By LtCol Larry D. Huffman & Maj Jeffrey W. Hannay - Originally published in December 1997 Marine Corps Gazette
Security at the expeditionary airfield requires training, focus, organization, and sacrifice of comfort.
The Marine wing support squadron (MWSS) has the mission of providing security for the flight line and critical airfield facilities or security at the forward operating base (FOB), one of the 13 functions of aviation ground support (AGS). This role includes FOB defense, a much broader concept. In discussing the role of the MWSS, the terms security and defense are often used interchangeably. The security mission is too often ignored in garrison when competing against other operational commitments. This article discusses the security mission of the MWSS in the defense of an FOB, addresses shortfalls, and offers a solution without increasing structure.
FOB is a broad term that includes main airbases, air facilities, air sites, and air points. FMFM 5-1, Organization and Function of Marine Aviation defines all but the forward arming and refueling point, a subelement of an air point, as secure airfields or in a secure location.
Security is a relative term. It is a matter of degree, not an absolute that precludes catastrophe. Before the bombing, the Federal Building in Oklahoma City was considered secure; as was the Air Force barracks in Saudi Arabia, the World Trade Center, and the Marine barracks in Beirut.
`Let the MPs and GCE Do It' Within the MWSS, security responsibilities are too often believed to reside with its military police (MP) department. Also, many erroneously assume that the ground combat element (GCE) will be assigned to defend the FOB. Both of these assumptions are flawed.
MWSS MPs alone cannot handle the security mission at an FOB. Under most threat conditions, the aviation combat element (ACE) commander will require a more robust security force. And it is doubtful GCE assets will be available for defensive operations except under the most extreme tactical situation.
In garrison, MWSS MPs, 1 officer and 72 enlisted Marines, are under the command of the headquarters and service squadron of the air station through the Fleet Assistance Program (FAP). Operational focus and training targets law enforcement, manning vehicle control points, and flight line security. Some training is provided in riot control and reaction to a terrorist threat. This focus is a natural consequence of the physical security needs of the station commander in a nontactical environment.
All would be well if the GCE could defend the airfield on a constant basis. The ACE might be able to depend on the GCE participating in the local defense of the FOB if the threat was from conventional forces; entirely possible even considering the extended distance the FOB may be located from the main battle. However, after securing the FOB, subsequent ground battles to defend the airfield should be fought far away-rear area security should place minimal reliance on the GCE.
Every Marine a Rifleman
Can other Marines within the MWSS augment the MPs to provide security at the FOB? The answer is yes, but at a cost-other AGS functions are degraded. The MWSS table of organization was developed from the ground up to meet minimum AGS requirements. There aren't a lot of excesses in personnel.
All Marines receive training in defensive tactics and crew-served weapons employment before they reach their first operational command. However, once aboard that command, additional training, focus, and organization are needed along with a dedicated command group to conduct additional training.
Following boot camp, every noninfantry Marine completes a rigorous 17 days of Marine Combat Training (MCT), most of which is in a field environment. An occupational specialty school follows. The basic infantry skills of the MCT-trained Marine soon atrophy in the AGS-focused unit. Training within the MWSS is often limited to annual, possibly semiannual, crew-served weapon shoots and infrequent opportunities that deploy portions of the MWSS to the field. The entire MWSS seldom deploys since an average of 26 percent of its structure is subject to the FAP to support garrison requirements. The lance corporal who 10 months ago trained at MCT on the employment of the .50 caliber machinegun, MK19 grenade launcher, AT4, M249 squad automatic weapon, and M240G machinegun, can still put rounds down range, but lacks more advanced infantry skills. More importantly, the technical infantry skills required of a noncommissioned officer employed in an infantry role are slight.
