James Fallows

I actually would love to find out that the TSA co-sponsored this one. (No policy point here: just charming, to the very end.)


Thanks to Matt Wells

(see update at bottom) .... something preposterous happened over the weekend in Santa Barbara. I've resisted mentioning it, because it involves one of my hobby-horse subjects (general aviation). Nonetheless I think it deserves broader attention than it has received so far.

The main characters here are John and Martha King. If you have come anywhere near the flying world, they need no further introduction -- and very vivid associations will spring  immediately to mind. They run a well-known set of flight schools, but beyond that they are omnipresent because of their somewhat hokey, but extremely wholesome and all-American toned, set of instructional videos. Here are the Kings, in their trademark matching shirts:

Oprah isn't really the right comparison among mainstream celebrities, since she is more blindingly famous, plus hipper-seeming. Maybe Mister Rogers, in his heyday on PBS, would come closest to The Kings in being well known and also unembarrassed about his earnest tone. Maybe I'd add a little dash of Ron Popeil, the infomercial titan, since like him the Kings seem genuinely excited about the message they have to impart to their viewers. And a touch of the "Well, Timmy... " narrator from 1950s-era instructional videos, or Clark Griswold from the National Lampoon Vacation movies. You get the idea.

Unlike Clark Griswold, the Kings are highly accomplished at what they do. As they point out on their site, "John and Martha are the only husband and wife to both hold every category and class of FAA pilot and instructor certificates." That is, from gliders to helicopters to jets, they are certified as practitioners and teachers.

Over the weekend, the Kings were detained at gunpoint by Santa Barbara police and held in  handcuffs for half an hour, for reason that appear not to have been their fault in any way. The details are here and here, but the heart of the story is this:

- Eight or so years ago, a small Cessna 150 airplane was stolen in Texas;
- Each aircraft has a registration number, often known in America as the "N-number" since it begins with an N for US-registered aircraft. When a plane is destroyed, stolen, exported, or otherwise put out of commission, the FAA eventually "deregisters" its N-number and makes it eligible for reassignment to a new plane;
- Several years after the theft in Texas, the FAA deregistered the stolen plane's N-number -- N50545 -- and made it eligible for reassignment;
- Last year, that number was assigned to a small Cessna 172
- The Kings had leased that plane and were making a perfectly normal business trip. But some security agency - reportedly a branch of the DEA -- still had the number on its "stolen aircraft" watch list. When the Kings filed an instrument flight plan with that number, the DEA noticed it and told local police to apprehend the Kings as soon as they landed. And then, as reported on the AOPA site:

According to John King, who was piloting the airplane, upon landing at Santa Barbara, the airplane was directed to a remote part of the airport instead of the FBO [Fixed Base Operator - the normal place for small planes] where the Kings planned to park. There, four police cruisers were parked. After shutting down the engine, King was ordered out of the aircraft with his hands up and told to back slowly toward the officers, who had guns drawn. After he was handcuffed and placed in a cruiser, Martha was ordered to similarly exit the aircraft. She too was handcuffed and placed in a separate cruiser.

Yes, I know: no one was hurt or really seriously inconvenienced. Far, far worse happens every day in big cities and along the border -- and generally to people who, unlike the Kings, don't have the resources and connections to get their story out. And so on. Still, we have people who (by all reports) have done nothing wrong, either in this incident or in a past pattern of behavior, who are held at gunpoint because security agencies didn't update their files. And the general reaction in the flying world is: If John and Martha King, epitomes of the wholesome, can be taken as security threats, how much more suspicious must everyone else seem?

Later, perhaps, a larger point or more information. For now, just noting the news for the record.
____
UPDATE: Max Trescott, who according to his web site was recently the "Certified Flight Instructor of the Year," reports that this is the second time local police have mistakenly detained people flying this same plane. The previous time was in Kansas early in 2009. What this means, of course, is that the same out of date  "stolen plane" info concerning N50545 remained in the DEA's (or some agency's) files even after it was shown to be incorrect.

