UK’s (and EU’s) Iran sanctions for human rights abuses

The EU sanctions on Iran's human rights abuses were first implemented in Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 and subsequently amended in Council Regulation (EU) No 264/2012.

EU persons and EU-domiciled entities, as well as people and entities located in the EU, may not be involved in:

the sale, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly of equipment which might be used for internal repression to any person, entity or body in Iran or for use in Iran

the provision (direct or indirect) of technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance related to the above equipment

Annex IV are goods (e.g. equipment or software) which can monitor or intercept communications. A license is required:

to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly items as listed in Annex IV to any person, entity or body in Iran or for use in Iran

for the provision of technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance related to the items listed in Annex IV to any person, entity or body in Iran or for use in Iran

for the provision of telecommunication or internet monitoring or interception services of any kind to or for the direct or indirect benefit of Iran’s government, public bodies, corporations and agencies or any person or entity acting on their behalf or at their direction

Links:

Council Regulation (EU) No 264/2012

Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011

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UK’s BIS issues Notice to Exporters 2013/24 changes licensing for Egypt

The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) has issued a new Notice to Exporters. In the previous one, BIS announced that, in addition to the suspension of licenses for equipment that could be used for internal suppression in Egypt, the Export Control Organization (ECO) would also be reviewing additional existing licenses. The review has been completed, and the holders of 49 additional licenses have been notified that their licenses have now been suspended.

Additionally, this Notice to Exporters now places Egypt to the list of countries not covered by the following Open General Export Licenses (OGELs):

Export After Repair/replacement under warranty: Military Goods
Export For Repair/replacement under warranty: Military Goods
Export After Repair/replacement under warranty: Dual-Use Items
Export For Repair/ Replacement Under Warranty: Dual-Use Items

5. Impact on extant licence holders and new licence applicants:

5.1 Extant licence holders will be contacted by ECO to inform them of the suspension.

5.2 The suspension will be kept under review until such time as conditions indicate that it is appropriate to lift these restrictions.

5.3 ECO is considering whether further extant licences should be revoked. ECO will keep you informed about this and any other developments through Notices to Exporters and, where appropriate, through individual notifications.

Existing license holders will be notified by ECO that their licenses are suspended until further notice (e.g. until these changes are reversed). And, of course, ECO is still considering whether additional licenses, beyond these 49, need suspension – which will, of course, necessitate another Notice to Exporters, Mr. Watchlist would wager.

Links:

Notice to Exporters 2013/24

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Said Youssef Ali Abu Aziza delisted by UN, OSFI [Updated: DFAT, too]

The following person listed by the UN Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee has been removed from OSFI's Consolidated List:

QI.A.230.07. Name: 1: SAID 2: YOUSSEF 3: ALI 4: ABU AZIZA

Name (original script): سعيد يوسف علي أبو عزيزة

Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1958 POB: Tripoli, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Good quality a.k.a.: a) Abdul Hamid b) Abu Turab Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Libyan Passport no.: a) Libyan passport number 87/437555 b) Libyan passport number 274381 National identification no.: Libyan national identification number 145126 Address: na Listed on: 8 Jun. 2007 (amended on 13 Dec. 2011) Other information: Mother’s name is Fatima Isa. Member of Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (QE.L.11.01) and Al-Qaida (QE.A.4.01). Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 24 Nov. 2009.

Update: DFAT has since updated its Consolidated List, too.

Link:

OSFI notice

UN Notice

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UK (and EU) restrictions on Iranian nuclear program

The EU's Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP (codified into law by Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012) adopted sanctions against Iran's weapons programs (nuclear and ballistic) and any revenue they get fron these. These include:

prohibition on the sale, supply or transfer to Iran of graphite, raw or semi-finished metals (such as aluminium or steel) and software for integrating industrial processes. The prohibition includes technical or financial assistance.
prohibtion on sale or supply of key naval equipment and technology for ship-building, maintence or refit..

Annexes I and II of the Regulation list items which regulated EU persons and enitities (EU citizenship or location within the EU) cannot be involved with the:

sale, supply, transfer or export to Iran or to an Iranian entity or body outside Iran of listed dual-use goods and technology

provision of brokering services, and the provision of technical and financial assistance, related to the listed goods and technology

purchase, import or transport from Iran of listed items

investment in and financing of any Iranian person, entity or body engaged in the manufacture of listed items

Annex I is the EU's Dual-Use List, while Annex II are additional dual-use goods which would provide significant assistance to Iran's nuclear and ballistic programs.

