A Very Public Sociologist

The first two set of selections from Gramsci's Prison Notebooks discussed here were concerned with demonstrating how classes exerted their influence through groups of intellectuals. In the fragments grouped together in 'Notes on Italian History' Gramsci is demonstrates how the formation of the Italian state during the 19th century was the story of subordinate classes overcoming the domination of the peninsular by landed aristocracies, petty monarchs, Austria, and agents of the Pope while simultaneously negotiating the consent of the mass of the peasantry and nascent working class. As I'm no scholar of Italian history this contribution to the ongoing series on Gramsci's Selections will confine itself to a few (overly theoretical) points.

Gramsci begins by noting that classes do not enter the stage of history as unified actors: they are the outcome of particular social processes:

The historical unity of the ruling classes is realised in the State, and their history is essentially the history of States and group of States. But it would be wrong to think that this unity is purely juridical and political ... the fundamental historical unity, concretely, results from the organic relations between State or political society and "civil society" (Gramsci 1971, p.52).

Subaltern (i.e. non-ruling) classes belong to civil society: that segment of society not part of the state (in this definition the economy is part of civil society, whereas 'political society' is not). Nevertheless class histories are bound up with the state under whose auspices they developed. For example, it would be impossible to understand the making of the working class in these islands without reference to its relationship with the UK state.

To analyse non-ruling classes Gramsci recommends six methodological criteria:

1. Classes are 'objectively' formed by economic processes from the classes and strata of previous societies. Initially they have a non-conscious 'sociological' existence and to an extent their previous histories are preserved.
2. In their existence, classes have active/passive affiliations with a number of political actors of other classes. Their dealings with these parties influence them, condition political consequences of those interactions and in turn impact on the formation of the class.
3. As well as being influenced by the social weight of subaltern classes, parties and institutions belonging to the ruling class attempt to win control over them by seeking their consent to be ruled.
4. The above produces an organisational response within subaltern classes. The initial group of organisations are formed to press its own claims.
5. The second set of organisations lay claim to the interests of the subaltern class(es) in the prevailing social order.
6. Finally, organisations emerge that assert the integral, independent identity of a class as a class.

Applied to the formation of the working class in capitalist societies, these criteria can guide the study of the passage it makes from a class in itself to a class for itself (in Gramsci's guarded writing, the latter three criteria refer to the formation of trade unions, social democratic and labour parties, and revolutionary parties). Such an analysis must pay attention to the complex interplay of struggles, institutions, parties, etc.

In the second part of his notes on Italian history; 'The Problem of Political Leadership in the Formation and Development of the Nation and the Modern State in Italy', Gramsci demonstrates how the formation of the Italian bourgeoisie was bound up with the consolidation of their nation state. He begins:

... the supremacy of a social group [class] manifests itself in two ways, as "domination" and as "intellectual and moral leadership". A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to "liquidate", or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups. A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise "leadership" before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to "lead" as well (ibid, pp 57-8).

By making the distinction between coercion and consent, Gramsci argues ruling and rising classes tend to use force for subjugating subaltern classes to its will while exercising 'intellectual and moral leadership' to speak with and bind potential class allies to it. Such leadership is the condition for winning power, but also it must continued to be exercised if a class is to retain its dominant position: class rule that depends on force of arms alone is a brittle thing doomed to early extinction.

This insight into the nature of class rule remains as keen now as it was almost 80 years ago. But as his discussion of the formation of the Italian state shows, a class must have reached a certain level of development before it can exercise intellectual and moral leadership. Looking at the revolutionary wars of Italian unification (the Risorgimento), Gramsci argued the orientation of the bourgeoisie could be summed up by two broad factions. The first was the Moderate Party, which was a 'pure' bourgeois party. Its anchor in Italy's capitalist class meant it was socially homogenous (its members were owners, managers and entrepreneurs - social locations forged by the capitalist relations of production), influential and, because of its class basis, not consistently revolutionary.

The other dominant faction of Risorgimento Italy was the Action Party. The group favoured Italian unification under a single republic and, to varying degrees, were hostile to the political influence wielded by the Vatican. However, its Jacobin pretensions were a symptom of the shallow roots it had in the Italian bourgeoisie. Without the anchor its leadership was unstable and vacillating, which in turn meant it couldn't seek to shore up its base. As such the moments the Action Party had in the Risorgimento were episodic and fleeting. Exacerbating this was its de facto alliance with the Moderates against Italy's petty states: just as the homogeneity and resources of the Moderates drew in their train intellectuals from other classes, it similarly conditioned the Action Party. If the AP was to play a similar role to its Jacobin counterparts in the French revolution, Gramsci argued it needed to separate from the Moderates and form its own 'national-popular will': it needed to build a base among the peasantry and nascent working class and become something more than the Italian bourgeoisie's arms-length revolutionaries. But it did not produce its own programme and did not go down this route. It meant the Italy what was to eventually emerge was one most in tune with the interests of its bourgeoisie: a constitutional monarchy and limited parliamentary government. But it also meant the exclusion of the working class from the revolutionary process meant it would form its own parties later on: organisations stamped by a high degree of class consciousness and a receptivity to revolutionary socialism.

Gramsci's examination of the Risorgimento period is much richer and detailed than what I've presented here. It recalls Marx's The Class Struggles in France in his grasp of the intermeshing of personalities, parties, factions and classes in the historical process.

