The way of ideas
Medieval prelude
Plato’s conception of Ideas or essences as the true objects of knowledge had fateful implications for the way the soul was understood in both the ancient and the medieval worlds. This can be illustrated by the semantic vicissitudes of the word Idea, which he introduced into philosophical parlance. Etymologically, the word derives from the Greek verb eidô (“to look”), and, in its original pre-philosophical use, it meant something like the visual look of a thing. In Plato’s usage, however, it was as if this visual form had been detached from the object in question (and from the particularity that accrued to it there) and elevated to the rank of a universal archetype. As such, it became an object of thought (rather than of perception) and of knowledge in its most authentic and rigorous form. Even though Ideas in Plato’s account were not housed in any soul or mind, in Christian theology such archetypes were thought to reside in the mind of God, who created the world using them as his models. But if the infinite mind of God was the locus of Ideas and if God created man in his “image and likeness,” it followed that the knowledge achieved by finite human minds must also be knowledge through Ideas. By this route, Ideas were brought back down to earth again, albeit at one remove from the perceptual objects themselves out of which the concept of an Idea had originally been derived. In this way, the (now) familiar sense of the term has emerged in which it designates what is in a person’s mind when he comes to know something, whether through perception or memory or thought. An “idea” is thus representative in the sense that it is a mental content that stands for something that is outside the mind and is known through this idea.
The thesis that intelligible forms are internal to the mind of God gave a very different character to the whole conception of the soul-mind and the goal of its knowledge. Mainly under the influence of the Christian philosopher St. Augustine (354–430), the vocation of the soul was redefined as an aspiration for a vision of and union with God. By comparison, knowledge of both the intelligible realm of Plato and the natural world to which so much of Aristotle’s thought was devoted were of secondary interest. This distinctly Augustinian tradition maintained itself through the Middle Ages and found expression in writings such as St. Bonaventure’s Journey of the Mind to God (1259), yet it was not the dominant strain of thought during that period.
That position developed from the Aristotelian conception of the mind as the form of a living body, as set forth in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. The soul-mind was also conceived as receiving the forms of the objects it comes to know in the same unhesitatingly realistic spirit as in Aristotle’s thought without any evident awareness of the skeptical possibilities inherent in the contrast on which this conception rested. Even in the early modern period, when a reaction set in against Aristotle’s doctrine of essential form, it was still axiomatic that the objects with which the mind deals in all its forms of knowledge are “ideas”—i.e., mental representations of things that are typically outside the mind.