When the commander elects to move the airplanes closer to the forward edge of the battle area to provide the most responsive close air support, he accepts additional risk in exchange for greater capability. This requires accepting increased threat from terrorists and agent saboteurs or from unconventional forces. The converse also is true; we can reduce risk by operating from further away. Yet we can never eliminate risk completely. The potential insecurity posed by these threats exists everywhere, even from the relatively safe confines of a host nation.
A New Approach
To enhance security at the FOB requires understanding that the security mission is too large for MPs alone and that the GCE will be employed elsewhere in all but the most extreme situations. The MW SS must form and train a provisional rifle company (PRC) from organic squadron personnel and equipment. MWSS-273 recently tested this concept with success.
Forming the PRC began in November 1996 with a position paper sketching the doctrinal issues associated with rear area security at an FOB. The commander's intent emphasized identifying shortfalls in security measures as well as the right equipment, training, personnel assignment, and operational logic. The notional table of organization was carefully developed to ensure that no function of AGS could be terminated at the FOB, but accepting that some AGS capabilities would be degraded.
The commanding general of the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing was briefed in May, and he quickly approved the formation of PRCs for all 2d Marine Aircraft Wing MWSSs.
At the FOB, the PRC will most likely be employed full time; however, the decision to employ the PRC rests with the commanding officer of the ACE, who should seek the advice of the MWSS commanding officer. The decision is based on a continuous threat analysis, external forces available to protect against that threat, and a determination of what AGS capability is degraded when the PRC is employed. To preclude a ground attack from disrupting air operations, the security mission at the FOB must be much more than concertina wire around the ammunition supply point, barricades at entry points, and a cursory check of an identification badge against an access roster.
The S-3 organizes the other functions of AGS, less security. The PRC is commanded by a major, the S-4, who is assigned as the tactical security officer (TSO) and commands the company from a cell colocated with the command operations center. That cell, or base defense operations center, (BDOC), reports through the commanding officer of the MWSS to the ACE.
The TSO is responsible for the coordination of all security elements associated with the FOB to include any tenant units assigned defensive sectors. A small section of the PRC is tasked with serving as liaison to other tenant units being integrated into the ACE defensive plan.
The TSO trains one MWSS rifle platoon, a weapons platoon, and the MP department. A second rifle platoon is in cadre and is expected to be formed only when the highest threat level exists. All Marines assigned to the PRC are released from their normal duties during training to include MPs who remain assigned to the FAP. The PRC trains 2 consecutive days each month to refresh skills learned at MCT.
The tactics of the PRC are basic. Employment concepts include:
- Point security of critical airfield facilities versus perimeter.
- Foot and mobile patrols.
- Manning entry points.
- A mobile reaction force.
- Use of organic personal and crew-served weapons.
- Use of the PPS-15 ground radar intrusion detection system and night vision equipment.
- Construction of fortifications and barriers.
- Use of lighting to improve security.
- Observation and listening posts.
The major value in the PRC is that the members of the company train together on a recurring basis emphasizing reaction drills and synchronization as well as crew served weapons employment. Focusing on the basics of defensive operations is essential in preventing the over-extension of the capabilities of the PRC.
MWSS-273 continues to refine the concept. This includes testing a standing operating procedure for the BDOC, conducting a study to identify any additional communications requirements, and hopefully integrating the unit into an ACE-level exercise. The MWSS exercise objective would be to determine if the MWSS could provide all AGS functions while defending the airfield with the PRC. The most difficult task in forming the PRC has been in integrating PRC specific training with the FAPed MPs who must concurrently execute their garrison duties.
The MWSS can provide the means to defend against Level I and II threats at the FOB using the PRC while maintaining other functions of AGS. Though defensive training sacrifices normal assignments, FOB security requirements dictate the priority. Our ongoing experiment with the formation, training, and employment of the PRC indicates that the concept is valid and that it will contribute to the expeditionary capability of Marine aviation.
Planning Considerations
Force protection requires aggressive action by the commander deployed in an expeditionary environment. The best efforts of any security element at the FOB will fail without absolute commitment to security, sacrifice of many conveniences, and the closest coordination between the MWSS and the ACE.