Another reader writes in with the fair point that this is less a case of "security theater" than of still-disconnected government databases, long after they were supposed (at great expense) to be combined. More on this after a while.

An otherwise-unexplained message from the FAA yesterday to pilots who have signed up for regular safety announcements. Click for larger:

Recently I announced my resolve to be less a carping critic, and more a source of constructive suggestions, when it comes to our friend the TSA.

The invaluable xkcd.com has an answer. Click for larger (so to speak) or go to the original site:

This discussion of "security theater" started with a father exasperated that his four-year-old twin girls had to take off their little sandals before going through the TSA screening machine, and continued with some similar complaints -- but also arguments that the only thing worse than applying rules inflexibly would be forcing individual TSA agents to make split-second judgment calls all day long.

Now, further ammo on both sides. A mother writes:

After reading your story about the girls taking off their Tevas, I just have to go one better, and tell you that several years ago, when my son was an infant (i.e., not even able to walk), I tried to carry him through a metal detector at an airport wearing Robeez - those little soft, flexible shoes that you put on babies because they are cute, and are easier to keep on than socks. (Below)

As we were going through the line, the TSA guys kept repeating - take off your shoes, take off your shoes.  As I stood there waiting for them to usher me through the metal detector, shoeless, and with my son on my hip, the guy said something like "shoes go on the belt" - pointing at my son.  It took me a second to realize what he meant, but of course, I dutifully took off the "shoes" and put them on the belt.  Team America: 1.  Terrorist babies: 0. 

A few years later, I was flying again - my son was now 2.5 or 3, able to walk through himself, and he kept setting off the metal detector.  Instead of letting me talk to him about it, and look in his pockets, one of the TSA staff just kept telling him to walk through again and again, with my son getting more confused and scared with every order.   After a few tries, he just grabbed my son's hand and pulled him away from me to frisk him.  My son was genuinely terrified, and kept screaming  "Mommy!" as the guy pulled him away, with me following, but not daring to touch my son or tell the guy to stop for fear of what would happen to one or both of us.  

How insane is it that when the government provides subsidies for poor people to buy health insurance, we call it Big Brother, but frisking a toddler somehow counts as a national security imperative?

From the other extreme of apparent menace in footware -- not baby socklets but combat boots -- this report from a military doctor:

To add to the theater of the absurd that is the TSA, I discovered when traveling to and from Iraq recently in my Army uniform that military personnel do not have to remove their boots when going through airport security.  I don't know anything about bomb making, but I am willing to bet that a pair of boots on an adult are far better than Tevas on a child for that purpose.  In more security theater, one of my stops en route to Iraq was Ft. Hood, where I mobilized through the same SRP site as the tragic November massacre.  There is, of course, now security at the the SRP site, but no security at other facilities on the post with more regular, high density concentrations of troops, such as dining facilities.  It seems that in the wake of the Ft. Hood massacre, military personnel should be subjected to the same "security" measures as pre-schoolers.

And from another doctor:

A few years ago I was at the San Jose (CA) Airport and watched a man with one leg in a cast and on aluminum crutches go through security. The TSA official placed the crutches on the belt to be x-rayed while the man had to hop on his good leg through security.  Besides the absurdity it sure looked like an accident waiting to happen.

After the jump, arguments on the other side: that the only defense is keeping strictly to the rules.

More »

After yesterday's report about four-year-old girls taking off their sandals in the airport security line, one reader writes:

Several years ago, a TSA agent at the Islip/Macarthur NY airport made us remove a pacifier from the mouth of our toddler daughter before going through the metal detector. After she started crying, he said, rather sarcastically, "If that's the worst thing that happens to her all day, it's a pretty good day."

I haven't punched anyone in the face since I was fourteen years old, but I kind of regret not slugging the jerk. (Though I'd probably be in federal prison right now if I had...)

