to the Syrian regime and benefits from
his connections with the regime.
c) He is also associated with the designated entities
Hamsho International, Syria Steel SA and Al Buroj Trading.
Relation: a) Associated with
Hamcho International (SSID 200-12352)
b) Owner and Chairman of Al Buroj Trading (SSID
200-30729)
c) Owner and Chairman of Syria Steel SA (SSID 200-30719) Modifications:
Listed on 18 Mar 2015

and six entities to their Consolidated List under the Syrian sanctions program:

SSID: 200-30694 Name: Organisation for Technological Industries (OTI)

Good quality a.k.a.: Technical Industries Corporation (TIC) Address: P.O.Box 11037,
Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic

Justification: a) Subsidiary of the Syrian Ministry of Defence, which has been designated.
b) OTI is involved in the production of chemical weapons for the Syrian regime. It is
therefore responsible for the violent repression against the Syrian population.
c) As a
subsidiary of the Ministry of Defence, it is also associated with a designated entity.
Relation:
Subsidiary of the Ministry of Defence (SSID 200-12560) Modifications: Listed on 18 Mar
2015

SSID: 200-30703 Name: Syrian Company for Information Technology (SCIT)

Address: P.O.Box 11037, Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic

Justification: a) Subsidiary of the Organisation for Technological Industries (OTI) and
therefore the Syrian Ministry of Defence, which have been designated. It also works with the
Central Bank of Syria which has been designated.
b) As a subsidiary of OTI and the Ministry
of Defence, SCIT is associated with these designated entities.
Relation: a) Subsidiary of the
Ministry of Defence (SSID 200-12560)
b) Subsidiary of the Organisation for Technological
Industries (OTI) (SSID 200-30694)
c) Works with the Central Bank of Syria (SSID 200-
12534)
Modifications: Listed on 18 Mar 2015

SSID: 200-30712 Name: Hamsho Trading

Good quality a.k.a.: a) Hamsho Group b) Hmisho Trading Group c) Hmisho Economic
Group
Address: Hamsho Building, 31 Baghdad Street, Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic
Justification: a) Subsidiary of Hamsho International, which has been designated. b) As
such, Hamsho Trading is associated with a designated entity, Hamsho International.
c)
Supports the Syrian regime through its subsidiaries, including Syria Steel. Through its
subsidiaries it is associated with groups such as the pro-regime Shabiha militias.
Relation: a) Subsidiary of Hamcho International (SSID 200-12352) b) Controls Syria Steel SA (SSID
200-30719)
Modifications: Listed on 18 Mar 2015

SSID: 200-30719 Name: Syria Steel SA

Good quality a.k.a.: a) Syria Steel Co b) Syria Steel Rolling Mill c) Hmisho Steel Address:
Hamsho Building, 31 Baghdad Street, Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic

Justification: Subsidiary of Hamsho Trading and therefore ultimately a subsidiary of
Hamsho International, which has been designated. As such, Syria Steel SA is associated
with a designated entity. Syria Steel also supports the Syrian regime through its work with
Shabiha militias and producing armaments.
Relation: a) Subsidiary of Hamsho Trading
(SSID 200-30712)
b) Subsidiary of Hamcho International (SSID 200-12352) Modifications:
Listed on 18 Mar 2015

SSID: 200-30729 Name: Al Buroj Trading

Good quality a.k.a.: Borouj Trading Company Address: Hamsho Building, 31 Baghdad
Street, Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic

Justification: a) Subsidiary of Hamsho Trading and therefore ultimately of Hamsho
International, which has been designated.
b) As such, Al Buroj Trading is associated with a
designated entity, Hamsho International.
Relation: a) Subsidiary of Hamsho Trading (SSID
200-30712)
b) Subsidiary of Hamcho International (SSID 200-12352) Modifications: Listed
on 18 Mar 2015