Overall Gramsci's approach to analysing class can be most clearly seen today in the so-called Neo-Gramscian approach to study class relations at the level of states. But there are objections that can be levelled at Gramsci from within and without the Marxist tradition. The main criticism regards his analytical criteria: that a class, when formed, is on an irreversible path towards greater consciousness. Now some may take this as a teleological argument which was handed down to Gramsci from Hegel by way of Benedetto Croce, but it seems to me this criteria is the theoretical condensation of the concrete experiences of the workers' movement up to the 1930s. At the time Gramsci compiled his thoughts it was reasonable to argue the working class had risen from an amorphous mass and developed the means to become progressively self-aware and that only the brute force of fascism could set back this development in Western Europe. But from the vantage point of the early 21st century with its weaker labour movements and the massive reversals revolutionary socialism has suffered, of course Gramsci's argument appears teleological: the last 30 years has seen very significant retreats to the point where class consciousness, at least in Britain, is at an historic low.

Just quick post to AVPS readers from myself and Brother S to convey our May Day greetings to friends and comrades.

May Day this year stands at the threshold of significant changes to British and world politics. The aftermath of the election in five days time could drive the final nail into the shoddy, crumbling coffin of our political system. If polls hold up and the LibDems extract proportional representation as the price for governing in coalition with one of the other two, we can wave goodbye to the undemocratic farce of first pass the post elections. Whatever form of PR is installed in its place (I've made no secret of being a single transferable vote fan boy) there will be new opportunities for socialist politics outside and inside the Labour party. The era of two-party politics is done.

But constitutional tinkering isn't the real reason why change is coming. As everyone knows, all three main parties are promising an agenda of cuts and "pain". It says it all that one of the main planks of Labour's campaign is it promises to be less vociferous and savage than the other two - a clear appeal to lesser evilism if there ever was one. Whoever gets in, whether a majority government or a coalition of some description, they will face large scale industrial unrest. Unfortunately, comrades who look forward to an automatic mass radicalisation off the back of it are liable to be disappointed. There might be anecdotal evidence of a slow revival, but the labour movement remains weak and basic trade union consciousness is stuck at an historic low. This means unions - especially public sector trade unions - will bear the brunt of the cuts offensive, and undoubtedly some form of radicalisation among a number of workers will be forged, but the problem is where it goes from there. It could feed into the wider labour movement and revitalise the sclerotic giant that is the organised working class. It might be mopped up by the Labour party (if out of power) or move into the 'major' minor parties. It's doubtful the revolutionary left will be swamped by tens of thousands of new adherents, but it cannot be ruled out completely. Or, to look at things pessimistically, because our movement is weak new radicalisation could dissipate in a thousand different directions. Change is in the air, but it definitely won't work for you.

Lastly our thoughts are with the millions that have taken to the streets of Greece in recent months. The confidence the Greek working class have shown in defying a truly savage programme of cuts is not only an inspiration for the working class everywhere, but is potentially a real global game changer. Greece might not fit the ideal-typical revolutionary situation beloved of the British left (Wot? No Leninist-Trotskyist party at the masses' head?), but for all intents and purposes a revolutionary situation it remains. Who can say what's going to happen next? But I would like to think on this May Day, it's just possible the tide of neoliberalism has finally been turned on the shores of the Aegean and that the rising of the Greek working class signals the gathering of a tidal wave of resistance is gathering. May it swamp the fetid waters of global capital and wash it all away.

We left the previous post on On Liberty by noting the problematic nature of John Stuart Mill's application of his philosophy to economics. Just to quickly recap, because the economy is the collective outcome of self-organising individual activity liberty's interest is best served by the state and society keeping their noses out of it as much as possible. However, the (relatively) brief airing of his views on economics in On Liberty are by no means his final words on the subject. Mill did after all produce a large body of work examining the political economy of the day and, according to a collection of Mill's and Jeremy Bentham's essays on utilitarianism, began enunciating positions calling for a 'cooperative wage system' and means of narrowing the wealth divide between employers and employees. But at the same time Mill - consistent with his understanding of liberty - remained a resolute opponent of economic planning by the state, the practice of trade unionism and championed flat taxes over progressive taxation because they infringed the liberty of the individual.

Looking at the foundation of Mill's philosophy is the individual, albeit the individual abstracted from all social contexts. Society as a conglomeration of individuals minding their business and having the freedom to pursue their heart's desire - provided their conduct is not injurious of others and/or does not interfere with the right of every other individual to do the same - is the good society. Liberty is the freedom to act without unjust interference from the state, society and other groups of individuals while respecting at all times the right of others to the same.

Applied to economics we have a picture of individuals freely buying and selling and entering into contractual relationships with one another. The latter can assume any number of types of transaction, but what interests us here is the contract of employment, whereby one party to the contract receives a regular payment in return for working under the direction of the employer. Though Mill was aware these relationships were open to abuse society had thrown up legal remedies designed to protect the interests of contract parties and, fundamentally, the liberty of withdrawing from the contract remains intact. For example, an employer who runs their workplace as a mini-police state does not damage liberty because all the employees are there voluntarily. If they do not like it they are always free to leave. However if those workers down tools or otherwise not cooperate with the employer in an attempt to change their conditions they are collectively overstepping their contracts and are actively forcing their will on the manager/owner. From Mill's point of view they are acting against liberty.

This is where Mill's liberalism is its weakest. To put it bluntly where the vast majority of people engaged in economic activity are compelled to work in return for a wage because they have very little or no capital to invest, all talk of their economic freedom is meaningless. Mill fails to appreciate the illiberal authoritarianism that underpins market economies. One does not have to adhere to Marx's theory of exploitation to acknowledge that this situation, which is an unshakeable characteristic of all capitalist economies, is not compatible with liberty of the majority who live in these societies. And if we move into a situation that acknowledges inequalities between individuals exist - again without necessarily having to support Marx's treatment of these as systemic features of capitalism - the key assumption liberalism makes concerning the fundamental but abstract a priori equality of individuals completely breaks down. This leads to two basic political positions. You either accept the prevailing state of affairs as natural or the best of all possible worlds, or you seek to improve and/or radically transform society. There is no room in between for a distinct, independent liberal position.