But another demurs:

It certainly sounds stupid to make 4-year old girls remove their sandals. But here's what I think is going on: The TSA doesn't want their employees working on the security lines to exercise independent judgment about what constitutes a potential threat and what doesn't. These men and women have a limited amount of training and it certainly isn't enough to be able to spot a potential terrorist.

I think this approach is correct. Yes, it does lead to some absurdities, like making 4-year olds remove their sandals. But this sort of rigid application of the rules doesn't terribly inconvenience anybody and it doesn't appreciably add to the length of time it takes to get through security. Better that everyone be subject to the same rules than that some 26-year old TSA employee, with a 2-week training course under his or her belt, be charged with the discretion to decide who looks like a possible threat and who doesn't.

Could they revise the protocol so that travelers don't need to remove sandals? Maybe that would make sense, but bear in mind that the more rules there are and exceptions to rules, the less reliable the system will be. If there are too many rules or exceptions to rules, more mistakes will be made by the TSA personnel. That's not in anyone's best interest.

It's a fair point that rules are rules, and that as soon as you allow or require each TSA agent to make judgment calls, you're asking for new complications. Lines would probably be longer and, if anything, more confrontational, since each individual agent's judgment, rather than "the rules," would be the source of intrusions we didn't like.

Still, the fundamental problem with "security theater" is that it elevates the appearance of greater security, plus the machinery and process of seeming safety-concerned, over the reality. In my view, the no-exceptions, no-common-sense-allowed application of rules undermines the long-term faith that the security authorities know what they are doing. We're really making the pilots of the plane (along with four-year-olds) give up their bottled water at the checkpoint? What do we think they're going to do with it? If a pilot is a secret agent bent on suicide terrorism, confiscating his water isn't going to make any difference. And in all other circumstances, since we are after all trusting him to fly the damned plane, why won't we trust him with his water?

In a larger sense this is why it's a shame that the TSAs's "intelligence-based" program to identify probable threats, as opposed to its "apply the same rules to everybody" approach at the airport checkpoints, has so far proven disappointing.  (Background here.) And someone with long involvement in this field wrote to me recently, more and better intelligence-based security is the only sensible way ahead for the TSA:

You can't have it both ways -- thumping on TSA for security theater in its traditional checkpoint screening and then, when TSA introduces an intelligence-driven, non-intrusive layer of security, whack 'em again.... TSA needs encouragement to do more things that are intelligence-driven. They are very risk-averse from the public affairs point of view and if, even when they venture out into smart security, people like you beat on them, it will cause them to stick with the old stuff.

Again a fair point. So, for the record, I henceforth resolve to be supportive and constructive -- including with constructive criticism! -- in urging TSA to develop the intelligence-based systems that will mean less hassle for four-year-olds, teething infants, and uniformed flight crews, and more on more-probable malefactors. (And, yes, I realize that the next stage is a debate about "profiling" -- that is for another time. "Profiling" is merely "intelligence" done clumsily.)

A reader based in Asia writes, via mobile phone:

Thought you might appreciate this. just flew back from dc to beijing with my 2 4yr old twin girls. TSA made them remove their Tevas (see pic, hard 2c where a bomb or weapons might go); meanwhile I was playing single Dad, had lots going and was holding up the line

Stupidity is one thing that is not in deficit in certain quarters of DC.
 

He asked me not to use his name, so he doesn't "get on a list."

This is old news -- the GAO report I'm about to mention came out two months ago and in some circles has already been discussed. But I had missed it until I saw a recent mention by Robert Poole, of Reason, on his Airport Policy Newsletter. (Here's a link to past issues; the one I'm about to quote from should be posted soon.) The GAO study really deserves more general-press and general-public discussion than it has received so far, because it illustrates an apparent new pointless extreme in security-theater thinking.