Implementing appropriate security measures at the FOB is an inconvenience for tenant commands, which is probably why it is often ignored during exercises. Deploying to an established airfield in or near urban areas presents a major challenge for the MWSS in meeting the security needs of the ACE. The lack of appropriate security measures invites catastrophe and can have strategic implications reaching far beyond the tactical costs when force protection efforts fail.
The first belt of security provided by the PRC must begin far from the runway. This requires that a clearly marked no-man's land be established thousands of yards, preferably miles, from the airfield.
The experience of the Air Force after the Khobar Tower bombing provides a recent precedent. The Air Force now flies 200 sorties per day in Saudi Arabia from the Prince Sultan Air Base enforcing the "no-fly zone" in Iraq. The complex's outer fence lies no closer than three miles to the inner perimeter. This is a lesson learned and reinforced by the Pentagon's initial inquiry into the Khobar Towers blast that killed 19 Airmen in June of 1996. "Force protection had not been given sufficient priority by the prior commander."
Segregating the airfield from the local population is the most effective way to secure it from a Level I or II threat. Civilians standing directly outside the fence to watch and photograph airplanes preparing and returning from combat air patrols in Bosnia, as was happening at Aviano, Italy, is a clear invitation to the compromise of security. How easy it remains for a terrorist in a small pick-up to stop at a roadside restaurant adjacent to the airfield, remove the canvas covering a mortar, and then fire a couple of rounds onto the airfield. The terrorist would be able to cover the weapon and be on his way before the last round exploded. Even one rifle shot observed impacting on the airfield, fired from the relative safety of a passing vehicle, could affect flight operations for an extended period.
Internal areas marked as off-limits at the FOB must be enforced by tenant commanders allowing the PRC member free fire zones when movement is detected. The MWSS or combat service support element must provide full logistics support to the FOB. Contractors and host nation workers provide an inherent security risk. If the resulting environment of the expeditionary airfield is austere, it must be accepted. Improved security generally implies sacrifices in creature comforts or inconvenience for deployed forces. Measuring what is prudent against what is "nice to have" will be the commander's responsibility. BGen Daniel M. Dick, USAF, who took over the base command at the Prince Sultan Air Base after the Khobar bombing, said, "We don't do anything for convenience or efficiency (anymore) . . . Force protection-it's obviously job one' for us."
The personnel requirements for force protection are staggering. Four hundred of the 4,000 people at Prince Sultan Air Base are dedicated to providing security.
Terrorism as exemplified by Khobar, Beirut, the World Trade Center, and Oklahoma City are as much a means of waging war for our adversaries as conventional forces. It provides an asymmetrical option for the terrorist that effectively offsets our enormous combat power. Our continued reliance on host nation support makes us all too vulnerable. It is all too easy to emphasize host nation facility support over security. Prefacing nearly every major U.S. deployment is a contracting officer arranging for the essentials of U.S. life . . . porta-johns, pay telephones, and fresh food. Even if routinely searched, the truck coming through the gate to service the portajohns under a contract vendor could contain enough explosives to kill many or destroy a critical airfield facility.
Summary
Major improvements to the security at the FOB are within our grasp. The ACE must demand security and require that all exercises integrate real FOB security measures as a training objective. The ACE along with all tenants of the airfield must accept the inconvenience that adequate security measures require. And, finally, the ACE with its MWSS must rely on internal assets, such as the provisional rifle company at MWSS-273, for FOB security.
>LtCol Huffman is a combat engineer and the commanding officer of MWSS-273 at Beaufort, SC. Maj Hannay is the executive officer of MWSS-273 and an F/A-18 pilot.
>>Information regarding Air Force security at the Prince Sultan Air Base was taken from an Associated Press article that appeared in the 21 January 1997 Beaufort (S.C.) Gazette.
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