Annex III is similar to Annex II, but which are potentially licensable:

A licence is required for the sale, supply, transfer or export to Iran or to an Iranian entity or body outside Iran of goods and technology listed in Annex IV

A licence is required for the provison of brokering services, of technical or financial assistance related to those items, or for investment in Iranian entities engaged in manufacturing those items

Licenses are only issuable in exceptional circumstances – such as on humanitarian grounds – when there is no risk of the goods ending up in Iran's nuclear program.

Notice to Exporters 2010/40 discusses changes to the licensing policy for Annex III (formerly called Annex IV) items.

Annex IV items are specific to the ban on purchase, import or transport to the EU of Iran's crude oil or petrochemical products.

Annex V contains petrochemical products that cannot be imported to the EU if they are Iran-origin or are exported from Iran.

Annex VI lists equipment key to Iran's production of oil, natural gas and petrochemicals, including exploration and production (e.g. drilling) equioment, and refining (oil) or liquefaction (natural gas) equipment. EU members may not supply or export these to Iran.

Annex VII is a listing of gold, precious metals and diamonds, none of which can be supplied or sold to Iran.

Council Regulation (EU) 267/2012 also prohibits the “sale, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly of newly printed or unissued Iranian denominated banknotes and minted coinage, to, or for the benefit of the Central Bank of Iran.”

Additionally, “Goods whose supply is prohibited for human rights reasons (including equipment and technology which may be used for the monitoring or interception of the internet and telecommunications and related services) are listed in Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011.”

Links:

Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP

Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012

Dual-use goods controls guide

UK Strategic Export Control Lists

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UK Export Control Organization’s (ECO) Iranian sanctions

The ECO has issued the following notices on Iranian sanctions:

Notice to Exporters 2012/47 – issued on 21 November 2012 about new Financial Restrictions (Iran) Order 2012. These new restrictions update the previous restrictions announced in Notice to Exporters 2011/27.

Notice to Exporters 2012/19 – issued on 26 March 2012 about prohibitions on export of internal repression and internet monitoring equipment.
Notice to Exporters 2012/18 – issued on 26 March 2012 about new and amended non-proliferation sanctions against Iran.
Notice to Exporters 2012/06 – issued on 27 January 2012 about new restrictive measures targeting Iran’s oil and gas sector, financial sector and nuclear programme.
Notice to Exporters 2011/12 – issued on 27 May 2011 about enforcement of certain provisions of EU sanctions against Iran.
Notice to Exporters 2010/40 – issued on 10 November 2010 about the refusal of licences for the export of items listed in Annex IV of Council Regulation 961/2010.
Notice to Exporters 2010/34 – issued on 27 October 2010 with further information about the EU implementing measure, Council Regulation 961/2010. This comprised a number of restrictive measures including restrictions on oil and gas exports.
Notice to Exporters 2010/21 – issued on 26 July 2010 when the EU announced new restrictions on trade with Iran. This included an asset freeze on listed Iranian entities and individuals with effect from 27 July 2010 (Council Regulation 668/2010) and the adoption of new restrictive measures on trade, energy, transport and financial services (Council Decision of 26 July 2010).

Links:

Notice to Exporters 2012/47

Notice to Exporters 2012/22

Notice to Exporters 2012/19

Notice to Exporters 2012/18

Notice to Exporters 2012/6

Notice to Exporters 2011/27

Notice to Exporters 2011/12

Notice to Exporters 2010/40

Notice to Exporters 2010/34

Notice to Exporters 2010/21

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Breaking News: EU suspends certain export licenses to Egypt (updated with additional links)

Today, the UK's Department for Business, Innovation and Skills released Notice to Exporters 2013/23:

Notice to Exporters 2013/23: EU suspend all export licensing to Egypt of any equipment which might be used for internal repression
23 August 2013

1. On 21 August 2013, in response to the increasing levels of violence in Egypt, the Member States of the European Union agreed to suspend all export licensing to Egypt for equipment which might be used for internal repression.