Does that mean On Liberty's arguments can be deposited in history's museum of nice ideas? No. Firstly the stress Mill placed on liberty is invaluable to any critique of capitalism that would like to see it replaced by a freer democratic society not scarred by the injuries of class, race, gender and sexuality. Taking liberty as a central element of radical politics does not mean a trip into the whacky realms of "libertarianism".

Second the abstract character of liberalism that renders it a utopian strand of capitalist politics can paradoxically make it useful to address problems in Marxian political theory - so argues Leo Panitch in his 2001 book Renewing Socialism. For Marxists the fight for socialism is bound up with the material existence of the working class. Capitalism will only be transcended by our class becoming conscious of its existence and its interests and waging class struggle successfully. This culminates in the first, or lower stage of socialism - the dictatorship of the proletariat. This simply means the replacement of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie (under which we exist now, be the state forms it takes are constitutional monarchies, liberal republics or outright dictatorships) by the rule of the working class. The workers' state constructed on the bones of what went before would likely be more democratic and free than any form of political rule possible under capitalism, but there remains a key contradiction at its heart. As the rule of the workers become more consolidated and a greater proportion of society falls under its conscious democratic direction the need for security against counterrevolution from within and without remains pressing until capitalism is decisively defeated on a global scale. The Russian revolution and the history of the USSR demonstrates the negative resolution of this contradiction. Actual counterrevolution and the threat of it saw the infant workers' state in that country relied on militarily defeating those who wished to overthrow it. But in so doing, exacerbated by the backwardness and devastation of the country the state became increasingly bureaucratised and turned into the very opposite of a socialist state.

For Panitch liberalism's theorisation of the relationships between individuals, states and societies in an idealised context is ready made for addressing these issues in an emerging socialist society. They offer a set of arguments that already have wide currency and can be deployed in defence of and for furthering democratisation - in other words they can be a resource for countering the bureaucratising consequences of vigilance against counterrevolution.

Liberalism means Marxists do not have to re-invent the wheel to defend the democratic gains of revolutionary change.

Edit: A complete list of posts on On Liberty can be found here.

Dave Osler earlier noted how some sections of the left are all sixes and sevens over the events unfolding in Iran. I don't know why this should be so surprising. The far left has long standing strategic differences over the Middle East. But what is really strange is the unanimity of response from the various strands of political Islam resident in Britain.

Let me start with the definition of political Islam. I understand it in a broad sense, as political movements that draw on Islam to meet their objectives. Applied to the British context this includes relatively innocuous organisations such as the Muslim Association of Britain, who aim to integrate British Muslims into the country's political and cultural mainstream while promoting Islamic teachings. It would also include the to be re-launched Al-Muhajiroun, who campaign for an Islamic UK state. In other words, political Islam encompasses movements right across the spectrum. It should not be confused with Islamism, which denotes a particular strand of political Islam that simultaneously treats the religion as a political philosophy.

It would be reasonable to assume organisations of political Islam would have something to say about the situation in Iran. I know if I was a young Muslim I would be interested to hear the opinion of organisations that claim to represent my interests or would like to recruit me. I'm pretty sure the musings of the local Imam - if he touched on the crisis in the Islamic Republic at all - would not be enough. So what are these groups saying?

Let's have a look at the more mainstream sites. The British Muslim Forum apparently aims to represent the political thoughts of Muslims resident in the UK and boasts of being the largest Muslim umbrella organisation in the country with 600 affiliates. Alas its not doing a great job of representing any kind of thought - at least on the internet - as the website has not been updated since February. The Muslim Association, the pressure group some on the ultra-left think is "Islamofascist" because of its links to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood doesn't have much to say either. Its last news item is Obama's speech in Cairo at the beginning of the month (the MB website is no better - seems every topic under the sun gets a look in ... apart from Iran). The story is the same for the Islamic Society of Britain, The Muslim Parliament of Great Britain, and Progressive British Muslims (another organisation who, online at least, looks like it's gone into abeyance).

What about the extremes? Over the years the mainstream political establishment have been pressuring so-called community leaders to aggressively stamp out the extremists and Islamists. The silence of the mainstream offers the head bangers an ideal opportunity, doesn't it? You would think ... but Hizb ut-Tahrir - an organisation no one could accuse of being idle - hasn't got a thing to say. US designs on Pakistan? Check. The global recession? Check. Revolution in Iran? Nope.

In fact, the only organisation that does is the two man show, the Muslim Public Affairs Committee. They carry a couple of snippets from Youtube, but don't really offer any opinion on the events.

This is indeed a curious silence on the part of British political Islam. Could it be for sectarian reasons? Or is it more likely they are utterly bewildered by events?

Preliminary report from the Committee for a Workers' International website.

Mass protests and demonstrations have erupted in Iran in opposition to the apparent rigging of the Presidential elections by the Mahmoud Ahmedinejad regime. According to reports, the largest anti-government demonstration of over one million people took place in the capital Tehran. Reports coming out of Iran claim that over a dozen have been killed in clashes with the police and hated Basij militia. With heavy press censorship, much of the movement has been co-ordinated through the use of Twitter – Iran has the highest number of internet bloggers per head of population. Although the picture is unclear at the time of writing, reports of mass protest in other cities such as Shiraz are also emerging. Tehran University has been surrounded by armed police and brutal repression has been reported of students in their dormitories. Other reports speak of gunfire being heard throughout the capital during the night following the election. Ahmedinejad, who announced victory within a few hours of the polls, has apparently simply left the country and is in Russia attending diplomatic meetings.