SSID: 200-30737 Name: DK Group

Good quality a.k.a.: a) DK Group Sarl b) DK Middle-East & Africa Regional Office
Address: a) DK Middle-East & Africa Regional Office, Peres Lazaristes Center, No. 3, 5th
Floor, Emir Bachir Street, Beirut Central District, Bachoura Sector, Beirut, Lebanon
b)
Azarieh Building – Block 03, 5th Floor, Beirut, Lebanon c) Azarieh Street – Solidere –
Downtown, P.O.Box 11-503, Beirut, Lebanon

Justification: DK Group supplies new banknotes to the Central Bank of Syria. DK Group
therefore provides support to the regime. Due to this supply relationship, it is also associated
with a designated entity, the Central Bank of Syria.
Relation: Supplier Central Bank of Syria
(SSID 200-12534, supplies new banknotes to the Central Bank of Syria)
Modifications:
Listed on 18 Mar 2015

Links:

FINMA Notice

Data files of updates – PDF, XML

 

March 12, 2015: 4th Independent Reviewer Report of Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act of 2010

Every year, there is an independent review of the UK’s TAFA 2010 law, and its implementation. This year’s report has a lot of statistical and historical context in it. Interesting points:

As to designations being challenged in court:

The only possible improvement that I could suggest to current processes is
prompted by the reflection that when decisions to designate are tested on appeal,
there has been a persistent tendency to de-designate rather than to defend the
decision in court.

and

  1. During the period under review, two persons designated by the Treasury under
    TAFA 2010 brought a challenge by way of judicial review, not to their designation
    but the fact that it was publicised. That fact was said to have prejudiced their ability
    to receive a fair trial. The High Court held that the decision to publicise generally,
    without giving them the opportunity of making representations and without giving
    the trial judge or the judge in charge of the criminal proceedings the opportunity of
    considering the matter, was flawed. It accordingly directed that their names be
    removed from the published list of those designated. However their designations
    remained in force, and the High Court indicated that the names could remain on a
    list of designated persons distributed to financial institutions.
    31

The case for expanded use of TAFA:

Over 600 extremists are among the many Britons who have travelled out to
Syria and Iraq. A significant proportion have joined ISIL and other extremist
groups. They are reckoned to be more numerous than the Britons who fought
in previous or current theatres of jihad such as Bosnia, Afghanistan and
Somalia.

In addition to the potential of such persons to commit terrorist acts abroad,
there is some evidence that a minority of returning fighters may have been
involved or wish to be involved in terrorist activity at home. This growing risk
caused the threat level to the UK from international terrorism to be raised in
August 2014 to “severe“, meaning that an attack is highly likely.

Travel to and from such conflict zones, together with the preparation of
terrorist acts, often requires funding and facilitation.

The small number of designations indicates that asset-freezing law has played
only a marginal role in combating the most serious terrorist threat of the
present time.

De-risking and frozen assets:

  1. Whilst they are not allowed to close a frozen account,financial institutions do
    not wish to deal with persons or organisations believed to be associated with
    terrorism, citing reputational and regulatory risk. The imposition of some huge
    penalties for money-laundering and the facilitation of sanctions breaches,
    particularly in the US, gives a degree of substance to such concerns.


    When a designation expires or is revoked, it is normal for banking services to
    be withdrawn
    notwithstanding the provision by the Treasury of a letter such
    as I have recommended,
    49 explaining the position and for great difficulty to
    be experienced by the designated person in finding another banker.

    Nor have more radical solutions for example, the imposition of a universal
    service obligation on the banks, a power to require banking services to be
    provided in a particular case,
    50 or a role for the Bank of England as banker of
    last resort
    been adopted.

And only one new recommendation:

Recommendation 13

The Chair of AFRG meetings at which new potential designations are discussed
should consider adopting
a “devil’s advocate” approach, whereby one member of the
AFRG is asked to put the case against designation, thus assisting the group in
identifying any possible weaknesses in the case put forward. Sufficient material
should be provided (including, where appropriate, primary intelligence underlying
agency assessments) for this exercise to be performed in a meaningful way.

A sleepy report, comparatively, but very edifying nonetheless.