2. The Council also agreed to reassess export licences of equipment covered by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP – which defines common rules governing control of export of military technology and equipment.

3. This follows action already taken by the Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills on 19 July 2013 to revoke five standard individual export licences for Egypt where there was a clear risk that the goods might be used for internal repression, or provoke or prolong conflict.

Impact on extant licences and issuing of new export licences to Egypt

4. We are currently reviewing extant licences to determine which ones we consider to be for equipment which might be used for internal repression and therefore subject to suspension. We will notify you directly in the event that your licence is to be suspended.

5. The Export Control Organisation will review whether it is necessary to revoke, suspend or amend any additional extant licences where the proposed transfer is no longer consistent with the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria (‘Consolidated Criteria‘).

6. You should be aware that any other export licence applications for Egypt will be subject to greater levels of scrutiny and longer processing times.

7. We are committed to keeping exporters informed on changes in export controls. We also recommend that you keep yourself well informed of developments through the media and other information channels.

And here is the contact info for the UK's Export Control Organization, should you have questions:

Export Control Organisation

Department for Business, Innovation and Skills

1 Victoria Street

London

SW1H 0ET

Tel: 020 7215 4594

E-mail: eco.help@bis.gsi.gov.uk

Fax: 020 7215 2635

Link:

Notice to Exporters 2013/23

EU Council conclusions on Egypt of August 21, 2013

Common Position 2008/944/CFSP

July 19, 2013 Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills license revocation

Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria

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OFAC’s got some ‘splaining to do…

From OFAC's FAQ on how to determine if you have a match against the SDN list, we have:

Step 3. How much of the SDN’s name is matching against the name of your account holder? Is just one of two or more names matching (i.e., just the last name)?

If yes, you do not have a valid match.*

If no, please continue to 4 below.

Really? Is that really the standard? How about:

The data matches the first and middle names but not the last: does every Mary Ann and Jose Maria require additional review?
The data matches a first name and the maternal last name of a Hispanic (or Portuguese-speaking) individual, but not the paternal last name – do those require additional research and review?
The data matches the 2 last names of a Hispanic (or Portuguese-speaking) individual, but none of the first or middle names – do those require review?

And what should be reviewed for matches to the multiple name components of Muslim names? Are they all created equal other than the given name?

It's very easy for OFAC to say “we can't give any more guidance – otherwise, the terrorists will win.” And it's also not very fair, especially since each of these cases involves significant additional operational overhead – or much smarter systems – to handle the increase in matches.

OFAC needs to issue more precise guidance… period.

To be clear, Mr. Watchlist believes that none of the cases in the list above requires additional review, and that a workable model for Muslim names would require matches to the given name, or initial, and the nisbah, which is the tribal, clan or geographic name. A case could potentially be made to substitute the laqab, which is an attribution name, like al-Rashid, for the nisbah, but it's my understanding that the nisbah is the closest to a family or last name in Muslim name structures.

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Treasury Explains It All for You: This Morning’s Terror Designations

In what appears to be a trend for the more high-profile OFAC designations, Treasury issued a press release this afternoon to explain who the people they added to the SDN List this morning were:

Treasury Sanctions Hizballah Leadership

Action Targets Hizballah’s Leadership Responsible for Operations Outside of Lebanon

WASHINGTON –

The U.S. Department of the Treasury today designated four members of Hizballah’s leadership responsible for operations throughout the Middle East, further exposing Hizballah’s pernicious activities that reach beyond the borders of Lebanon. These designations include senior members of Hizballah responsible for activities ranging from assisting fighters from Iraq to support the Assad regime in Syria, to making payments to various factions within Yemen, and to military leaders responsible for terrorist operations in Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Cyprus, Israel, the Palestinian territories, and Iraq.

Belying Hizballah’s claim to be a domestic Lebanese “resistance” organization, its expansive global network seeks to extend its malign influence, and the influence of Hizballah’s patron Iran, throughout the Middle East and beyond. The Treasury Department will continue to combat Hizballah’s terrorist activity inside and outside Lebanon with all available tools and will continue to work with partners around the world to make it clear that Hizballah’s militant and extremist activities should not be tolerated by any nation.