These mass demonstrations against the regime in Tehran have taken place despite the threat by the regime to authorise the use of live ammunition against the protestors. Although the situation still remains unclear it appears that big sections of the urban population have lost their fear of the regime and are prepared to take to the streets to protest against it. This represents a crucial turning in the struggle against any dictatorship. BBC video footage of the protests shows protestors refusing to disperse when faced with attacks by the military police. To the forefront of these protests have been the students but clearly with the active support of older sections of the population – especially white-collar workers. There are divisions within the regime about how to deal with this mass movement. This, combined with the mass mobilisation of the middle class and students, clearly indicates that important elements of a pre-revolutionary crisis are developing. At this stage however, the working class has not yet decisively joined the struggle and there is confusion in the political consciousness of those involved reflected in some of the religious slogans which are also being chanted such as “God is great”. However, it should be remembered that the first demonstrations of the Russian revolution in 1905 were led by a priest, Father Gapon.

How this movement will now develop is not yet clear but it has already forced the regime into an abrupt about turn. The Guardian Council, in the face of this mass opposition, has been compelled to overturn its previous decision and allow a recount of contested votes. This is a clear attempt to calm the situation as the regime fears that the protests will erupt further and develop into an uprising against the regime itself.

Fuelled by rising mass unemployment and a yearning for democratic rights, especially amongst the youth – 60% of the Iranian population is under the age of thirty. The urban youth in particular are in revolt against the theocratic repression which they have suffered. An important feature of this movement have been the mobilisations of young women, demanding “equality”. This was reflected in the enormous popularity of Zahra Rahnavard, wife of the main opposition candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi, during the campaign. It is unprecedented in Iranian elections for women to play such a leading role. At the same time, while the mass opposition in the cities has rallied to Mousavi, he is no socialist or defender of the working class and the poor. A former Prime Minister, his pro-capitalist programme is limited to reform of the current theocratic state. However, the attempt to rig the election by Ahmedinejad has possibly opened the flood gates to a mass movement that could topple his regime and open a new era in Iran. At the same time there is an apparent division between the rural poor and some sections of the most down trodden and oppressed in some of the cities and urban centres who have tended to support Ahmedinejad because of his right-wing reactionary populist stance against corruption and the rich liberal elite and “anti-western imperialist” stance.

Iran has been transformed in recent years with nearly 70% of the population estimated to be living in the urban areas with a highly educated layer of young people.

The decisive question in the short term is if the working class now moves into action following reports of trade unions discussing calling a general strike which is the main fear of the regime. At the time of writing the opposition has called off a mass protest scheduled to take place in Tehran to avoid clashes with pro-government forces. This illustrates the fear reformist pro-capitalists like Mousavi have of unleashing mass mobilisations which can easily get out of their control and move in a more radical revolutionary direction. It is possible that Mousavi may try and reach a compromise with the existing regime to avoid bringing the masses onto the streets. Alternatively, the regime may be forced to accept Ahmedinejad’s defeat in order to try to maintain control of the situation. Attempts may also be made to wind down the protests for fear of their consequences. Mousavi has already called on protests planned for tomorrow to be cancelled.

However, the genie is now out of the bottle and a decisive new phase of the struggle has been opened in Iran. The struggle for genuine democratic rights, the right to strike, to hold free elections, form free trade unions, political parties and equality for women needs to be fought for by all workers, youth and socialists. The emergence of the working class into this movement can give it the necessary cohesion and power to defeat the regime. The formation of democratically elected committees of struggle from the workplaces and universities linking with the middle class and urban poor can form the basis of a united struggle. The calling of a general strike and forming a defence militia along with a class appeal to the rank and file of the army are steps which are necessary to take the movement forward to overthrow the regime. Such committees could also convene elections to a revolutionary constituent assembly to decide the future of Iran. The guarantee of democratic rights and a solution to the mass poverty and unemployment can only then be assured with the formation of a workers’ and peasants government on a revolutionary socialist programme to transform society in the interests of all working people.

It was back to business as usual at this Thursday's branch meeting of Stoke Socialist Party after the frenetic campaigning of the European election. Brother G commanded our attention with a lead off on the Iranian revolution.

He kicked things off with a potted history of Iran for the century up to the 1979 revolution. The country emerged from the high colonial period of the late 19th/early 20th centuries independent, but suffered constant interference and distortion at the hands of Tsarist Russia and the British. Against a backdrop of tribal chaos, uprisings and deep divisions in the elite, modern Iran could be said to begin with the assumption of power by Reza Shah. Backed by Britain he had consolidated his autocratic rule by 1925 and spent the next 16 years developing Iran's infrastructure and industrial base. Unfortunately, the Shah's attempt to preserve neutral status during the Second World War fell foul of Allied plans. With Reza ousted and his son installed as a puppet, the country was temporarily partitioned between the USSR and Britain for the duration of the war.

In 1951 Mohammed Mossadegh assumed the prime ministerial office and won mass support after he moved to nationalise Iran's significant oil industries. This was not to the taste of the British or the Americans - they collaborated with the Shah to dismantle the constitutional monarchy and had him removed in a coup two years later, replacing the nascent liberal democracy with the autocracy of the pre-war years. Like his father's regime the new order was repressive but made significant strides forward in its development. This culminated in a six-point reform plan in 1963 (under pressure from the Kennedy White House), which, among other things, enshrined rights for women. This 'white revolution' was opposed by the growing Islamist movement led by Rudollah Khomeini (later Ayatollah) who denounced the reforms and was later forced into exile.

Winding forward to the end of the seventies, by then the Shah's regime was in trouble. Development had encouraged large scale rural-urban migration, which proved combustible as the world economy slid into crisis in the early part of the decade. Under the pressure of a massive strike wave the Shah dissolved parliament and released political prisoners - which was a crucial error. These intelligentsia managed to bring about an alliance of striking workers, radicalised Muslims and nationalists that went on to depose the Shah. This was not a Muslim uprising per se, but rather the founding of the Islamic republic came after power struggles among the victorious revolutionary elite.