The GAO report is number 10-763, and its ungainly official title is, "Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate TSA's Passenger Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges." Summary page is here; full 89-page PDF of report is here; PDF of summary and highlights is here. The object of the study, requested by Rep. John Mica, a Republican of Florida, was the TSA's "BDO" program and its "SPOT" process. BDOs are Behavior Detection Officers, the uniformed TSA officials who are supposed to keep a quiet eye on passengers in airports to see who is behaving suspiciously. SPOT means Screening Passengers based on Observation Techniques. For (skeptical) background on the whole idea, see here and here. From the GAO report, here's the basic idea of the "SPOT" process --  click for larger:




And how has it worked out? Robert Poole has an accurate summary of what the GAO found after a prolonged investigation:

One of the most obvious questions is whether SPOT has spotted any terrorists. Out of 2 billion passengers boarding planes at SPOT airports, the BDOs took aside 152,000 people, and referred 14,000 to LEOs [Law Enforcement Officers], of whom 1,100 were arrested (0.7% of all SPOT referrals). And what were they arrested for? Well, 39% as illegal aliens, 19% for outstanding warrants, 15% for having phony documents, 12% for drug possession,12% other, 1% undeclared currency, and 1% "no reason given." Not a terrorist in the bunch. As GAO drolly puts it, "TSA officials did not identify any direct links to terrorism or any threat to the aviation system in any of these cases."

But wait--it gets worse. The GAO investigators also looked into the question the other way around. Of people who were nabbed as aviation terror subjects and who had passed through SPOT airports, how many were identified by BDOs? With help from Customs & Border Protection and the Justice Department, GAO reviewed the travel history of individuals allegedly involved in six terrorist plots uncovered by various agencies. At least 16 of those people moved through eight different SPOT airports, six of which were among the 10 highest-risk airports in TSA's current airport threat assessment. Those individuals "moved through SPOT airports on at least 23 different occasions." But there is no evidence that any of them were identified as suspicious by the BDOs at those airports.

Really, this can't go on. I mean, yes, I know it "can." But it shouldn't.

Previous dispatches here, with related links. Story so far: I mentioned an instance of "security theater" being scaled back and asked for other good-news reports. No such luck! The reports that have rolled in are of a different type. Let's start with one from the distant north:

A security mystery -- at least, new to me. Deplane in Iceland (Icelandair, JFK-KEF), and you are immediately put through a clone of the security line you went through just before boarding: shoes off, laptops out, metal detector, x-ray conveyer belt. The woman in front of me had her little Icelandair bottle of water confiscated and said, baffled as the rest of us, "But we're getting OFF the plane!?"

That was the last security I saw anywhere in Iceland. Passport control and customs were separate (and minimal). No metal detectors anywhere else. You can walk right up to the Prime Minister's door (I saw it). For that matter, much of the police force has been laid off because of the fiscal crisis.

One Icelander said he thought it had to do with the U.S. not being a Schengen country and KEF being a gateway airport. But I don't get it. I've landed in lots of European airports and never gone through post-flight security before.... In my imagination, it's the result of the relevant Icelandic official being mistreated at JFK, but [the correspondent's wife] points out that half our fellow passengers were Icelandic.

And from a tropical paradise:

I live in the Republic of Palau, in the western Pacific. All of the American-affiliated islands out here in Micronesia are served by Continental Airlines. One of their requirements is that, at intermediate stops between islands, half of the coach-class passengers have to get off the plane so a "cabin security check" can be conducted. (This doesn't apply to BusinessFirst passengers, though.) Even families with infants have to get off the plane, sometimes at 3AM, and wait for the "security check" to be completed.

From a long series of e-mails with Continental and TSA I found out the reason for this requirement.

More »

In dispatches previously here and here, I mentioned one instance of security-theater being ratcheted back, and another of its permanence. Now, two more items reporting modest progress in the "sanity about security" campaign. After that, some less heartening accounts. A reader writes:

Security was ratcheted back at Heathrow recently. Yesterday I got a flight Heathrow-Dublin and accidentally left my pocket knife in carry on. Instead of losing it, it was allowed - new rule is blades under 6cm are ok. Unfortunately, it wasn't allowed on the way back Dublin-Heathrow, which is expectedly silly. Fortunately I could check my bag.