“Whether ferrying foreign fighters to the front lines of the Syrian civil war or inserting clandestine operatives in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere, Hizballah remains a significant global terrorist threat,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. “So long as Hizballah spreads instability, conducts terrorist attacks and engages in criminal and illicit activities around the world, we will continue to sanction Hizballah’s operatives, leaders and businesses, wherever they may be found.”

The individuals sanctioned today were designated pursuant to Executive Order 13224, which targets terrorists and their supporters for acting for, or on behalf of Hizballah. U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in any transactions with the individuals designated today, and any assets of those designees subject to U.S. jurisdiction are frozen.

Khalil Harb

In the years prior to Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, Khalil Harb served as the deputy commander for Hizballah’s central military unit’s southern Lebanon region from 1988 to 1992, and as the commander for this region from 1992 to 1994. From 1994 to 1997, Harb served as the commander of Hizballah’s central military operations. By 2000, Harb supervised Hizballah military operations inside Israel, Jordan, Cyprus, and Turkey.

In late November 2000, Harb was given responsibility for overseeing work of the Islamic Resistance, including assisting with the smuggling of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives from Syria into the West Bank via Jordan. By late 2003, Harb was head of the Syrian/Jordan/Israel/Egypt operations unit, which was subordinate to Hizballah’s Islamic Jihad council.

In March 2006, Harb served as Hizballah’s chief of military liaison with the Palestinian factions and Iran, dealing almost exclusively with Palestinians and Iranians inside and outside the territories. Prior to this posting, Harb had served as Hizballah’s chief of military special operations. During the summer of 2006, Harb was given command of a Hizballah special operations unit in southern Lebanon, which engaged the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in July 2006, at the Lebanese-Israeli border where IDF Special Forces entered Lebanon. In early 2007, Khalil Harb was chief of Hizballah’s Unit 1800, also known as Hizballah’s Nun Unit, the Hizballah entity responsible for supporting Palestinian militants and conducting Hizballah operations in the countries surrounding Israel, and he travelled to Iran for meetings regarding coordination between Hizballah, Iran, and the Palestinians.

In February 2010, Harb, serving as the leader of the Palestinian activities for Hizballah, planned unspecified attacks against Israeli officials in Israel, in retaliation for the assassination of former Hizballah External Security Organization (ESO) chief Imad Mughniyah. By mid-May 2010, Hizballah created a new position for Harb as “advisor to the Secretary General,” which provided Harb oversight of Hizballah Unit 1800, which he previously commanded.

As of 2012, Harb was responsible for Hizballah’s Yemen activities and was involved in the political side of Hizballah’s Yemen portfolio. Harb also served as commander of a Lebanon-based Hizballah special unit that focused on Israel. Since the summer of 2012, Harb has been involved in the movement of large amounts of currency to Yemen, through Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E., and in late 2012, Harb advised the leader of a Yemeni political party that the party’s monthly Hizballah funding of $50,000 was ready for pick up.

Muhammad Kawtharani

As the individual in charge of Hizballah's Iraq activities, Kawtharani has worked on behalf of Hizballah's leadership to promote the group's interests in Iraq, including Hizballah efforts to provide training, funding, political, and logistical support to Iraqi Shi'a insurgent groups. A member of Hizballah's Political Council, Kawtharani also helped secure the release from Iraqi custody of Hizballah operative Ali Musa Daqduq, a senior Hizballah commander designated by the Treasury Department in November 2012 who was responsible for numerous attacks against Coalition Force in Iraq, including planning a January 20, 2007 attack on the Karbala Joint Provincial Coordination Center that resulted in the deaths of five U.S. soldiers.

Over the last year, Kawtharani has assisted in getting fighters to Syria to support the Assad regime.

