October 7, 2012 3:40 PM
By Karen Hodgson

On the evening of Oct. 3, two Tunisian citizens were detained at Istanbul's Atatürk Airport as they tried to enter Turkey with false passports. On Oct. 4, a 'breaking news' special report by the Turkish news channel Kanal D claimed that the two Tunisian citizens (aged 30-35) were on the list of persons wanted for killing the US Ambassador to Libya, Chris Stevens. Since then, conflicting reports have emerged in the Turkish media and it is still unclear whether both men are being held, both are being deported, or, as one newspaper reports, one detainee has been deported and the other jailed in Turkey for a separate crime.

Reports on Oct. 5 offered further details, some of them conflicting. One report claimed that the two suspects' names had been on a list that the CIA had provided to the intelligence agencies of Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. According to the report, these intelligence units had then passed the names to their border units. In Turkey, the CIA had informed the Turkish Central Intelligence Agency (MIT) and the Turkish Police Department. As the two Tunisians tried to enter Turkey, their names coincided with those on the list. The two were taken to the Istanbul Anti-Terror Unit and interrogated, and a comprehensive investigation had been started on whom they planned to meet in Turkey, the report concluded.

Another Oct. 5 report claimed that the Istanbul Police Department denied that the two Tunisians were arrested as suspects in the murder of the ambassador. Similarly, another newspaper claimed that Istanbul security had denied that the two men were linked to Ambassador Stevens' murder, and claimed that the two men were detained for using fake passports and were being deported.

On Oct. 6, a newspaper reported that the two Tunisians were found not to be linked to the murder of Ambassador Stevens. The Tunisian detainee with the initials A.O. was allegedly jailed; while the other, with the initials J.B., was released and deported to his country. No information was given about the reason for A.O's imprisonment.

(1)

October 6, 2012 12:01 PM
By Bill Roggio

The Al Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant, an al Qaeda-linked jihadist group that is fighting Bashir al Assad's regime in Syria, has released two photographs of the execution of Syrian soldiers reportedly captured in Aleppo [one of the photographs is reproduced above]. The soldiers were "from the Hanano barracks" according to the statement that was released by the group. The short statement was released on Sept. 3 and translated by the SITE Intelligence Group on Oct. 3.

The photos of the execution are eerily similar to video footage of al Qaeda in Iraq's execution of Iraqi policemen in Haditha in March 2012. In that video, the captured Iraqi policemen are tied up and placed in a line. An al Qaeda fighter then walks down the line and executes the policemen with a pistol. To watch the video of the Haditha executions, see LWJ report, Al Qaeda in Iraq video details deadly raid in Haditha.

Al Nusrah's tactics, operations, and propaganda are nearly identical to those of al Qaeda in Iraq. Al Nusrah has now claimed credit for 26 of the 33 suicide attacks that have taken place in Syria since December 2011. The Syrian terror group conducts complex suicide assaults, ambushes, IED attacks, and assassinations. Just as al Qaeda in Iraq rails against the Shia, Al Nusrah says its attacks are directed against the Nusayri, or Alawite, enemy. Alawites are a sect of Shia Islam, and President Assad's regime is supported by Iran.

(6)

October 6, 2012 11:20 AM
By Bill Roggio

The Yemeni military today prevented a terrorist suicide attack, and possibly a suicide assault, on an airbase in Lahj province that houses US military trainers as well as unmanned US strike aircraft, or drones. From the Yemen Post:

The Yemeni army thwarted on Saturday a suicide attempt against al-Anad air force located in South Yemen in which US soldiers are existed.

Military sources said that a bomb car managed to infiltrate into al-Qaeda in Lahj governorate with the aim of carrying out an suicide bombing, pointing out that it planned to target US soldiers who train Yemeni troops on counterterrorism.

"The car was seized while it was hidden under trees and it was ready to be exploded" they added. "The bombs were defused and the investigation on the care are ongoing."

Reuters reported that two men were detained, and that "anti-tank missiles" were contained within the car.

Al Anad has long been known to host the Reapers that are used to hunt al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leaders and fighters in Yemen [see these reports at USA Today and Asharq Alawsat].

Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and allied groups have made airbases in Afghanistan and Pakistan a prime target, and the terror groups have had some success with these raids over the past several years. The last such attack, on Sept. 14 at Camp Bastion in Helmand province, Afghanistan, resulted in the destruction of six USMC Harriers and the death of the squadron commander and a sergeant.

(1)

October 5, 2012 9:09 AM
By Bill Ardolino

Source: US CENTCOM via the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Click on image for larger version.

According to a recent study, the drastic improvement in Iraq's security during 2007-2008 was due to a synergistic combination of the Iraqi tribal Awakening and US forces. The data-based analysis, published over the summer in International Security, stresses the importance of the 2007 'Surge' of American forces and the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy, but assigns much of the credit to conditions specific to Iraq at the time. In "Testing the Surge," authors Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro maintain that the Surge and COIN worked, but only in the unique context of a widespread uprising against al Qaeda and other extremist groups.

The study's methodology relied on the following:

1. cross-referencing a dataset of 193,264 "significant activities" (SIGACTS; military vernacular for 'attacks' or 'security incidents');

2. examination of 70 interviews with Coalition officers who were serving in 90% of the areas where the SIGACTS during this period occurred (12 of these officers served in the same area before and after trends in violence); and

3. data on civilian and sectarian casualties (19,961 incidents, which included 59,245 civilian deaths) from "Iraq Body Count."

The authors' application of these sources and methodology to test four "candidate explanations" -- the Surge, the Awakening, Sectarian Cleansing, and the 'Synergy theory' -- is convincing. But their analysis is missing a few major factors, and portions of the piece are open to criticism.

Back in November 2007, I wrote a LWJ report on 'Why the violence has declined in Iraq,' summarizing the factors US military leaders commonly believed were responsible for the improvement in security. These included:

1. The Surge and COIN
2. The Awakening ('the rise of the Iraqi people and reconciliation')
3. Strengthened Iraqi security forces
4. The theory that sectarian cleansing and refugee flight had run their course
5. The truce with elements of the Mahdi Army
6. Improved border control of foreign fighters and weapons

The authors of the International Security piece address three of these six factors in depth [listed in bold above]: the Surge, the tribal 'Awakening,' and the theory that sectarian killing had burned itself out. But the piece does not address the growth in the ISF, the Mahdi Army's cyclical military and political posture, and the fluctuating porosity of the border (the latter a function of peaks and valleys in Iranian efforts to stoke instability, status of tribal alliances along Anbar's border, and diplomatic pressure on Syria).

To those six factors, I would also retroactively add another item unmentioned in my 2007 piece: the incessant string of Joint Special Operations Command night raids that bled insurgent leadership and middle management during this period. While arguably part of the Surge, this component of the American strategy preceded official counterinsurgency efforts and operated (somewhat) independently from them.