Links:

HM Treasury Notice

4th Independent Reviewer Report

 

March 30, 2015: Bank of China has phish for Lent

Press Releases
Fraudulent email purporting to be related to Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited

The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) wishes to alert members of the public to an e-mail purporting to be sent from Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited (BOCHK). The e-mail requests customers to use an embedded hyperlink to connect to a fraudulent website (for example, “http://naszefokusownie.pl/wp-content/bochk/hong/index2.html”) and provide their account information such as the Internet banking logon user name and password. BOCHK has clarified that it has not sent these e-mails to its customers and has no connection with the fraudulent website.

Anyone who has provided his or her personal information to the website, or has conducted any financial transactions through the website should contact BOCHK at 3988 2388 and any local police station or the Cyber Security and Technology Crime Bureau of the Hong Kong Police Force at 2860 5012.

“Members of the public are reminded not to access their Internet banking accounts through hyperlinks embedded in e-mails, Internet search engines or suspicious pop-up windows. Instead, they should access their Internet banking accounts by typing the website addresses at the address bar of the browser, or by bookmarking the genuine website and using that for access. In addition, banks are not expected to send e-mails asking their customers to provide their account information (e.g. Internet banking logon passwords) or verify their account information online. If in doubt, they should contact their banks,” said an HKMA spokesperson.

Hong Kong Monetary Authority

30 March 2015

Link:

HKMA Notice

 

March 20, 2015: EU, HMT remove 1, modify 50 Ukraine-related sanctions designations

On March 20th, Her Majesty's Treasury implemented Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2015/427 by modifying 50 listings on their Consolidated List (omitted for brevity) and removing the following person:

SHVETSOVA, Ludmila, Ivanovna

DOB: 24/09/1949. POB: Alma-Ata, USSR Position: Deputy Chairman of State
Duma, United Russia Listed on: 29/04/2014 Last Updated: 20/03/2015 Group ID:
12955.

Links:

HMT Notice

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2015/427

 

March 25, 2015: US Department of Justice Press Release: Schlumberger pleads guilty to Iran & Sudan sanctions violations

No Enforcement Action notices yet, but the guilty plea and fine ($232.7 million) have appeared multiple times in the press. And here is Justice's press release – it will be interesting to see OFAC's calculus and greater detail, when published:

Department of Justice
Office of Public Affairs

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Wednesday, March 25, 2015
Schlumberger Oilfield Holdings Ltd. Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay Over $232.7 Million for Violating US Sanctions by Facilitating Trade with Iran and Sudan

Parent Company, Schlumberger Ltd., Also Agrees to Continue Cooperation With U.S. Authorities and To Hire an Independent Consultant to Review Its Sanctions Policies, Procedures and Internal Sanctions Audits

Assistant Attorney General for National Security John P. Carlin, U.S. Attorney Ronald C. Machen Jr. of the District of Columbia and Under Secretary Eric L. Hirschhorn of the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security announced today that Schlumberger Oilfield Holdings Ltd. (SOHL), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Schlumberger Ltd., has agreed to enter a guilty plea and to pay a $232,708,356 penalty to the United States for conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) by willfully facilitating illegal transactions and engaging in trade with Iran and Sudan.

The plea agreement, which is contingent upon the court’s approval, also requires SOHL to submit to a three-year period of corporate probation and agree to continue to cooperate with the government and not commit any additional felony violations of U.S. federal law. In addition to SOHL’s commitments, under the plea agreement, SOHL’s parent company, Schlumberger Ltd., has also agreed to the following additional terms during the three-year term of probation, inter alia: (1) maintaining its cessation of all operations in Iran and Sudan, (2) reporting on the parent company’s compliance with sanctions, (3) responding to requests to disclose information and materials related to the parent company’s compliance with U.S. sanctions laws when requested by U.S. authorities, and (4) hiring an independent consultant to review the parent company’s internal sanctions policies and procedures and the parent company’s internal audits focused on sanctions compliance. The guilty plea concludes a joint investigation commenced in 2009 and led by the Justice Department’s National Security Division, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Dallas Field Office.