Muhammad Yusuf Ahmad Mansur

Muhammad Yusuf Ahmad Mansur (Mansur), a member of Hizballah since at least 1986, once served in a Hizballah military unit operating in south Lebanon. Around 2004, Mansur was transferred to Hizballah’s Unit 1800. Mansur was subsequently dispatched to Egypt to work with Unit 1800 under Muhammad Qabalan, and in 2008, the cell escalated its operations to target tourist destinations in Egypt. Mansur served as the Egypt-based cell leader. By early 2009, Egyptian authorities had disrupted the Hizballah cell and arrested and detained Mansur and dozens of other individuals for planning to carry out terrorist operations against Israeli and other tourists in Egypt. Hizballah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in November 2009 publicly acknowledged that Mansur was a Hizballah member involved in transporting arms and equipment to Palestinian militants. In April 2010, an Egyptian court sentenced Mansur to 15 years for his involvement in the cell, which was subordinate to Hizballah’s Unit 1800. However, in late January 2011, the imprisoned members of the Hizballah cell escaped and Mansur returned to Lebanon. In February 2011, Mansur appeared on Lebanese television with Hizballah officials at a Hizballah rally in Beirut.

Muhammad Qabalan

Hizballah terrorist cell leader Muhammad Qabalan (Qabalan) once served as the head of a Hizballah infantry platoon. In 2008, Qabalan, as a leader in Hizballah’s Unit 1800, was serving as the Lebanon-based head of the Hizballah Egypt-based terrorist cell targeting tourist destinations in Egypt and was coordinating the cell’s activities from Lebanon. In April 2010, an Egyptian court sentenced Qabalan in absentia to life imprisonment for his involvement in the cell, which was subordinate to Hizballah’s Unit 1800. As of late 2011, Qabalan worked in a separate Hizballah covert unit operating in the Middle East.

Identifying Information

Name: Khalil Yusif Harb

AKA: Khalil Yusuf Harb

AKA: Hajj Ya’taqad Khalil Harb

AKA: Mustafa Khalil Harb

AKA: Sayyid Ahmad

AKA: Abu Mustafa

DOB: 9 October 1958

Name: Muhammad Kawtharani

AKA: Muhammad Al-Kawtharani

AKA: Mohammad Kawtharani

AKA: Muhammad Kawtarani

AKA: Jafar al-Kawtharani

Nationality #1: Lebanon

Nationality #2: Iraq

DOB #1: 1945

DOB #2: 1959

DOB #3: 1961

POB: Najaf, Iraq

Name: Muhammad Qabalan

AKA: Hassan al-Ghul

AKA: Muhammad Qablan

DOB: 1969

Citizenship: Lebanese

Location: Southern Suburbs, Beirut, Lebanon

Name: Muhammad Yusuf Ahmad Mansur

AKA: Sami Hani Shihab

AKA: Salem Bassem Sami

AKA: Jamal Hani Hillawi

AKA: Muhammad Yusuf Mansur Sami Shihab

AKA: Mohammad Yousef Mansour

AKA: Mohammad Youssef Mansour

AKA: Muhammad Yusuf Mansur

AKA: Mohammad Yusuf Ahmad Mansur

AKA: Muhammad Yusif Ahmad Mansur

AKA: Sami Shehab

AKA: Sami Shihab

AKA: Hani Halawi

DOB No. 1: September 14, 1970

DOB No. 2: January 1, 1974

DOB No. 3: 1980

POB: Bint Jubayl, Lebanon

Location: Beirut, Lebanon

Mr. Watchlist would guess that, if we don't see another one today, the SDNTK designations weren't all that strategic.

Link:

Treasury Press Release

Posted with Blogsy

OFAC changes to terror, narcotics trafficking lists

Today, OFAC added 4 new SDGTs (Specially Designated Global Terrorists):

HARB, Khalil Yusif (a.k.a. AHMAD, Sayyid; a.k.a. HARB, Hajj Ya'taqad Khalil; a.k.a. HARB, Khalil Yusuf; a.k.a. HARB, Mustafa Khalil; a.k.a. MUSTAFA, Abu); DOB 09 Oct 1958 (individual) [SDGT].

KAWTHARANI, Muhammad (a.k.a. AL-KAWTHARANI, Jafar; a.k.a. AL-KAWTHARANI, Muhammad; a.k.a. KAWTARANI, Muhammad; a.k.a. KAWTHARANI, Mohammad); DOB 1945; alt. DOB 1959; alt. DOB 1961; POB Najaf, Iraq; nationality Lebanon; alt. nationality Iraq (individual) [SDGT].