A more complete analysis of the reasons for reduced violence would review a few of these other factors, especially an analysis of the increased size and operational capability of Iraqi Security Forces, and correlations between SIGACTs and the changing status of the Mahdi Army's political and military posture (accounting for its degree of centralized control of cells) throughout 2007 and 2008.

Beyond a narrow focus on only three factors, Biddle et al. also open themselves to criticism in their dismissal of the sectarian cleansing argument. If the "sectarian thesis" is defined as a "completion of the process" -- concluded refugee flight, total sectarian segregation, and hyperbole like Patrick Cockburn's cited quote that "the killing stopped because there was no one left to kill" -- then the study's authors have resoundingly refuted the argument. But the sectarian thesis has shades of grey. The idea that sectarian conflict, and the resulting flight of refugees, had progressed far enough to enable a pause during which displaced Iraqis could benefit from the rise of Sons of Iraq militias and the increase in US and Iraqi checkpoints, is one that remains worthy of consideration.

With those criticisms in mind, I wholeheartedly agree with Biddle et al. that the US Surge and the Awakening exponentially reinforced each other, and that this synergy is responsible for most of the change in security. The authors' list of tribal Awakenings that failed without sufficient US engagement prior to 2007 compellingly demonstrates how the tribal security movement could have fizzled in the absence of additional US forces and a widespread focus on counterinsurgency doctrine. Simply put, al Qaeda and other jihadi-salafist organizations were too well-funded, too strong, and too ruthless for the tribes and Iraqi security forces to gain rapid momentum without US support.

In my forthcoming book Fallujah Awakens, to be published by Naval Institute Press in April 2013, I examine how the Awakening and counterinsurgency strategy combined to influence the Fallujah area during 2006-2007. The book makes the following argument about the synergy theory and the specific impact of the American counterinsurgency (COIN) effort:

COIN has been the subject of controversy in punditry and military circles; its supporters credit the doctrine with saving the Iraq enterprise, and they later sought to impose a similar strategy in Afghanistan. Its detractors claim that local dynamics, and not the change in American methodology, were responsible for Iraq's turnaround. Both camps make valid points. But ultimately, the U.S. military supported local developments with the effective use of COIN to halt the growth of radical insurgent groups and Iraq's slide toward civil war.
...
Many critics of the military's counterinsurgency focus are correct in the assertion that the doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all template for success when fighting an insurgency. The conditions that enabled quick gains in Iraq, such as more tribal and geographic homogeneity, a more centralized population, greater nationalism, and a widely hated common enemy in al Qaeda, are not as prevalent in Afghanistan. In addition, some doubters argue that the popular Western media narrative of Petraeus and his advisors rescuing Iraq with a novel strategy is also overplayed. These criticisms have merit. Local political conditions, many of them outside of America's control, are responsible for much of the rapid security progress seen in Iraq during 2007-2008.

But critics of COIN go too far when they diminish the impact of both the 2007 American "surge" and the strategy behind it. The conditions for rapidly improving security may have been specific to Iraq, but they were supported by the U.S. military's implementation of essential components of the doctrine. Most pivotal was a reengagement by American forces, which projected into the population, incrementally choked off insurgent freedom of movement, supported local security forces, and protected civilians. I saw it work. And more significantly, the doctrine was lauded to me by everyday Fallujans who were not inclined to praise the Americans. Security volunteers, politicians, and day laborers matter-of-factly credited the effectiveness of Iraqi cops and US Marines, and the civil affairs engagement of the latter, with turning around local opinion and security in their area.

Counterinsurgency doctrine is not miraculous. Perfectly applied in most political environments, it is a methodology that can take years and years to yield tangible gains. But COIN made a rapid difference in Iraq, and understanding its promise and limitations will have further value if America finds itself embroiled in another complex fight against an insurgency.

The backlash against COIN, the Surge, and the narrative that Petraeus rode into theater on a white stallion to rescue Iraq is understandable, in light of the doctrine's muddled impact on Afghanistan, and simplistic media portrayals of the Iraq war that devalue the contribution by Awakening forces and 'Sons of Iraq' militias. But the Surge and COIN worked in the context of the Awakening.

This was evident to me from the testimony of US personnel, and from witnessing the effect of the reanimated American campaign. However, it was really driven home by the candid admissions of Iraqis who credited Americans with giving them the support they needed to find their feet and take the fight to both al Qaeda in Anbar and the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. In that respect, while the International Security piece would have ideally examined more factors, it nevertheless makes a valuable contribution to the conflict's history. The authors have taken this thesis to a more detailed level with their review of objective data and the addition of 70 interviews worth of primary research.

(16)

October 2, 2012 11:24 PM
By Bill Roggio

The 'let's negotiate with the Taliban' crowd in Washington and Europe must be fighting off a major case of depression today after reading this report at The New York Times. An excerpt:

With the surge of American troops over and the Taliban still a potent threat, American generals and civilian officials acknowledge that they have all but written off what was once one of the cornerstones of their strategy to end the war here: battering the Taliban into a peace deal.

The once ambitious American plans for ending the war are now being replaced by the far more modest goal of setting the stage for the Afghans to work out a deal among themselves in the years after most Western forces depart, and to ensure Pakistan is on board with any eventual settlement. Military and diplomatic officials here and in Washington said that despite attempts to engage directly with Taliban leaders this year, they now expect that any significant progress will come only after 2014, once the bulk of NATO troops have left.

"I don't see it happening in the next couple years," said a senior coalition officer. He and a number of other officials spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the delicacy of the effort to open talks.

"It's a very resilient enemy, and I'm not going to tell you it's not," the officer said. "It will be a constant battle, and it will be for years."

And so yet another pillar of the Obama administration's Afghanistan strategy collapses.

You can be sure the short knives will be out to cast blame on one party or another for sabotaging the negotiation efforts (the NYT report lists two villains: Congressional opposition to freeing five al Qaeda-linked Taliban leaders; and the 'moderate' political wing of the Taliban being outmaneuvered by the radical 'military' wing).

But the Taliban were never serious about negotiations to begin with. I've long argued that the US truly had little idea as to the real intentions of the power brokers within the Taliban, and often were talking to former Taliban wannabes attempting to peddle influence (like Mutawakil and Zaeef), or in one case, a Taliban impostor. Additionally, I've pointed out that there has been no split between al Qaeda and the Taliban, and the Taliban were never willing to renounce the terror group and turn over its leaders.

Finally, I'm going to refer you to something I wrote in June 2011 on the issue of the 'surge' and its purported ability to batter the Taliban to the negotiating table. The apparent lack of will evidenced by a halfhearted, time-limited surge, combined with the availability of safe havens in Pakistan, gave the Taliban no compelling reason to abandon the fight:

Regardless, it is curious that top US and NATO leaders believe that they can carry out high-level talks with the likes of Mullah Omar, as if the setbacks they have experienced the past year have been far worse than what the Taliban experienced during the US invasion in 2001-2002. The Taliban survived that onslaught, fled to Pakistan, regrouped and refitted, and pushed back into Afghanistan with a vengeance.