Moving on to the discussion, P admitted his knowledge of Iran was extremely limited and referred to the treatment of the revolutionary period in Marjane Satrapi's Persepolis. As the daughter of well to do and well connected parents, her biographical tale relates a convincing sense of the post-revolutionary struggles and the subsequent crackdown on the communist party (the Tudeh) and any other element opposed to the nascent theocracy. P also recalled a few articles he'd read in the past about the Tudeh - while it is true it had borne the brunt of the Shah's repression (its leading cadre were mostly dead, imprisoned or exiled) the party's political strategy was hampered by a misunderstanding of the class relationships in Iranian society. It believed the so-called democratic uprising against the Shah should be led by nationalist and "objectively progressive" Islamist parties who would complete the unfulfilled "democratic tasks" of Iranian capitalism, and then it would be the turn of the organised working class to make its mark. The Tudeh did not have the leadership of the revolution to begin with, but being wedded to a strategy that conceded it to other classes doomed it to the role of a subordinate partner that could be easily disposed of after it had outlived its usefulness.

For A the outcome of a revolutionary process cannot be determined in advance. It all depends on the class forces underpinning revolution and counterrevolution, and a successful revolution from a socialist point of view is extremely difficult without a revolutionary party being in the mix. In Iran's case the revolution opened in 1978 after and accumulation of contradictions exacerbated by the oil crisis. In its opening phase it was the mass of the workers who moved into action, many of them led by Tudeh activists. This movement grew by leaps and bounds and in some areas threw up embryonic workers' councils and administrative committees - but unfortunately a decisive workers' leadership was lacking. This enabled capital via the medium of the Islamic parties to win revolutionary momentum, put down the workers' movement and carry out their reactionary programme.

Brother F said Iran shows how an unsuccessful revolution can lead to the strengthening of the ruling class. But it is also demonstrates Islam is no more a barrier to class consciousness than any other religion. The popular tendency to see Islamic countries as swivel-eyed jihadist monoliths overlooks that fact that each are capitalist countries with the same basic set of class relationships and struggles undergirding their national and cultural peculiarities. The founding of the Islamic republic was the triumph of the counterrevolution within the revolution, but nevertheless there are positives to be taken from it.

A outlined a couple of these. The revolution demonstrated to the whole world of the latent power the working class possesses everywhere. Despite repression how the Shah was toppled by the labour movement remains well within living memory, providing a rich vein of militancy the working class can draw on as it enters into battle with the mullahs.

Part of the problem for Iranian leftists, said G, is how an otherwise unstable regime is constantly strengthened by the moves of outside actors. Iraq's abortive invasion of Iran in 1980 served only to strengthen Khomeini. Likewise the crude sabre-rattling of the Bush years enabled the government to divert attention from increasingly serious domestic problems. By way of contrast Obama's commitment to hands off diplomacy could more effectively undermine the mullahs than any raft of sanctions or UN-sponsored denunciations.

But unfortunately, P noted, there is a tendency among some on the revolutionary left to wear anti-imperialist blinkers when it comes to Iran. George Galloway, for example, is eloquent in his denunciations of US and UK policy in the Middle East and towards Iran, but that's where it ends. He is studiously silent about the character of the Islamic republic and its internal struggles. Likewise with the Socialist Workers' Party and their consistent opposition to the affiliation of Hands Off the People of Iran to Stop the War, seemingly on the grounds that criticising the Iranian is tantamount to lining up with the US and UK. Socialists should go beyond putting a plus wherever our masters place a minus and analyse Iran as it is. In P's opinion Iran's regime now resembles Imperial Germany prior to the First World War - an authoritarian and unelected state bureaucracy with liberal democratic window dressing and limited political freedoms. Very far from ideal but certainly not the jihadist-talibanite hell the media portrays it as. Concluding, A felt the job of socialists in Britain is not to cheer lead the Iranian government nor line up with pro-war liberals but call for and do our best to support independent workers' organisations in the country.

At the regular Keele sociology seminar on Tuesday, Mark Featherstone presented a condensed version of a book chapter looking at utopian bodies. Mark has written extensively for the burgeoning field of utopian studies, which has proven to be an insightful and interesting branch of ideology critique. Utopian thinking and utopian politics has a long pedigree in Western thought stretching right back to the ancient Greeks. This history has seen all manner of weird utopias proposed but they all share two key principles. Utopias are spatially and temporally closed to the outside world, and internally they are socially identical, which is enforced by overt regulation or an implicit ideology. Furthermore utopias come in two flavours: the conservative (i.e. rigidly hierarchical) or egalitarian.

There is a further assumption undergirding utopian thought. As perfect communities utopias rest upon an orderly person with their orderly personalities. In pre-modern utopias this was part of Aristotle's great chain of being, of uniting the micro with the macro scales in one essential unity, which is exemplified by DaVinci's sketch of the Vitruvian Man (pictured). However this cosmic unity (which was carried over into mediaeval thought) started breaking down with the advent of modern thought. Rather than one vast ribbon tying all the elements of creation together, science, philosophy and sociology disassembled social phenomena and demonstrated how it was constituted out of the social relations obtaining between people. This argument can be observed most forcefully in Emile Durkheim's sociology, and particularly his The Division of Labour in Society. Durkheim was not the first to use the body/organism metaphor to describe society, but (along with Marx) he was a pioneer of theorising the consequences of the growing division of labour, a process leading to greater social differentiation, a decomposition of 'traditional' relationships and the formation of new norms and values. However the rate of breakdown can and does outpace the speed of recomposition, leading to outbreaks of anomie.

Contemporaneously Freud's development of psychoanalysis undid the essential unity of personhood and offered an explanation of ordered and disordered bodies. Personalities were not coherent wholes, they were made up of the chaotic and impulsive id, the tyrannical ideal personhood of the superego and the mediating element, the ego. Later on Jacques Lacan reinterpreted these core Freudian concepts - the id became 'the real', the feeling, the phenomenology of one's body that cannot be communicated. The ego was translated into the imaginary, combining the functions of ego and superego and presenting a representational sense of self-image. Therefore the id and real denote the unrepresented (and unrepresentable) while ego and the imaginary refer to (internal/external) representations of the unified self.