“Over a period of years, Schlumberger Oilfield Holdings Ltd. conducted business with Iran and Sudan from the United States and took steps to disguise those business dealings, thereby willfully violating the U.S. economic sanctions against those regimes,” said Assistant Attorney General Carlin. “The International Emergency Economic Powers Act is an essential tool that the United States uses to address foreign threats to national security through the regulation of commerce. Knowingly circumventing sanctions undermines their efficacy and has the potential to harm both U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. The guilty plea and significant financial penalty in this case underscore that skirting sanctions for financial gain is a risk corporations ought not take.”

“This is a landmark case that puts global corporations on notice that they must respect our trade laws when on American soil,” said U.S. Attorney Machen. “Even if you don’t directly ship goods from the United States to sanctioned countries, you violate our laws when you facilitate trade with those countries from a U.S.-based office building. For years, in a variety of ways, this foreign company facilitated trade with Iran and Sudan from Sugar Land, Texas. Today’s announcement should send a clear message to all global companies with a U.S. presence: whether your employees are from the U.S. or abroad, when they are in the United States, they will abide by our laws or you will be held accountable.”

“Today's criminal guilty plea demonstrates the Commerce Department’s commitment to aggressively prosecute multinational corporations for violations involving embargoed destinations,” said Under Secretary Hirschhorn. “We will continue to pursue violators wherever they are located and whatever their size. I commend the Office of Export Enforcement and the Department of Justice for their outstanding efforts to investigate and prosecute this case.”

A criminal information was filed today in federal court in the District of Columbia charging SOHL with one count of knowingly and willfully conspiring to violate IEEPA. SOHL waived the requirement of being charged by way of federal Indictment, agreed to the filing of the information, and has accepted responsibility for its criminal conduct and that of its employees by entering into a plea agreement with the government. The plea agreement, which is contingent upon the court’s approval, requires that SOHL pay the U.S. government $232,708,356 and enter into a three-year period of corporate probation. SOHL’s monetary penalty includes a $77,569,452 criminal forfeiture and an additional $155,138,904 criminal fine. The criminal fine represents the largest criminal fine in connection with an IEEPA prosecution.

In addition to SOHL’s agreement to continue its cooperation with U.S. authorities throughout the three-year period of probation and not to engage in any felony violation of U.S. federal law, SOHL’s parent company, Schlumberger Ltd., also has agreed to continue its cooperation with U.S. authorities during the three-year period of probation, and hire an independent consultant who will review the parent company’s internal sanctions policies, procedures and company-generated sanctions audit reports.

Summary of the Criminal Conduct

According to court documents, starting on or about early 2004 and continuing through June 2010, Drilling & Measurements (D&M), a United States-based Schlumberger business segment, provided oilfield services to Schlumberger customers in Iran and Sudan through non-U.S. subsidiaries of SOHL. Although SOHL, as a subsidiary of Schlumberger Ltd., had policies and procedures designed to ensure that D&M did not violate U.S. sanctions, SOHL failed to train its employees adequately to ensure that all U.S. persons, including non-U.S. citizens who resided in the United States while employed at D&M, complied with Schlumberger Ltd.’s sanctions policies and compliance procedures. As a result of D&M’s lack of adherence to U.S. sanctions combined with SOHL’s failure to train properly U.S. persons and to enforce fully its policies and procedures, D&M, through the acts of employees residing in the United States, violated U.S. sanctions against Iran and Sudan by: (1) approving and disguising the company’s capital expenditure requests from Iran and Sudan for the manufacture of new oilfield drilling tools and for the spending of money for certain company purchases; (2) making and implementing business decisions specifically concerning Iran and Sudan; and (3) providing certain technical services and expertise in order to troubleshoot mechanical failures and to sustain expensive drilling tools and related equipment in Iran and Sudan.

The Illegal Schemes

Illegal U.S. Person Approval of Capital Expenditures. According to court documents, one of the important functions of D&M management personnel was the supervision of D&M’s capital expenditure (CAPEX) process. The CAPEX process was a forecasting mechanism enabling oilfield locations to predict what tools and equipment they would need to meet anticipated demand for oilfield services. Oilfield personnel worldwide made requests through an automated system for the manufacture of new tools and for permission to spend money for certain purchases in order to support oilfield operations. Once approved by the D&M Global Asset Manager in the United States, a request for new equipment was transmitted to one of three manufacturing centers for the production of new tools and other assets. The spending of funds for large-scale purchases was authorized once the request was approved by the D&M Global Asset Manager. Under the CAPEX process in place during the relevant time period, approval by the D&M Global Asset Manager, a U.S. person, was required for every CAPEX request, including requests submitted by or for the benefit of D&M oilfields in Iran and Sudan.