The US and NATO have already signaled that they want out of Afghanistan, and will begin the drawdown over the next several years. Even with the US pressure in Helmand and Kandahar the past year, the Taliban still control vast areas of the east and north, as well as pockets in the south. The Afghan security forces are far from ready to take control. The Taliban still have safe haven and state support in Pakistan. Regardless of the Taliban's losses in the past year, they are still in a far better position than they were in late 2002.

If you are interested, you can peruse the following Long War Journal and Threat Matrix articles on supposed negotiations with the Taliban:

• Oct. 7, 2008 - Taliban have not split from al Qaeda: sources
• Oct. 14, 2008 - Taliban mock West for calling Afghanistan unwinnable
• March 6, 2009 - Taliban deny reports of negotiations with Afghan government
• Nov. 23, 2009 - More talk of Taliban talks
• Nov. 26, 2009 - Mullah Omar rejects negotiations
• Jan. 27, 2010 - Taliban talks and Groundhog Day
• Jan. 28, 2010 - Hamid Gul on Taliban negotiations
• Jan. 31, 2010 - The Taliban on General McChrystal and negotiations
• Nov. 15, 2010 - Mullah Omar rejects reports of peace talks, highlights Taliban strategy
• Nov. 23, 2010 - NATO, Afghan officials negotiated with Taliban 'impostor'
• March 17, 2011 - Afghan peace council reportedly seeks talks with Taliban commanders held at Gitmo
• June 19, 2011 - Is the US really negotiating with the Afghan Taliban?
• Dec. 19, 2011 - Taliban seek freedom for dangerous Guantanamo detainees
• Jan 3, 2012 - Taliban releases statement on negotiations
• Feb. 15, 2012 - Taliban expand list of demands, refuse to denounce 'international terrorism'
• Feb. 29, 2012 - Taliban claim CIA 'fabricated' truce letter from Mullah Omar
• March 15, 2012 - Taliban suspend 'dialogue' with US

(19)

October 2, 2012 9:47 PM
By David Barnett

On Oct. 1, two Islamist militants were arrested by Egyptian forces near the city of el-Arish in the North Sinai governorate. The militants, who have since been transferred to Cairo, reportedly threw a grenade as authorities attempted to carry out the arrests, according to Ma'an News Agency. The arrests come just a few days after an Egyptian policeman was stabbed by a suspected jihadist in el-Arish.

Since the beginning of the so-called Arab Spring, a number of Salafi jihadist groups linked to al Qaeda have sprouted up in the Egyptian Sinai, including, but not limited to: al Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula; the Mujahideen Shura Council; Ansar Jerusalem; and Jund al Sharia. The terror groups have conducted attacks against Israel, UN peacekeepers in the Sinai, Egyptian forces, and a pipeline transporting natural gas to Israel and Jordan.

Just over a week ago, members of the jihadist group Ansar Jerusalem attacked Israeli soldiers along the border with Egypt. An Israeli soldier was killed and another was wounded after the terrorists opened fire. Israeli troops killed three terrorists while returning fire; at least one was wearing a suicide vest.

Although some observers suggest that there are only "tens of armed Jihadists" in the Sinai, the issue does not appear to have an end in sight. As a result, concern has arisen among a number of countries, including Egypt, Israel, the United States, and Great Britain.

According to the London-based Al-Hayat, during a recent meeting between Britain's Lieutenant General Simon Vincent Mayall and Egyptian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Sidqy Sobhy, Mayall reiterated that Britain was ready and willing to provide military advice to Egypt in its operations against jihadists in the Sinai.

For more information on al Qaeda-linked jihadist groups operating in the Egyptian Sinai, see LWJ reports, Mujahideen Shura Council calls attack in Israel a 'gift' to Zawahiri and al Qaeda 'brothers' and Ansar al Jihad swears allegiance to al Qaeda's emir; and Threat Matrix report, New jihadist group emerges in the Egyptian Sinai.

(1)

October 2, 2012 11:30 AM
By Lisa Lundquist

In the fog of war it can be difficult to discern what is happening as events unfold. It is getting even harder these days in Afghanistan, where the Taliban have sought to infiltrate Afghan security forces and have instigated an increasing number of green-on-blue, or insider, attacks on Coalition forces. [See LWJ Special Report, Green-on-blue attacks in Afghanistan: the data.]

On Sept. 29 in the troubled Sayyidabad district of Wardak province, an ISAF soldier and a civilian contractor were killed in what the ISAF press release called "a suspected insider attack." The very brief release noted that there were also Afghan army casualties, and that a joint investigation of the incident was underway.

Reports in the Afghan press hinted at a more complex story. Pajhwok News said that five people had been killed and four more were wounded. The account was unclear as to whether the other three people killed were Afghan soldiers, or if the soldier or soldiers who opened fire on the Coalition soldiers was killed or captured. Khaama Press reported "heavy clashes" between Afghan and Coalition forces in Sayyidabad district on Sept. 29.

The following day, conflicting accounts of the incident were being offered by various officials. According to The New York Times, Afghan officials said variously that the clash was a result of a misunderstanding, a verbal argument, an attack by a single Afghan soldier, or a mistaken US response to an insurgent mortar shell. Deputy ISAF commander Lt. Gen. Adrian Bradshaw said that "[w]hat was initially reported to have been a suspected insider attack is now understood to possibly have involved insurgent fire."

Yesterday The Washington Post provided an account that is much more detailed -- and, The Long War Journal has been told, more accurate -- of the events in Sayyidabad on Sept. 29. The events show that, despite increasing vigilance and stricter measures by both Coalition and Afghan military leadership, including the temporary suspension of joint patrols, the physical threat and psychological damage of the insider attacks remain a potent challenge for the Coalition effort in Afghanistan.

Just two days after the relaxation of a temporary ban on joint Afghan-Coalition patrols, a patrol of about 20 US soldiers met up with a contingent of Afghan soldiers who were manning a checkpoint in the village of Sisay in the Tangi Valley. Sayyidabad district and the Tangi Valley have been heavily infiltrated by the Taliban since US forces withdrew from Combat Outpost Tangi in the spring of 2011 and turned it over to Afghan forces, who promptly abandoned it. In August 2011, the Taliban shot down a US Army Chinook helicopter in Sayyidabad, killing 38 US and Afghan troops, including 17 US Navy SEALS from the Naval Special Warfare Development Group.

The US soldiers had come on Saturday afternoon to conduct a routine collection of biometric data from civilians. Pleasantries were exchanged, and the Afghans offered tea to the Americans. While the biometric data was being collected by the US soldiers, suddenly, "without warning or provocation," an Afghan soldier "raised his weapon and opened fire -- mortally wounding the senior American on the patrol," according to a US military official.

After the senior US soldier was shot, a firefight broke out between the US and the Afghan troops. The Washington Post reports: "Another Afghan soldier at the checkpoint opened fire on the Americans, killing a US civilian contractor and wounding two other American soldiers. Soon, Afghan soldiers and possibly insurgents began firing at the Americans from several directions."