MANSUR, Muhammad Yusuf Ahmad (a.k.a. HALAWI, Hani; a.k.a. MANSOUR, Mohammad Yousef; a.k.a. MANSOUR, Mohammad Youssef; a.k.a. MANSUR, Mohammad Yusuf Ahmad; a.k.a. MANSUR, Muhammad Yusif Ahmad; a.k.a. SHEHAB, Sami; a.k.a. SHIHAB, Sami Hani; a.k.a. “HILLAWI, Jamal Hani”; a.k.a. “SAMI, Salem Bassem”; a.k.a. “SHIHAB, Muhammad Yusuf Mansur Sami”), Beirut, Lebanon; DOB 14 Sep 1970; alt. DOB 01 Jan 1974; alt. DOB 1980; POB Bint Jubayl, Lebanon (individual) [SDGT].

QABALAN, Muhammad (a.k.a. QABLAN, Muhammad; a.k.a. “AL-GHUL, Hassan”), Southern Suburbs, Beirut, Lebanon; DOB 1969; citizen Lebanon (individual) [SDGT].

and 5 new SDNTKs (Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficking Kingpins):

PARRA SANCHEZ, Mario; DOB 11 Nov 1970; POB Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; C.U.R.P. PASM701111HSLRNR07 (Mexico) (individual) [SDNTK] (Linked To: BUENOS AIRES SERVICIOS, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: ESTACIONES DE SERVICIOS CANARIAS, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: GASODIESEL Y SERVICIOS ANCONA, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: GASOLINERA ALAMOS COUNTRY, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: GASOLINERA Y SERVICIOS VILLABONITA, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: PETROBARRANCOS, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: SERVICIOS CHULAVISTA, S.A. DE C.V.).

SOLIS AVILES, Angello de Jesus, Calle Camino Los Lagos No. 4070-A, Fraccionamiento Centenario, Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; DOB 23 Oct 1985; POB Escuinapa, Sinaloa, Mexico; alt. POB Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; C.U.R.P. SOAA851023HSLLVN00 (Mexico) (individual) [SDNTK] (Linked To: BUENOS AIRES SERVICIOS, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: ESTACIONES DE SERVICIOS CANARIAS, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: GASODIESEL Y SERVICIOS ANCONA, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: GASOLINERA ALAMOS COUNTRY, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: GASOLINERA Y SERVICIOS VILLABONITA, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: PETROBARRANCOS, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: SERVICIOS CHULAVISTA, S.A. DE C.V.).

VALDEZ RODRIGUEZ, Manuel Arturo; DOB 15 Dec 1985; POB Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; C.U.R.P. VARM851215HSLLDN09 (Mexico) (individual) [SDNTK] (Linked To: BUENOS AIRES SERVICIOS, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: ESTACIONES DE SERVICIOS CANARIAS, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: GASODIESEL Y SERVICIOS ANCONA, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: GASOLINERA ALAMOS COUNTRY, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: GASOLINERA Y SERVICIOS VILLABONITA, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: PETROBARRANCOS, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: SERVICIOS CHULAVISTA, S.A. DE C.V.).

VALENZUELA VALENZUELA, Vanessa (a.k.a. DE CORTEZ, Vanessa); DOB 16 Nov 1985; POB Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; C.U.R.P. VAVV851116MSLLLN05 (Mexico) (individual) [SDNTK] (Linked To: BUENOS AIRES SERVICIOS, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: ESTACIONES DE SERVICIOS CANARIAS, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: GASODIESEL Y SERVICIOS ANCONA, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: GASOLINERA ALAMOS COUNTRY, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: GASOLINERA Y SERVICIOS VILLABONITA, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: PETROBARRANCOS, S.A. DE C.V.).

VILLEGAS LOERA, Juan Carlos, Calle Golfo de California No. 1635, Colonia Nuevo Culiacan, Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; DOB 11 Apr 1958; POB Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; C.U.R.P. VILJ580411HSLLRN09 (Mexico) (individual) [SDNTK] (Linked To: BUENOS AIRES SERVICIOS, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: ESTACIONES DE SERVICIOS CANARIAS, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: GASODIESEL Y SERVICIOS ANCONA, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: GASOLINERA ALAMOS COUNTRY, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: GASOLINERA Y SERVICIOS VILLABONITA, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: PETROBARRANCOS, S.A. DE C.V.; Linked To: SERVICIOS CHULAVISTA, S.A. DE C.V.).

and amended a number of SDNTKs (7, to be precise):