This is where utopianism comes back in - the ego and the imaginary represents a utopian body form shaped by the ideologies, discourses, hegemonies and technologies of the body circulating around society. In the West this has always involved a privileging of order of disorder, male over female bodies and the ideal body beautiful as opposed to the real lived body that breakdowns and dies ('excremental bodies', as Foucault put it). To show up the persistence of utopian bodies Mark turned to their treatment in ancient Greece (and their representations today), the New Testament, the French Revolution, Soviet, Nazi and the contemporary capitalist body.

Beginning with the Greeks, Plato's Phaedo describes the death of Socrates, which emphasises the transient nature of the flesh and the transcendental soul. But the more familiar image of the classical body is handed down to us from the Polykleitos sculptures - the Doryphoros, Discophoros and Diadumenos and which more recently has resurfaced in 300. In this images the Greek body is always upright - it is a phallic body but is denuded of sexuality thanks to the diminutive nature of their genitals. Instead the phallus is transferred to the utopian (male) body, and is distinct from the feminised depictions of Dionysus, women and slaves.

Similar themes appear in The New Testament. Mark's reading of Corinthians has distinct parallels with the Phaedo. The body is to be disciplined by the soul to ensure, upon death, communion with the mystical (utopian) body of Christ. Here the soul is the source and guarantor of purity and self-identity whereas the body is both corruptible and corrupting - hence the reason for eschewing the flesh altogether.

The utopian body of the French revolution drew on all these themes. It was incorruptible, upright, virtuous and selflessly dedicated to the revolutionary public. Common imagery of the time depicted Hercules locked in combat with the Hydra - Hercules' utopian body condenses revolutionary value, the Hydra symbolises the multi-headed aristocratic conspiracy. The enemies of the revolution were variously portrayed as feminine, as animals, and as feminised animals promiscuously engaged in sex.

The imagery of the USSR under high Stalinism incorporated these themes. The explosion of new art in the early soviet republic (for example, El Lissitzky's New Man) conceived humanity as an abstraction, rejecting the constraints of lived bodies. It was the art appropriate to an industrial utopia in which mechanism exists as a possibility. But as the power of the bureaucracy consolidated its hold over post-revolutionary Russia, these artistic sensibilities became married to the new technocratic order. The body as abstraction became the body as motor, the robot worker unencumbered by fleshy limits, the worker that founds its propagandistic expression in the figure of Stakhanov and the Stakhanovite movement. The flipside of the Stakhanovite body was 'Oblomovism' - the decadent, indolent, work shy and idle bodies that were said to represent a cultural threat to socialist construction. The corrective mechanism was the gulag.

If Soviet utopian bodies were geared around work, Nazi bodies were all about combat. For example, the neo-classicism of Arno Breker's sculptures emphasise the martial qualities of the (male) utopian body. The conservative German writer, Ernst Junger chimed with prevailing Nazi hegemony by writing about near-painless superhuman soldiers that in many ways prefigured Terminator cyborgs. This celebration of hyper-masculinity and glorification of war was the Nazi and conservative response to a perceived masculine crisis of the Weimar years, both in terms of a flourishing cultural liberalism and the emasculation of the Fatherland at the hands of the allied powers. These utopian bodies were actively differentiated from the feminine and the decadent, corrupting bodies of the homosexual and Jew.

Post 1945 liberal democratic political culture embraced human rights and explicitly committed itself to saving excremental bodies. This however is undermined at every turn by the relentless exploitation of workers' bodies by capital and the hegemonic status of the body as worker, consumer and marketing device. The contemporary utopian body is ageless, flawless, cybernetic and networked. The excremental body of now is not eliminated, but is to be pitied (recipients of charity, impoverished workers overseas) or condemned (chavs, the overweight).

The most interesting point fleshed out in the discussion was the place of gender. All of Mark's examples are conspicuously male bodies - are there female utopian bodies? Does utopian thinking demand they are disciplined in similarly gendered ways? Mark replied these representations tended to fall into either 'mother' or 'loose', but required more thorough investigation both in and of themselves and their interaction with male utopian bodies. For example, how does this play out in pornographic culture? Does it uphold the utopian body? Another interesting point was on the depiction of utopian bodies throughout history - they are a-relational. They stand alone because the utopian body fights shy of contagion - individuals relating to one another, especially outside sanctified structures, run the risk of degeneration. Hence the proliferation of cultural organisations under the 20th century's totalitarianisms.

Returning to gender, on reflection there is an important point that comes to mind. Utopian studies offer a interesting angle to begin a sociology of the body throughout the ages, but the gendering of women as an undesirable other to the male utopian body is a theme long explored and critiqued by feminists. For example, is utopian studies really saying anything new when it talks about the marginal status of female bodies in ancient Greece and Nazi Germany?

I don't know what the the advantages of awarding honorary degrees, but I'm glad Keele granted one to radical film maker Ken Loach on Friday because it meant he did an open Q&A afterwards. And luckily I was there with notebook and pen at the ready.

As you can imagine he spent an hour answering pretty much everything that could be asked, so these are very much the edited highlights. The first questioner asked about his approach to casting and whether using "normal" people as opposed to professionals ever caused him problems? Loach replied that the bottom line has to be credibility - actors must be convincing in a particular role. As far as he was concerned if this is your aim you cannot have a working class woman played by the likes of Julia Roberts. This means a very long casting process as Loach typically sees people seven or eight times before making a decision. But by the end of it they have been "professionalised" by the process and are no greater risk than any other actor.