An official who had seen the report noted that the Sayyidabad attack represented an unusual type of insider attack in that it involved "multiple attackers from multiple positions." He continued: "Typically we are talking about a single gunman who acted in a somewhat rogue fashion, but in this case we are talking about an entire Afghan army unit and a large loss of life on both sides."

This account of the incident in Sayyidabad raises the specter that Afghan army units may be more heavily infiltrated by Taliban operatives and sympathizers than Coalition officials have been willing to admit, and that such infiltration may involve active collusion with insurgent forces on the ground.

(6)

October 2, 2012 7:05 AM
By Bill Roggio

Kunduz province remains a major hub of activity for the al Qaeda-linked Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a regional terror group that has integrated its operations with the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. The International Security Assistance Force announced that it captured yet another IMU leader in the province today.

An Afghan and coalition security force arrested a senior Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan leader and weapons facilitator in Chahar Darah district, Kunduz province, today. The arrested IMU leader is suspected of planning and conducting improvised explosive device attacks throughout Kunduz province, as well as coordinating the movement of IED materials for future attacks on Afghan and coalition security forces. The security force also detained two suspected insurgents during the operation.

The presence of IMU and al Qaeda cells has been detected in all seven of Kunduz's districts: Aliabad, Archi, Chahar Darah, Imam Sahib, Khanabad, Kunduz, and Qal'ah-ye Zal; according to an investigation by The Long War Journal.

Special operations forces have conducted 12 raids against the IMU in Kunduz province alone so far this year. In the last reported raid, on Sept. 19 in the Qal'ah-ye Zal district, special operations forces captured Qari Yahya, the IMU's top leader for Kunduz. Yayha was "maintaining communication and logistic ties with senior IMU and Taliban leaders" before he was captured.

The IMU has been a prime target of special operations forces in Afghanistan. So far this year, special operations forces have conducted at least 30 raids against the IMU; in Badakhshan, Baghlan, Faryab, Logar, Helmand, Kunduz, Takhar, and Wardak, or eight of Afghanistan's 34 provinces; according to International Security Assistance Force press releases compiled by The Long War Journal.

This spring, ISAF killed the two previous IMU leaders for Afghanistan, in raids just a few weeks apart in Faryab province. [See LWJ report, Special operations forces kill newly appointed IMU leader for Afghanistan, for more information.]

(1)

September 29, 2012 4:57 PM
By Bill Roggio

The US intelligence community is finally coming around to the conclusion that the Sept. 11 attack on the US consulate in Benghazi, Libya, was "a deliberate and organized terrorist attack carried out by extremists," and that "some of those involved were linked to groups affiliated with, or sympathetic to al Qaeda." The admission was made by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The statement is reproduced in full at the end of this article.

If you listened to the briefing by anonymous US State Department officials just one day after the attack, paired the statements up with the local press reports on the Benghazi attack, and also took note that al Qaeda's black banner was raised over the consulate, this all should have been painfully obvious [see Threat Matrix report, Ansar al Shariah issues statement on US Consulate assault in Libya].

US government officials made a major mistake by playing into the narrative that the Benghazi terror assault was merely part of spontaneous protests that broke out due to anger over a clip from a D movie that is offensive to Muslims. Al Qaeda and allied jihadist groups want people to believe that the assault on Benghazi was part of a groundswell of Muslim rage against the film. This can be seen in Ansar al Shariah's non-denial of complicity in the Benghazi attack. This is what Ansar al Shariah said in one of those non-denial denials [emphasis mine]:

Ansar al-Shariah Brigade didn't participate in this popular uprising as a separate entity, but it was carrying out its duties in al-Jala'a hospital and other places where it was entrusted with some duties. The Brigade didn't participate as a sole entity; rather, it was a spontaneous popular uprising in response to what happened by the West.

While Ansar al Shariah wants to obscure its role in Benghazi, a former Guantanamo detainee named Sufyan ben Qumu, who commands a brigade within the group, is thought to have played a major role in the attack. Additionally, US intelligence has intercepted communications between Ansar al Shariah and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, in which the former bragged to the latter about its role in the assault.

Statement on the intelligence related to the terrorist attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya

In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on U.S. personnel and facilities in Benghazi, Libya, the Intelligence Community launched a comprehensive effort to determine the circumstances surrounding the assault and to identity the perpetrators. We also reviewed all available intelligence to determine if there might be follow-on attacks against our people or facilities in Libya or elsewhere in the world.

As the Intelligence Community collects and analyzes more information related to the attack, our understanding of the event continues to evolve. In the immediate aftermath, there was information that led us to assess that the attack began spontaneously following protests earlier that day at our embassy in Cairo. We provided that initial assessment to Executive Branch officials and members of Congress, who used that information to discuss the attack publicly and provide updates as they became available. Throughout our investigation we continued to emphasize that information gathered was preliminary and evolving.
As we learned more about the attack, we revised our initial assessment to reflect new information indicating that it was a deliberate and organized terrorist attack carried out by extremists. It remains unclear if any group or person exercised overall command and control of the attack, and if extremist group leaders directed their members to participate. However, we do assess that some of those involved were linked to groups affiliated with, or sympathetic to al-Qa'ida. We continue to make progress, but there remain many unanswered questions. As more information becomes available our analysis will continue to evolve and we will obtain a more complete understanding of the circumstances surrounding the terrorist attack.

We continue to support the ongoing FBI investigation and the State Department review of the Benghazi terrorist attack, providing the full capabilities and resources of the Intelligence Community to those efforts. We also will continue to meet our responsibility to keep Congress fully and currently informed. For its part, the Intelligence Community will continue to follow the information about the tragic events in Benghazi wherever it leads. The President demands and expects that we will do this, as do Congress and the American people. As the Intelligence Community, we owe nothing less than our best efforts in this regard, especially to the families of the four courageous Americans who lost their lives at Benghazi in service of their country.

(4)

September 29, 2012 4:28 PM
By Bill Roggio

Just one day after the Kenyan military launched a three-pronged attack that included an amphibious assault, Shabaab relinquished control of the southern port city of Kismayo. After much false bravado about fighting to the death in Kismayo, HSM Press Office, Shabaab's English language Twitter account, announced that "[l]ast night, after more than 5 years the Islamic administration in Kismayo closed its offices," in its first tweet.

Shabaab then promised that "Kismayo shall be transformed from a peaceful city governed by Islamic Shari'ah into a battle-zone between Muslims & the Kuffar invaders."

It was inevitable that the Kenyan, African Union, and Somali forces would eject Shabaab from Kismayo. Shabaab does not have the capacity to confront organized militaries in direct combat. The hard part of the fight lies ahead, however, and Shabaab has experience in waging a protracted insurgency. Shabaab has surrendered overt control of the major cities and is shifting to a guerrilla insurgency, just as its predecessor, the Islamic Courts Union, did in 2007 after suffering a military defeat at the hands of the Ethiopian military.

