idealism

The mystical argument

In the third argument, the idealist holds that in the individual’s most immediate experience, that of his own subjective awareness, the intuitive self can achieve a direct apprehension of ultimate reality, which reveals it to be spiritual. Thus, the mystic bypasses normal cognition, feeling that, for metaphysical probings, the elaborate processes of mediation interposed between sense objects and their perceptions reduces its reliability as compared to the direct grasp of intuition.

It is significant that the claims of this argument have been made by numerous thinkers, in varying degrees idealistic and mystical, living in different periods and in different cultures. In ancient Greece, for example, it was made by Plato, to whom the final leap to the form of the Good was mystical in nature. In Indian Hindu Vedanta philosophy, it was made by the 8th-century monistic theologian Shankara and by the 11th-century dualistic Brahmin theist Ramanuja. In Buddhism the claims were made by the sometimes mystical, extreme subjectivism of the Vijnanavada school of Mahayana (represented by Ashvaghosha in the 1st and Asanga in the 4th century) and in China by the Zen school and by the 7th-century scholar Hui-neng, author of its basic classic The Platform Scripture. In Islamic lands it was made by Sufis (mystics)—in particular, by the 13th-century Persian writer Jalal al-Din Rumi. And in the West during the late 19th and early 20th centuries it was made by several distinguished idealists: in Germany, by the seminal modern theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher; in France, by the evolutionary intuitionist Henri Bergson, by the philosopher of action Maurice Blondel, and by the Jewish religious existentialist Martin Buber; and in English-speaking countries, by the Scottish metaphysician James Frederick Ferrier and the American Hegelian William E. Hocking.