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1994 or 1995: More advanced components for P-2 centrifuges are suspected to have arrived in Iran. B.S.A. Tahir, a Sri Lankan business man and Khan's chief lieutenant, told Malaysian police that Iran paid approximately $3 million for these centrifuge parts.
Mid 1990s:
-- Khan starts travel to North Korea where he receives technical assistance for the development of the Ghauri missile, an adaptation of the North Korean No Dong design. Khan makes at least 13 visits before his public confession in 2004 and is suspected of arranging a barter deal to exchange nuclear and missile technologies, though the details of any nuclear transfers remain unknown.
-- Khan is suspected to have met with a top Syrian official in Beirut to offer assistance with a centrifuge enrichment facility.
1997:
-- Khan begins to transfer centrifuges and centrifuge components to Libya. Libya receives 20 assembled P-1 centrifuges and components for 200 additional units for a pilot enrichment facility. Khan's network will continue to supply with centrifuge components until late 2003.
-- Khan is suspected of beginning nuclear transfers to North Korea around this time, though the dates of the first transfers are highly uncertain. Transfers to North Korea are believed to have continued through 2003, but the Pakistani government claims these transfers ceased in 2001. Over this period, Khan may have supplied North Korea with old and discarded centrifuge and enrichment machines together with sets of drawings, sketches, technical data, and depleted uranium hexafluoride.
1998:
-- India detonates a total of five devices in nuclear tests on May 11 and 13.
-- Pakistan responds with six nuclear tests on May 28 and 30.
2000: SEPTEMBER: Libya receives two P-2 centrifuges as demonstrator models and places an order for components for 10,000 more to build a cascade. Each centrifuge contains around 100 parts, implying approximately 1 million parts total for the entire P-2 centrifuge cascade.
2001:
-- Libya obtains 1.87 tons of uranium hexafluoride, the gas that is used to feed enrichment centrifuges. The amount is consistent with that required for a small pilot enrichment facility.
-- MARCH: Khan is forced into retirement. Khan refuses the compensatory position of "advisor to the chief executive" and is later given the ceremonial title of "Special Advisor to the Chief Executive on Strategic and KRL Affairs."
-- SUMMER: American spy satellites detect missile components being loaded into a Pakistani cargo plane outside of Pyongyang. Intelligence services assume the cargo to be missile technology traded in direct exchange for nuclear technology, but no hard evidence exists.
-- DECEMBER: B.S.A. Tahir signs a $13 million contract with Scomi Precision Engineering (SCOPE) in Malaysia for 25,000 aluminum centrifuge components.
Late 2001 or Early 2002: Libya receives blueprints for nuclear weapons plans. The plans are reported to be of Chinese origin with Chinese notes in the margins.
2002: DECEMBER: Shipments begin from SCOPE of aluminum centrifuge components. Four shipments are believed to have been sent from Malaysia to Dubai before August 2003, en route to Libya.
2003:
-- OCTOBER: The German cargo ship BBC China is intercepted en route to Libya with components for 1,000 centrifuges. The parts were manufactured in Malaysia by SCOPE and shipped through Dubai.
-- DECEMBER: Libya renounces its nuclear weapons program and begins the process of full disclosure to the IAEA, including the declaration of all foreign procurements.
2004:
-- FEB. 4: Khan makes a public confession on Pakistani television (in English) of his illegal nuclear dealings. Khan claims that he initiated the transfers and cites an "error of judgment." He is pardoned soon after by President Musharraf and has been under house arrest since. The Pakistani government claims that Khan acted independently and without state knowledge.
-- MARCH: A container aboard the BBC China (the ship that was previously intercepted) arrives in Libya with one additional container of P-2 centrifuge components. Colonel Qaddafi reports the arrival to American intelligence and the IAEA. The Libyans warn American officials that not all of the components from Libya's orders had arrived and some might still show up in the future.