After the Ethiopian invasion, the jihadist groups in Somalia harassed the Ethiopian military with ambushes, IED and suicide attacks, and assassinations until the Ethiopian forces ultimately withdrew in 2009. Shabaab and its allies then quickly retook control of the major cities and towns in central and southern Somalia that they had lost only two years earlier.

The easy part of the battle against Shabaab -- the conventional military fight -- is essentially over, although Shabaab still controls vast rural areas. The hard part is yet to come, and the resolve of the African Union and Kenyan military will be key in preventing Shabaab from retaking lost ground. The Somali military is not capable of standing up to Shabaab alone, and the weak, fractured, and corrupt government will not inspire Somalis to reject Shabaab.

Three years ago, the Ethiopians ultimately were unwilling to make a major, long-term commitment to Somalia and withdrew in 2009 after Shabaab slowly bled their forces. Will Kenya and the African Union now follow suit, or will they stick it out in Somalia?

Meanwhile, Shabaab has taken advantage of the regional instability during the past five years to expand its network throughout East Africa. In 2010, the terror group carried out two major suicide attacks in Kampala, Uganda. And Shabaab and its affiliate, the Muslim Youth Center, are known to have cells in Kenya and Tanzania.

(3)

September 28, 2012 9:41 AM
By Bill Roggio

AFP reports on a disturbing trend in northern Mali, where al Qaeda-linked jihadists from the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, Ansar Dine, and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb have been in control since February. Foreign jihadists from West African countries such as Togo, Benin, Niger, Nigeria, Guinea, Senegal, and the Ivory Coast are filling out the ranks of the jihadist groups. A Nigerien is identified as a combat commander. AFP also identifies Egyptians, Algerians, and Pakistanis among those operating in northern Mali:

Perhaps the most startling thing about these fighters along this frontier route is that nearly all of them are from sub-Saharan Africa rather than the Maghreb.

"Me too, I am surprised," Nigerien Hicham Bilal, who is leading a katiba (combat unit) to Gao, admitted to AFP. "Every day we have new volunteers. They come from Togo, Benin, Niger, Guinea, Senegal, Algeria and elsewhere."

Since all of them want to go to war, Bilal said, the fighters are no longer divided into separate Islamist movements.

"We are all mujahedeen," he declared. "Here, there's no more MUJAO (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa), Ansar Dine (Defenders of the Faith) or AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb)."

A young Ivorian, clearly a new recruit, boasted: "We are ready for battle. We are waiting for the French or African troops to arrive."

And residents of Gao, the largest city in northern Mali, report that
two training camps for new recruits have been established, according to AFP.

Seven months after the jihadist alliance seized northern Mali, the United Nations, the European Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and countries such as Algeria are still debating on whether to deploy forces to northern Mali.

Unfortunately, this delay has given the jihadists an opportunity to train and organize recruits from the West African nations. Don't be surprised if you see reports that fighters from Mali are returning to their home countries to establish networks there.

(4)

September 27, 2012 1:12 PM
By The LWJ Editors

Ten days ago, US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta claimed that the green-on-blue attacks, in which Afghan security personnel are killing Coalition forces, were evidence of the "last gasp" of the Taliban.

His remarks were ill-timed; just days before, the Taliban stormed Camp Bastion in Helmand province, destroying six of the eight aircraft in a USMC Harrier squadron, and killing the squadron commander and a sergeant. Several days later, the US and NATO suspended operations with Afghan forces due to the green-on-blue attacks. Meanwhile, data released by ISAF continues to show that the Taliban remains a resilient fighting force, not one whose "momentum is broken," as President Obama has characterized it. The comments by Panetta and Obama are reminiscent of former Vice President Dick Cheney's remark in 2005 that the Iraqi insurgency was "in the last throes," when it was anything but.

For more background information, see Long War Journal and Threat Matrix reports:

Analysis: The Taliban's 'momentum' has not been broken
ISAF data show insurgent attacks down, civilian casualties up
6 Harrier jets destroyed, 2 damaged in Taliban assault on Camp Bastion
US military suspends combat patrols with Afghan forces
Afghanistan - now what?

(6)

September 23, 2012 11:09 AM
By Karen Hodgson

A Turkish jihadist site recently published a list of what it claims are foreign-backed groups in Syria. While the list includes some of the most widely known groups operating in Syria, such as the Al Nusrah Front, and the Free Syrian Army (FSA), it does not include other major ones like al Qaeda in Iraq and the Abdullah Azzam Brigades. On the other hand, it includes some smaller groups that have received less attention. The claimed locations of the groups appear to be accurate.

The posting states that there are tens of groups fighting against the Assad regime, with different ideological views and different sources of support, but it does not discuss these sources of support or identify the "foreign backers" of these groups. However, the foreign backers of some of the groups are known. The leadership of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) has received shelter in Turkey, though the FSA is now reported to be moving its leadership base to Syria, either to Idlib or Aleppo province. In addition, Saudi Arabia and Gulf nations have set up an international fund to pay salaries to the FSA. Liwa al-Tawhid is is thought to be backed by the FSA. The Al Nusrah Front is backed by al Qaeda.

A translation of the somewhat idiosyncratic list, which includes names, ideological tendencies, and numbers of fighters in the groups, is below (information in brackets is from LWJ):

1. Tawheed Brigades [a.k.a. the al-Tawheed Brigade]: This group, which is active in the Aleppo and Idlib region, subscribes to a view that is similar to al Qaeda's. High-level officers are not accepted into this group.

2. The Al Nusrah front: This is the Syrian branch of al Qaeda. The Al Nusrah Front shares al Qaeda's ideology, but calls itself by a different name. The group is active in Aleppo and Idlib, and has been responsible for organizing the attacks on Damascus.

3. Libyans, Chechnyans and Afghans: They are present mostly in Aleppo, and they organize attacks in Idlib, Homs, and Damascus.

4. The Free Syrian Army (FSA): This group includes high-level officers. The FSA fights against Syrian troops in Idlib, Damascus, Homs, Hama, Dar'a, and Aleppo. Its central base is the Antakya Apaydın camp [in Turkey, near the Syrian border]. The group is estimated to have around 20,000 armed members. FSA members subscribe to the Salafist view. Some al Qaeda members are known to have infiltrated this group.

5. The Farouq Brigade [likely referring to the al Farouq Brigade, which is one of the most active battalion units of the Free Syria Army]: This group, which has around 7,000 armed members, is active in the Homs region.

6. Bedouin: These fighters are based in the Dar'a region [in southwest Syria, near the border with Jordan].

7. Military Council: [The group is active in] Deir al-Zour.

8. Al Qaeda Tawheed Brigades: [The group was active in] Deir al-Zour. [The group] is known to have disintegrated now, but it was a small group with no link to another group by a similar name.

9. Open Battalion: These are Salafi Islamists, but not like al Qaeda. They are active in the Aleppo region. The group includes soldiers and civilian opposition members.