Consequently, D&M’s CAPEX process violated sanctions with Iran and Sudan in a number of ways. Although CAPEX approvals were ordinarily sought through an automated computer system, D&M personnel outside the United States frequently sent emails to the D&M Global Asset Manager in the United States justifying particular requests, many of which related to requests submitted by or on behalf of Iran and Sudan. Furthermore, in these email communications, D&M personnel outside the United States referred to Iran as “Northern Gulf” and Sudan as “Southern Egypt” or “South Egypt” in email communications with D&M personnel in the United States.

In addition, D&M personnel outside the United States implemented a process designed to disguise the identities of the embargoed locations in the automated computer system in order to obtain approval from the D&M Global Asset Manager in the United States. Orders entered into the automated computer system were identified by a series of numbers and letters. Typically, the alpha-numeric identifier included a two or three-letter code indicating the country that placed the order. Instead of entering the country code for Iran or Sudan, D&M personnel entered non-embargoed country codes for embargoed location orders. Specifically, the code “BGM,” which identified a bonded-goods warehouse in Jebel Ali, United Arab Emirates, was used in place of the Iran and Sudan country codes in order to disguise the true locations. These efforts were deliberately taken and demonstrate the company’s involvement in contriving ways intended to evade restrictions imposed by U.S. sanctions.

D&M Headquarters Involvement in Iran and Sudan. According to court documents, separate and apart from the illegal CAPEX approval process that violated U.S. sanctions, D&M headquarters personnel made and implemented business decisions involving D&M operations in Iran and Sudan—again, all in violation of U.S. sanctions’ restrictions on the facilitation of trade with Iran and Sudan. D&M’s illegal involvement in the day-to-day operations in Iran and Sudan, through U.S. persons working at D&M headquarters, occurred with D&M’s knowledge and understanding of the applicability of U.S. sanctions laws to the company.

Technical Services. According to court documents, when technical problems arose in oilfield locations related to the operation of drilling tools, D&M personnel would enter relevant information about the technical issue into an automated computer system. D&M’s automated computer system would generally route the query to a technical expert who could assist the oilfield location in addressing the technical issue. If the technical issue was sufficiently complex, the query would ordinarily be routed to the technical experts located at the product center that manufactured the tool. At times, queries entered by, or on behalf of, D&M personnel in Iran and Sudan were addressed by D&M personnel located in the United States. The technical services provided to Iranian and Sudanese operations, by U.S. persons, violated the prohibitions of trade with Iran and Sudan required by U.S. sanctions.

SOHL and Schlumberger’s Remediation Efforts

In 2009, in consultation with the U.S. Department of State, Schlumberger agreed to no longer pursue new oilfield contracts in Iran. In 2011, Schlumberger voluntarily decided to cease providing oilfield services in Iran and the Republic of the Sudan (North Sudan). As of June 30, 2013, Schlumberger ceased providing oilfield services in Iran, and presently, Schlumberger has ceased providing oilfield services in North Sudan as well.

In announcing the plea, Assistant Attorney General Carlin and U.S. Attorney Machen commended the work of Special Agent Troy Shaffer from BIS’s Dallas Field Office. They also acknowledged the work of those who handled the case from the National Security Division and the U.S. Attorney’s Office, including former Trial Attorney Ryan Fayhee and former Assistant U.S. Attorneys John Borchert and Ann H. Petalas.

The case is being prosecuted by Trial Attorney Casey Arrowood of the National Security Division, Assistant U.S. Attorney Maia L. Miller of the National Security Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Zia Faruqui of the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section.

 

Link:

Department of Justice Press Release

Plea Ageement

Statement of Offense

Indictment