In the same vein:

I hesitate to mention it, but I have noticed that it is now rarely necessary to take one's quart bag of cosmetics out of one's carry-on bag when going through TSA screening in the U.S. and China (China experience was last night). I presume that the screeners can see it and analyze it easily enough using the X-ray machine.

On the other hand, reader Kostya, from upstate New York, reports:

I was standing in the security line at a Manhattan federal building recently. My partner Barbara was with me and I told her it was strange for me being there and seeing the photos of President Obama and Vice President Biden staring down on us. The last time I was there, the photo was of GHWB and I did not remember VP Quayle being there. It was further strange to me since I now live in a Catskills hollow and rarely go into government buildings and I am not used to seeing Barack Obama's smiling presidential photo anywhere except on my computer screen.

A guard in the security detail heard me say this to Barbara and came up to us and asked us to show him our identification. No on else in line was asked to produce IDs. We complied and he seemed satisfied. While walking away from us he asked me to stand on the carpet, the common kind of narrow runner many buildings and homes use. Evidently, the carpet has hidden powers that keep the building secure.

I admit I was pissed that the security guy, someone who gets paid to spend his day hanging out near an x-ray machine telling people to stay on the carpet, offended me. Plus, he was black and I am white and my unconscious racism must have contributed to my anger. My experience was a "how dare he" moment on many levels.

Nevertheless, it was my conversation with my partner, my speech, that made this guy ask us and no one else, for our ID. Had I complained about being singled out, we probably would created a major incident that would have included our being arrested and/or removed from the building and missing our meeting.

Just another anecdote from the new national security reality.

And a reader in Italy writes:

Ever the suspecting, non-trusting fellow, I wonder how many realize that this is not about stupidity or mindless bureaucracy, but about the fastest growing business on earth: security.

After the jump, a report on the security-theater ratchet in China. Thanks to all.

More »

Yesterday I passed along a good-news (in the circumstances) account, from a lawyer who had seen a pointless piece of security theater dismantled in Manhattan. Another lawyer writes with another side of the story:

You welcome "any similar accounts of the security-theater ratchet being reversed", but I offer you the exact opposite.

I am a prosecutor assigned to a courthouse, and every day I go to work I must clear security. This is more than reasonable, of course, but until last year we could clear security by showing our "State Attorney Badges" that were equipped with our picture. Without the badge and corresponding picture, you must go through detectors and place all bags, briefcases, and boxes into an x-ray machine.

Then last year, security was tightened, and the powers to be (AKA "judicial administration") determined that prosecutors must go through the same security system as everyone else. Our precious badges meant nothing. [JF note: this is like making airline pilots, who will soon be controlling the plane, go through TSA security along with the other passengers.] But the genius part of this measure was that the planners failed to account for the fact that prosecutors come to court everyday with evidence that is presented in trial. This evidence includes, among other things, guns, knives and drugs. Suddenly, prosecutors who were trusted by the public to keep evidence in their offices, and trusted to bring charges against citizens based on that evidence, were no longer allowed to bring that evidence to court to prove the cases.

Eventually, the administration decided to issue new badges and cards and pictures to prosecutors who could then pass through security if they showed the badge. WITH ONE EXCEPTION--THEY MUST PASS THROUGH SECURITY SCREENING IF THEY HAVE ANYTHING IN THEIR HANDS!! Evidence boxes are then X-rayed to determine that they do, in fact, contain firearms or weapons. Nothing is done, mind you, but they get to inspect the evidence first. It should also be noted that nothing stops me from carrying a holstered gun or placing a knife in my pocket and using it if I see fit. Nothing at all. But still it goes on...

Kafka would be proud.