10. Dawn of Islam Battalion [possibly the Brigade of Islam, or Liwa al-Islam]: This group is comprised of Salafi Islamists fighting in Aleppo.

11. Free Sham [a.k.a. Ahrar al-Sham or Free Men of Syria]: This group consists of Salafi Islamists active in Aleppo and Damascus. Turkish Osman Karahan was part of this group.

12. The Brigade of Unity [a.k.a. Liwa al-Tawhid, part of the FSA]: This group of about 3,000 fighters is active in Damascus and the surrounding countryside.

(3)

September 23, 2012 9:45 AM
By Bill Roggio

The International Security Assistance Force captured two "insider attack planners" during a raid in the eastern province of Logar on Sept. 21. From the ISAF press release:

Afghan and coalition security forces confirmed today the arrest of two insider attack planners during a security operation in Pul-e 'Alam district, Logar province, Friday. The detained insurgents were known insider attack - or "green on blue" - facilitators, and planned several operations throughout Logar province. At the time of their arrest, the attack planners were in the advanced stages of preparing for a strike against a coalition base, which included the construction of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), recruitment of insurgent fighters, and the attempted infiltration of Afghan security forces. The security force also detained one suspected insurgent as a result of the operation.

ISAF has clearly begun stepping up efforts to kill or capture the Taliban network that is conducting the green-on blue attacks. On Aug. 30, security forces arrested a Taliban fighter wanted for killing two British International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) members during a green-on-blue attack on May 13 in southern Helmand province. He was attempting to join the Afghan National Army at the time of his capture (he was a member of the Afghan National Police when he killed the British troops).

And on Sept. 15, ISAF killed Mahmood and "more than a dozen armed insurgents" in an airstrike in the Bar Kunar district of Kunar province. Mahmood executed the May 11 green-on-blue attack in Kunar that resulted in the death of one US soldier; two other soldiers were wounded. Mahmood fled to the Taliban, and on Aug. 7 the Taliban released a video showing him being welcomed as a hero [see Threat Matrix report, Observations on Taliban video 'welcoming' rogue ANA soldiers].

As Lisa and I have noted in our report on the spike in green-on-blue attacks, the Taliban's role in the green on-blue attacks is likely far more significant than NATO admits. And these attacks aren't a "last gasp" effort of a dying Taliban, as US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta attempted to characterize them last week, but the result of what appears to be a well-planned effort by the Taliban.

It has been evident for some time that the Taliban have devoted significant efforts to stepping up attempts to kill NATO troops by infiltrating the ranks of Afghan security forces. Mullah Omar said as much in a statement released on Aug. 16, in which he claimed that the Taliban "cleverly infiltrated in the ranks of the enemy according to the plan given to them last year," and he urged government officials and security personnel to defect and join the Taliban as a matter of religious duty. He also noted that the Taliban have created the "Call and Guidance, Luring and Integration" department, "with branches ... now operational all over the country," to encourage defections. [See Threat Matrix report, Mullah Omar addresses green-on-blue attacks.]

The Taliban clearly have a network in place to plan and execute the green-on-blue attacks. And ISAF is clearly attempting to target that network.

(2)

September 22, 2012 2:18 PM
By Bill Roggio

Pakistan's Minister for Railways, Ghulam Ahmed Bilour, placed a $100,000 bounty on a filmmaker who made a controversial D "movie" that insults the Prophet Mohammed, and urged al Qaeda and the Taliban to kill him. From Dawn:

A Pakistani federal minister has announced a bounty of $100,000 on the maker of the American film "Innocence of Muslims" disrespecting the Holy Prophet (PBUH), DawnNews reported.

Speaking here at a press conference on Saturday, the Federal Minister for Railways Ghulam Ahmed Bilour said that he was aware that it was a crime to instigate the people for murder, but he was ready to commit the crime. He added that there was no way to instill fear among blasphemers other than taking this step.

The minister also called on members of the Taliban and al Qaeda for their support, saying that if members of the banned militant organisations kill the maker of the blasphemous movie, they will also be rewarded.

This type of behavior from senior Pakistani officials shouldn't shock anyone. In November 2010, Maulana Attaur Rehman, Pakistan's Tourism Minister, said that the Taliban "are the true followers of Islamic ideology and America is the biggest terrorist of the world." And, immediately after the Lashkar-e-Taiba carried out the terror assault on the city of Mumbai in November 2008, a Pakistani Army corps commander called Taliban leaders Baitullah Mehsud and Mullah Fazlullah "patriots" during a briefing with senior Pakistani journalists.

This is also the same country where, in 2011, lawyers showered the assassin of the governor of Punjab (he was killed for opposing Pakistan's revolting blasphemy laws) with rose petals. At the same time, Barelvi clerics, who are often upheld as the caretakers of Pakistan's moderate Muslims, said the murderer acted with "courage, bravery and religious honor and integrity," and warned other Pakistani politicians against opposing the blasphemy law.

Also in 2011, Pakistan's lawyers gathered to chant "Go, America go," and "Osama bin Laden is our hero" after the al Qaeda leader was killed by US special operations forces in Abbottabad.

(10)

September 21, 2012 12:22 PM
By Bill Ardolino

The "surge" is officially over in Afghanistan:

The last of the 33,000 'surge' troops ordered into Afghanistan by President Barack Obama more than three years ago have withdrawn from the country, returning the US presence to pre-surge levels.

President Barack Obama's speech at West Point on Dec. 1, 2009 announced the shift in strategy, along with its goal to "to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan." The President also described the worsening scenario that the policy would attempt to correct:

But while we have achieved hard-earned milestones in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated. After escaping across the border into Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, al-Qaeda's leadership established a safe haven there. Although a legitimate government was elected by the Afghan people, it's been hampered by corruption, the drug trade, an under-developed economy, and insufficient security forces. Over the last several years, the Taliban has maintained common cause with al-Qaeda, as they both seek an overthrow of the Afghan government. Gradually, the Taliban has begun to control additional swaths of territory in Afghanistan, while engaging in increasingly brazen and devastating acts of terrorism against the Pakistani people.

Yet, as the surge ends, aside from significant -- though not decisive -- setbacks for al Qaeda and the Taliban, what about the above rationale has changed?

The Obama administration's Afghan push employed well-executed counterinsurgency doctrine in the provinces of Nimroz, Helmand, and eventually Kandahar, with stopgap measures everywhere else. The military's implied second act, after selling the initial surge and checking the Taliban's power in the south, was to shift forces to shore up the troublesome east. But this never happened. And as a result, counterinsurgency doctrine was never truly attempted in these key areas, although US military leadership indicated otherwise.

In an interview with LWJ last year, Regional Command East Commander Major General Daniel Allyn asserted that COIN was still being employed in the East, despite a drawdown of troops that prevented the resource shift. His assessment may have been politically necessary for a flag officer, and it was true to some degree; certain counterinsurgency components were present, and even a few others were robust. But overall, the fight in RC East was vastly underresourced to achieve the type of political and security momentum required to break the insurgency, and it was not accompanied by successful political pressure to address the insurgent redoubts in Pakistan. It is important to note, however, that given the region's dispersed population and geographic heterogeneity, a well-executed COIN strategy in the east would have been a herculean task even with proper resources, and possibly unlikely to succeed, at least within a time frame feasible for a Western democracy fatigued by a decade of war.