BUENOS AIRES SERVICIOS, S.A. DE C.V., Blvd. Guillermo Batiz Paredes No. 1100, Col. Buenos Aires, Culiacan, Sinaloa C.P. 80199, Mexico; R.F.C. BAS-960417-PY6 (Mexico) [SDNTK]. -to- BUENOS AIRES SERVICIOS, S.A. DE C.V. (n.k.a. GASOLINERA MULTILOMAS, S.A. DE C.V.), Blvd. Guillermo Batiz Paredes No. 1100, Col. Buenos Aires, Culiacan, Sinaloa C.P. 80199, Mexico; R.F.C. BAS-960417-PY6 (Mexico) [SDNTK].

ESTACIONES DE SERVICIOS CANARIAS, S.A. DE C.V., Blvd. Enrique Felix Castro No. 1029, Col. Desarrollo Urbano Tres Rios, Culiacan, Sinaloa C.P. 80020, Mexico; R.F.C. ESC-100224-2J9 (Mexico) [SDNTK]. -to- ESTACIONES DE SERVICIOS CANARIAS, S.A. DE C.V. (n.k.a. COMBUSERVICIOS LOS TRES RIOS, S.A. DE C.V.), Blvd. Enrique Felix Castro No. 1029, Col. Desarrollo Urbano Tres Rios, Culiacan, Sinaloa C.P. 80020, Mexico; R.F.C. ESC-100224-2J9 (Mexico) [SDNTK].

GASODIESEL Y SERVICIOS ANCONA, S.A. DE C.V., Manuel J. Clouthier No. 1800, Col. Libertad, Culiacan, Sinaloa C.P.80180, Mexico; R.F.C. GSA-100223-M92 (Mexico) [SDNTK]. -to- GASODIESEL Y SERVICIOS ANCONA, S.A. DE C.V. (n.k.a. GASOLINERA LA CANADA, S.A. DE C.V.), Manuel J. Clouthier No. 1800, Col. Libertad, Culiacan, Sinaloa C.P.80180, Mexico; R.F.C. GSA-100223-M92 (Mexico) [SDNTK].

GASOLINERA ALAMOS COUNTRY, S.A. DE C.V., Blvd. Pedro Infante No. 3050, Col. Recursos Hidraulicos, Culiacan, Sinaloa C.P. 80100, Mexico; R.F.C. GAC-100224-GDA (Mexico) [SDNTK]. -to- GASOLINERA ALAMOS COUNTRY, S.A. DE C.V. (n.k.a. GASOLINERA RECURSOS HIDRAULICOS, S.A. DE C.V.), Blvd. Pedro Infante No. 3050, Col. Recursos Hidraulicos, Culiacan, Sinaloa C.P. 80100, Mexico; R.F.C. GAC-100224-GDA (Mexico) [SDNTK].

GASOLINERA Y SERVICIOS VILLABONITA, S.A. DE C.V., Av. Alvaro Obregon No. 6040, Col. Villa Bonita, Culiacan, Sinaloa C.P. 80000, Mexico; R.F.C. GSV-100224-773 (Mexico) [SDNTK]. -to- GASOLINERA Y SERVICIOS VILLABONITA, S.A. DE C.V. (n.k.a. GASOLINERAS LA VILLA, S.A. DE C.V.), Av. Alvaro Obregon No. 6040, Col. Villa Bonita, Culiacan, Sinaloa C.P. 80000, Mexico; R.F.C. GSV-100224-773 (Mexico) [SDNTK].

PETROBARRANCOS, S.A. DE C.V., Av. Benjamin Hill No. 5602, Col. Industrial el Palmito, Culiacan, Sinaloa C.P. 80160, Mexico; R.F.C. PET-990309-G64 (Mexico) [SDNTK]. -to- PETROBARRANCOS, S.A. DE C.V. (n.k.a. SERVICIOS Y GASOLINERAS BARRANCOS, S.A. DE C.V.), Av. Benjamin Hill No. 5602, Col. Industrial el Palmito, Culiacan, Sinaloa C.P. 80160, Mexico; R.F.C. PET-990309-G64 (Mexico) [SDNTK].