The next question moved to his famous forum scenes, such as the debates in Land and Freedom and The Wind that Shook the Barley. Loach set out to bring the critical issues of the Spanish civil war out into the open, particularly the struggle between the Stalinists and mainstream republicans who wanted to prioritise the military struggle against Franco and leave the social revolution until afterwards versus the position of other lefts that saw the revolution and the war against the fascists as interrelated processes. A similar intent lay behind the production of Wind, which is an interpretation of the Irish struggle for independence as a revolution. Here for Loach the movement was particularly difficult for the British ruling class because in their eyes Ireland was a home nation, a core component of the Empire, and not a colony. Loach confessed to stretching history "a bit" to include discussion of Connolly's republican socialism, and also showed how imperialism can accommodate an independence movement. In his opinion the struggle more or less changed the flag because it fell under bourgeois hegemony and so, post-independence, it was business as usual as far as British capitalism was then concerned.

Turning to the state of cinema Loach said it could be the same as any other medium and should be as varied as imagination. But it is thoroughly commodified and exclusionary. Because of Hollywood's dominance, US films and US-funded films are produced with the American market in mind. As a result its output tends to resemble more a store full of airport novels than a public library. To illustrate this dominance in the UK, Loach's previous film, It's a Free World sold around 40 copies to British cinemas. But across the channel where Hollywood's grip is far less secure, French cinemas purchased 370 copies.

Loach also gave us a quick preview of Looking for Eric, which is due out this summer. It follows the descent into depression by Eric, a Man Utd-obsessed postman. Then one night he smokes a spliff and Eric Cantona appears and starts giving him advice. Kitchen sink meets magical realism?

Lastly it wouldn't be complete if Loach wasn't asked about his politics. Given the current situation, he was asked if he thought revolution was back on the agenda. His answer took us back to the late 60s. Then, Loach said, it felt as though it was around the corner or a couple of years away at the most. But now, while that hope is gone our situation is approaching something of an end game. Not because capitalism looks like it's about to be swept away, but due to the environmental crisis. In his opinion the planet cannot sustain a system premised on endless, reckless economic growth, and the idea 'the beast' could behave responsibly defies belief. So what happens next? His answer to the mainly young audience was simply "over to you".

This report comes from Per-Åke Westerlund of Rättvisepartiet Socialisterna, the Swedish section of the CWI (at present the CWI does not have an Icelandic affiliate). The BBC and Channel Four reporting of what is happening is nothing short of shameful. You'd be forgiven for thinking that the ruling Independence Party/Social Democrat coalition resigned simply because they felt guilt over their reckless economic policies. In fact, what Per-Åke reports on is a crisis not seen in Western Europe since the late 1960s. With the media chattering this last weekend about 'Reykjavik-on-Thames', could it happen here?

Iceland: Devastated by Global Crisis
A few days of demonstrations, including protesters throwing eggs being met by riot police with teargas, have been enough to force a new election in Iceland. The mass protests in what is, to date, the worst hit country in the global economic crisis, have been referred to as a revolution – a ’fleece’, ’facebook’, or ’saucepan’ revolution. Among those who have come onto the streets, there are discussions about the need for a new political force.

On Monday 26 January, the government handed in its resignation. This was clearly an attempt to defuse the protest movement. So was the proposal from resigning PM Geir Haarde of a "national unity government".

It is only three months ago, in early October, that Iceland went from being the fifth richest country in the world – based on GDP per capita – to experiencing the worst crisis of all countries, so far. The super-indebted Icelandic banks were nationalised in an attempt to limit the crisis. Today, 70 per cent of all companies and 40 per cent of households are technically bankrupt. GDP is expected to drop 10 per cent this year. Unemployment increased from six to nine per cent in December alone, inflation is close to 20 per cent, while interest rates are 18 per cent. The currency, the Icelandic krona, is hardly exchangeable.

Demonstrations of anger bring down government
There is a widespread hatred against the bankers who orchestrated the crisis and their friends, the politicians. While the top bankers seem to have left the country, however, the politicians remained in power. This changed last week.

From Tuesday, 20 January, when parliament restarted after the holidays, daily protests were organised. The main slogan was "incompetent government" and the demand was for new elections. Most people brought cooking pans and other improvised objects to drum on.

Last Wednesday, the protest took place outside a meeting held by the Social Democratic Alliance, a junior partner in the coalition government, demanding that the SDA resign. Later the same night, protesters surrounded the limousine of Prime Minister Geir Haarde, knocking on the car roof and throwing eggs and drink cans. Riot police were used to defend Haarde, who is also leader of the Independence Party. At that stage, he still ruled out any elections before those scheduled for two years’ time in 2011.

In protests late at night on Thursday, stones were thrown at the police, with two policemen injured. The police used teargas and pepper spray and 20 people were arrested in the first major attack on a demonstration since 1949, when Icelanders demonstrated against NATO membership. It has been reported that the government of Iceland, which has only a handful of soldiers, was considering calling in Norwegian forces.

The Icelandic website, Ice News, quoted one of the protesters:

"No one has resigned and no one has been fired. They are hard at work at getting what little is left here back into the hands of those who crashed our economy to begin with.

”The people here are afraid and at the mercy of ruthless criminals that have feathered their nests not only in our government, but also in the businesses and banks. These banks were given to them through a fake privatisation in 2005, they have literally done nothing but spend money since; now it´s all gone, and you want to give them more?".

The protester referred to the demand of the demonstrators that money promised from the IMF and governments should not be paid out to the present government. In total, ten billion US dollars has been promised in "rescue packages". The IMF deal includes severe demands for budget cuts and high interest rates, both measures that will deepen the crisis.

New elections
On Friday, Prime Minister Haarde suddenly declared new elections for 9 May. At the same press conference, he announced his resignation as leader of the Independence Party, revealing that he has cancer. Already, the leader of the Social Democratic Party, Foreign Minister Ingibjorg Solrun Gisladottir, is being treated for cancer. The following day, Minister of Commerce, Bjorgvin Sigurdsson, resigned at the same time as he sacked the boss of the state authority responsible for financial supervision.