But the fact remains that the Obama administration never made the attempt, which calls into question the point of wasting lives, limbs, and resources by surging into Helmand and Kandahar. Either policymakers were ignorant and unrealistic about the amount of time and effort required to turn around a country like Afghanistan, and they believed that "reversing Taliban momentum" was sufficient to achieve enduring progress, or the COIN doctrine and accompanying surge were cynically employed for domestic political considerations. None of these scenarios reflect well on the decision.

The stopgap plan for the East was to employ punishing night raids and conventional clearing operations against insurgents ('mowing the grass') while training up the Afghan security forces, in a strategy reminiscent of pre-surge Iraq. Allyn described this effort in last year's interview, and noted how it was contingent on partnered operations and minimum US troop levels in the East [emphasis mine]:

[T]he key for us to be able to do this is to accelerate Afghan security force capacity. That is the task that can be put at risk if there is an increased pace of withdrawal. Because I'm outnumbered two to one by Afghan security forces already. In other words, I have to prioritize who I'm partnered with based on where they are in their development, what mission we're going after in the region they're operating in ... so if the number [of American troops] comes down significantly greater, then partnership becomes a challenge. As long as we can keep those ratios right as we get the Afghan security forces developed; frankly, we are already making significant headway against the insurgency.

The plan for this accelerated development of the ANSF -- hinging on widespread partnered operations between both US and Afghan conventional and special forces -- has obviously been thrown into disarray by the alarming increase in insider attacks by Afghan security personnel on their Western partners within the past two years. And its failure was arguably officially acknowledged this week by the US military's resulting suspension of combat patrols with Afghan forces.

Throw in the Taliban's relentless, somewhat successful focus on high profile attacks, and Afghan President Hamid Karzai's destructive political maneuvers, exemplified by his firing of the competent and pro-Western-alliance governor of Helmand province, and it's hard to describe US strategy with words other than "rapidly deteriorating," and perhaps "dire."

After 11 years of war, the status of the American effort in Afghanistan is not encouraging: an abortive attempt at counterinsurgency; a surge of troops announced in conjunction with an intended withdrawal date; the partnership with a particularly self-destructive and corrupt Karzai regime; NATO's ineffective management of Pakistan's double game and support of insurgent redoubts across their border; a rash of insider attacks that have severely impeded the partnership required for rapid development of indigenous security forces; and some recent successful high-profile Taliban attacks. Contrary to the Obama administration assertions, and concurrent with a recent Long War Journal analysis, the Taliban's "momentum" has not been "broken."

Commentary on Afghanistan by contributors here at The Long War Journal has been negative for some time, but the accumulating snowball of bad news has reached a new level. It is hard to fathom what an attractive course of action looks like for US policy now. The best-case scenario: America maintains the tepid alliance with an Afghan government that permits help maintaining its existence during the protracted civil war likely to follow the US military's 2014 departure, while keeping a small force in country to conduct counterterrorism operations. And as unattractive as this best-bad-case-scenario option may seem for America, it's certainly bleaker for the people of Afghanistan.

(11)

September 20, 2012 11:29 PM
By Bill Roggio

Shabaab, al Qaeda's affiliate in East Africa, executed a double suicide attack in a secured area in the Somali capital of Mogadishu today. According to Al Jazeera, at least 15 people have been killed and the death toll may rise. From Shabelle:

Witnesses said two suicide bomb attacks at a restaurant killed on Thursday afternoon at least 10 people, among 3 Somali journalists and wounded twenty people.

Shabelle Media journalist Ahmed Abdi Hassan at the scene says two suicide bombers blew themselves up at Village restaurant opposite to the Somalia's national theatre.

The attacks also killed Liiban Ali Nur, Abdisatar Dahir, working with state-run Radio Mogadishu and TV and Abdirahman Yasin, director of voice of democracy (VOD), a local independent FM station.

Witnesses said the bombers detonated at the popular Village café, where journalists and some government officials had gathered to drink tea, a spot also close to the state house located in the heart of Mogadishu.

Despite last summer's offensive that ended Shabaab's overt control of the capital, Shabaab has continued to conduct suicide bombings, IED attacks, and assassinations in Mogadishu.

Shabaab carried out a suicide attack across the street from the Village restaurant, at the national theatre, on April 14. In that attack, a female suicide bomber targeted an event that was attended by senior Somali officials, including Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali. More than 30 people were wounded, including four members of parliament and two Somali reporters.

One month earlier, on March 14, a Shabaab suicide bomber killed five people in a bombing inside the presidential palace compound in the Somali capital.

(0)

September 20, 2012 11:55 AM
By Bill Roggio

Sheikh Ahmad Iman Ali, the leader of Shabaab's branch in Kenya, from a videotape released on Jan. 6. Image from the SITE Intelligence Group.

The Muslim Youth Center (MYC), an al Qaeda affiliate in East Africa and Shabaab ally, released a statement today on its blog as well as on Twitter that addresses the imminent assault on Kismayo by Kenyan and Somali forces. The combined Somali and Kenyan forces have been slowly advancing on the southern port city, and have taken Jana Cabdalla, a town just 25 miles from Kismayo. A Kenyan military officer claimed that more than 50 Shabaab fighters were killed during clashes in Jana Cabdalla.

In the Muslim Youth Center's defiant announcement [reproduced in full below], the group said it would sent reinforcements to the city and claimed they would fight to the end. The MYC said its leader, Amir Sheikh Ahmad Iman Ali, "rejects any [reconciliation] offer from the unbelievers and their apostate allies in Somalia," and implored its "brothers and sisters from Majengo (Nairobi), Thika, Nyeri and Mombasa and our Tanzanians mujahideen" to not give up the fight.

The MYC also said its ultimate goal is to raise "the flag of Tawheed high over Kenya and East Africa" (the statement is reminiscent Shabaab leader Hassan Dahir Aweys' call for a "Greater Somalia" in East Africa in 2006 and spokesman Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage's call for al Qaeda to flock to Somalia to "expand the East Africa jihad").

Most importantly, the MYC threatened to conduct attacks throughout the region (the group notes at the outset that it has branches in "Somalia, Tanzania, and Kenya").

"MYC in Kenya and our mujahideen brothers in the region are preparing for any eventualities that may transpire in Kismayo, and with the grace of Allah respond accordingly and decisively," the statement said.

Ironically, the MYC said that "the time of public warnings via twitter or other social media is now a thing of the past," even as it made the announcement on a blog and Twitter.

The MYC was likely involved in a failed suicide attack that was foiled on Sept. 14. The two suicide bombers who were detained in Nairobi had been ordered to conduct their attack by Jafra Hussein, a Shabaab leader from Kismayo. Abdimajid Yassin and Ali Hussein, the Somali suicide bombers, met up with Musa Shukri, a Shabaab logistics officer in Kenya, and Ahmed Abdurahman.