SERVICIOS CHULAVISTA, S.A. DE C.V., Blvd. Las Torres No. 2622 Pte., Fracc. Prados del Sol, Culiacan, Sinaloa C.P. 80197, Mexico; Calzada Las Torres S/N, Col. Prados del Sol Etapa 1, Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; R.F.C. SCU-070904-T25 (Mexico) [SDNTK]. -to- SERVICIOS CHULAVISTA, S.A. DE C.V. (n.k.a. GASOLINERA EL CRUCERO LAS TORRES, S.A. DE C.V.), Blvd. Las Torres No. 2622 Pte., Fracc. Prados del Sol, Culiacan, Sinaloa C.P. 80197, Mexico; Calzada Las Torres S/N, Col. Prados del Sol Etapa 1, Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico; R.F.C. SCU-070904-T25 (Mexico) [SDNTK].

Link:

OFAC Notice

Posted with Blogsy

And yesterday’s lucky winner: Vassyly Kotosky Villarroel Ramirez

The SDTNK designated yesterday warranted another press release from the US Treasury Department:

Treasury Targets Venezuelan Narcotics Trafficker

Action Designates Former Venezuelan Military Official, Previously Indicted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of New York, Who Aided Mexican Drug Cartels

WASHINGTON –

The U.S. Department of the Treasury today designated Venezuelan national, Vassyly Kotosky Villarroel Ramirez, as a drug kingpin pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act). Villarroel Ramirez, a former Captain in Venezuela’s National Guard (Guardia Nacional), was designated for the significant role he plays in international narcotics trafficking in both Colombia and Venezuela. While serving as a Captain in Venezuela’s National Guard, Villarroel Ramirez arranged for the transportation of loads of cocaine as well as the U.S. dollar proceeds from the sale of the cocaine, using various airports, seaports, and official government vehicles in Venezuela. Today’s action complements a 2011 indictment against Villarroel Ramirez by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of New York (EDNY) on multiple cocaine trafficking charges.

“Villarroel Ramirez is a prime example of a narcotics trafficker who exploited his former military position and connections to facilitate the transport of cocaine to Mexico and profit from the sales that followed,” said Treasury’s Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Adam J. Szubin. “We will continue to work with our law enforcement colleagues to target this type of abusive behavior which perpetuates the criminal violence linked to the narcotics trade.”

Villarroel Ramirez provided security and protection when cocaine loads and the proceeds from Mexico were smuggled from or into Venezuela’s Maiquetía International Airport via commercial or private aircraft. He facilitated the cocaine loads from Colombia through Venezuela in partnership with known drug traffickers such as Daniel Barrera Barrera (alias “El Loco Barrera”), Javier Antonio Calle Serna (alias “Comba”), and Jose Gerardo Alvarez Vazquez (alias “El Indio”) – all of whom have been designated as foreign narcotics traffickers under the Kingpin Act. The cocaine shipments benefited Mexican drug trafficking organizations, specifically the Sinaloa Cartel, Los Zetas, and the Beltran Leyva Organization – all of which have been identified by the President as significant foreign narcotics traffickers under the Kingpin Act.

On March 30, 2011, Villarroel Ramirez and a co-conspirator were indicted in the EDNY on six counts of cocaine trafficking-related charges. According to the indictment, between January 2004 and December 2009 Villarroel Ramirez and the co-conspirator imported thousands of kilograms of cocaine from Colombia through Venezuela to Mexico, for transportation to and distribution within the United States. Also, Villarroel Ramirez is reportedly charged with narcotics trafficking and money laundering in Venezuela since 2008.

Today’s action, taken pursuant to the Kingpin Act, generally prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in any transactions with Villarroel Ramirez and freezes any assets he may have under U.S. jurisdiction.

This action would not have been possible without the support of the Drug Enforcement Administration and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations.

Since June 2000, the President has identified 103 drug kingpins, and OFAC has designated more than 1,300 businesses and individuals, pursuant to the Kingpin Act. Penalties for violations of the Kingpin Act range from civil penalties of up to $1.075 million per violation to more severe criminal penalties. Criminal penalties for corporate officers may include up to 30 years in prison and fines up to $5 million. Criminal fines for corporations may reach $10 million. Other individuals face up to 10 years in prison and fines pursuant to Title 18 of the United States Code for criminal violations of the Kingpin Act.