The MYC statement in full:

MYC in Somalia, Tanzania and Kenya has been following with amusement the numerous media reports attributed to KDF and AMISOM propaganda officials that KDF will soon as part its final phase of "Operation Linda Nchi" enter Kismayo to military cleanse Muslims, and that it is offering amnesty to the mujahideen of MYC.

At this critical juncture, MYC under its leadership of Amir Sheikh Ahmad Iman Ali rejects any offer from the unbelievers and their apostate allies in Somalia. Such an offer by KDF reflects not only arrogance but also sheer ignorance of why many young Kenyans under the charismatic leadership of Sheikh Ahmad Iman Ali (May Allah preserve for the mujahideen) decided to embark on hijra to Somalia to support our mujahideen brothers in Al-Shabaab. If as KDF has been indicating, they intend to advance on Kismayo with a view of murdering and raping Muslims, we remind them on behalf of Al-Shabaab that it is never too late to retreat back into Kenya and deal with Kenya's internal problems that are increasing spiraling out of control.

However, if KDF and AMISOM do insist on unleashing its army on innocent Muslim women and children in Kismayo as part its religious cleansing operation, MYC will dutifully assume its responsibility: first as Muslims and second as part of our pledge of allegiance to Amir Sheikh Abu Zubeyr through Amir Ahmad Iman Ali's public declaration earlier this year. In this context, MYC in Kenya and our mujahideen brothers in the region are preparing for any eventualities that may transpire in Kismayo, and with the grace of Allah respond accordingly and decisively. The time of public warnings via twitter or other social media is now a thing of the past. The die seems to have been cast by KDF and AMISOM, and now the unbelievers must be accountable for their intended actions.

As it appears that we are now entering our reinforcement phase as part of Al-Shabaab, MYC reminds the mujahideen of Kenya and the mujahideen throughout the region that the unbeliever has continued to test our honour as Muslims, and it now falls to MYC and like-minded mujahideen groups to reclaim that honour as a prerequisite to raising the flag of Tawheed high over Kenya and East Africa.

We also ask Muslims to remember our brothers and sisters from Majengo (Nairobi), Thika, Nyeri and Mombasa and our Tanzanians mujahideen who are currently preparing with great enthusiasm to engage the unbelievers in Kismayo should they fulfill on their threat against the innocent Muslims in Kismayo. We ask that Allah makes them victorious and secures them the highest place in Jannah.

MYC

Press Office

(1)

September 19, 2012 5:38 PM
By Bill Roggio

US intelligence officials are finally coming around to the fact that the Sept. 11 assault on the US consulate in Benghazi, Libya that killed the US ambassador, an embassy staff worker, and two security personnel, was indeed a "terror attack" and not the aftermath of a spontaneous protest.

From Reuters:

"They were killed in the course of a terrorist attack on our embassy," Matthew Olsen, director of the National Counterterrorism Center, said in response to a question at a Senate hearing.

Olsen said whether the attack was planned for September 11 was under investigation, but the information so far indicated it was "an opportunistic attack" that "began and evolved, and escalated over several hours."

There were well-armed militants in the area, he said. "What we don't have at this point is specific intelligence that there was a significant advance planning or coordination for this attack."

...

Olsen told lawmakers U.S. authorities are investigating who was responsible for the attack, and it appeared that a "number of different elements" were involved, including individuals connected to militant groups.

"As well, we are looking at indications that individuals involved in the attack may have had connections to al Qaeda or al Qaeda affiliates, particularly Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb," he said.

"The picture that is emerging is one where a number of different individuals were involved, so it's not necessarily an either-or proposition," Olsen said.

Libyan officials are placing the blame for the Benghazi consulate attack on Ansar al Sharia, one of several Salafi jihadist groups that operate freely in Libya. The group has issued two non-denial denials, claiming that the attack was part "spontaneous popular uprising" in reaction to an obscure video on YouTube that insults the Prophet Mohammed. Ansar al Sharia's "denial" also claimed that although the group participated in the attack it didn't organize it. I'll repeat what I said on Sept. 12, just one day after the attack in Benghazi:

Ansar al Shariah wants you to believe that this attack was part of a "spontaneous popular uprising," and not an assault linked to an organized Jihadi-Salafist group that has launched attacks in Benghazi in the recent past, including against at least one foreign consulate. To believe that, you also have to believe that a group of demonstrators, armed with assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades, spontaneously showed up in front of the US Consulate, and then overran the security and killed the US ambassador and three Americans. While this is certainly possible, it isn't likely.

(1)

September 18, 2012 9:44 AM
By Bill Roggio

Today the International Security Assistance Force reported that it captured a Taliban leader involved in the Sept. 14 suicide assault on Camp Bastion. The assault killed two US Marines, including a commander of a Harrier squadron [more below], and resulted in the destruction of six US Marine Corps Harrier strike aircraft and three refueling stations, as well as two seriously damaged aircraft.

According to ISAF, the Taliban commander "is suspected to have provided support to the insurgents," and two other "insurgents" were also detained during the operation:

In Nad 'Ali district, Helmand province, today, an Afghan and coalition security force arrested one of the Taliban leaders behind Friday's Camp Bastion attack.

The Taliban leader was successfully taken into custody by the security force following joint efforts by Afghan and coalition forces to track down the Taliban insurgents responsible for the Camp Bastion attack. No civilians were harmed during the operation.

The Taliban leader is suspected to have provided support to the insurgents whose attack killed two ISAF service members and caused damage to multiple aircraft. ISAF forces killed all but one of the attacking insurgents, who was wounded and currently in ISAF custody.

The security force also detained two suspected insurgents as a result of this operation.

As I mentioned the other day, given the sophistication of this operation, I suspect that it was carried out by the Lashkar al Zil, al Qaeda's military arm that operates in Afghanistan and Pakistan and is composed of both foreign and local fighters. The assault team would need local support to stage and execute the attack (and might even include several local fighters familiar with the terrain).

Yesterday, the Department of Defense announced the identity of the two US Marines killed during the assault. Among them was Lieutenant Colonel Christopher K. Raible, who was the commander of Marine Attack Squadron 211, Marine Aircraft Group 13, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, I Marine Expeditionary Force.

It is difficult to argue that this was not one of the jihadists' most effective assaults on a major Coalition base since the war began. Beyond penetrating one of the most secure installations in Afghanistan, the attackers made it to the airfield, took a Marine Attack Squadron offline by destroying six Harriers and badly damaging two more, and killed the squadron commander.

Estimations of the monetary losses incurred in the attack are unclear, but you can get a ballpark figure. The Harriers are estimated to cost between $20 million to $30 million each. Even if the value has depreciated over the years, there have been investments in upgrades, and the aircraft will need to be replaced. Add in the destruction of the three refueling stations and the hangars, and the cost is significant.

(10)