These announcements, however, did not break the momentum of the protests. On Saturday, over 6,000 people gathered, demanding the government resign immediately.

"We will not allow more crap. The government must go. We've had enough of them controlling everything, just taking care of themselves and not caring at all for the people", said one of the speakers, Jakobina Olafsdóttir, to great cheers from the crowd. The Swedish daily, Dagens Nyheter, continued its report: "She and others in Iceland want to see a new society, without the cronyism and corruption they believe is prevalent and without the for so long so mighty Independence Party."

The same article continues: "Different protest movements have mushroomed. With the help of Facebook". [Ninety six per cent of 20-29 year-olds are on Facebook.] "They quickly gather thousands of supporters and can easily call meetings. Now, there are discussions between the different movements to form a common manifesto for a new society."

In opinion polls the opposition Left-Green Movement has doubled since the last election two years ago, to 32.6 per cent. The two governing parties have lost a combined 22 per cent. The Independence Party’s ratings have fallen to 22.1 per cent and the Social Democratic Alliance to 19.2 per cent. A previous partner of the Independence Party, the Progressive Party, has also increased in opposition, from 11.7 to 16.8 per cent.

This is a clear indication that people are looking for a more radical alternative. The Left-Greens are seen as the most anti-capitalist party, previously profiling themselves mostly on environmental issues. For example, the party advocates nationalisation of all natural resources. The Left-Greens also stand for re-negotiations on the IMF deal and for Iceland to leave NATO. Opinion in favour of joining the European Union, which surged when the currency collapsed last year, has already started to dwindle. Today, 38 per cent want to join, compared to over 50 per cent in October. Many have understood that foreign aid will not come without strings.

Revolution?
The mass demonstrations in Iceland, like recent protests in other European countries, show the willingness of people to try and take control over their own lives. They no longer trust politicians or capitalists. At the demonstrations in Reykjavik, the boss of the Central Bank, David Oddsson, a previous prime minister, has been compared to Adolf Hitler!

It is clear that the protesters have had enough and that they are representative of the generally-held feelings in Iceland. This has given rise to a lot of discussion about whether what is happening is a revolution.

“The word ‘revolution’ might sound a bit of an overstatement, but given the calm temperament that usually prevails in Icelandic politics, the unfolding events represent, at the very least, a revolution in political activism", Icelander Eirkur Bergmann wrote in the British paper, The Guardian.

Another recent visitor to Iceland, London School of Economics professor Robert Wade, commented, "The situation is very tense and very unstable". He compared the situation with other sometimes-violent street demonstrations in Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Greece over the last month.

A third commentator, Fredrik Erixon of the Brussels-based European Centre for International Political Economy, said the situation was reminiscent of "the French Revolution of 1789", rather than that of 1968. The anger is certainly there, but capitalist Iceland is far different from feudal France.

The lesson from mass movements in other countries in recent years is that unpopular regimes can be overthrown. But to alter the economic and political conditions in society the working class and its allies need their own party with a programme for socialist change.

In Iceland there will be a concerted campaign from national and global capital to submit to the IMF conditions, including economic blackmail. Any government that is not prepared to challenge the capitalists who have caused the crisis will come under enormous pressure to make huge cuts in living standards for working people. This is the case even if a Left-Green government is established, or a government of "experts", as some of the protesters have proposed.

Workers and youth in Iceland have already drawn important conclusions. New experiences will force them to look hard for alternatives. Transforming the situation in Iceland would need a fully socialist programme of nationalisation of all major parts of the economy, under democratic workers’ control and management. The crisis has shown that bankers, capitalists and today's top politicians are not wanted; democratically elected organisations of workers, youth, pensioners could run society without them. The beginnings of a movement against capitalism in Iceland must be welcomed and encouraged by workers and activists internationally. This is just the first indication of what is to come as more and more countries fall into recession and mass revolt begins to develop.

Flickr images from the protests can be viewed here.

In the final two pieces in History and Class Consciousness, Lukacs turns his attention to the problems of socialist organisation. The final piece is a general meditation on the revolutionary party, but this, ‘Critical Observations on Rosa Luxemburg’s ‘Critique of the Russian Revolution’ is, not surprisingly, a polemic against her views on the Bolsheviks. But this is not a point-by-point contestation of ‘the facts’ – it is a deep philosophical critique of her method.

The critique begins from what Lukacs argues is a misreading of the character of proletarian revolution in her remarks on the agrarian question in revolutionary Russia (or, to put it differently, what were socialists going to do about the peasantry?) Luxemburg criticised the Bolshevik solution for not laying down the prerequisites of socialist agricultural reform. Instead they did the reverse and made it more difficult in the long run. A socialist government should have centralized land ownership via nationalization. Instead the Bolsheviks adopted the peasant demand of land redistribution and stood by as it was parceled out chaotically into millions of individual plots. As far as Lukacs was concerned, it wasn’t really a question of right or wrong. What mattered was the extent to which the mass movement of peasants, in the context of dissolving bourgeois society, could be won for the revolution as opposed to the counterrevolution. Before the October revolution the land question was being resolved by the peasants themselves and was more or less an accomplished fact when the soviets became the governing power. Had the Bolsheviks turned their face against the movement, the revolution would not have been won.

Luxemburg does acknowledge it as an astute tactical move on the Bolsheviks’ part – but remained steadfast in her belief that it didn’t advance agriculture toward socialism. For Lukacs, Luxemburg’s “impatience” is an outgrowth of her overestimation of the revolution’s proletarian character. She overestimated the clarity and maturity of the Russian working class at that historical conjuncture, and therefore its ability to stamp its will on other classes. By extension Luxemburg underestimated the strength of those classes and the power their ideologies exert within the working class itself. As a result, “she constantly opposes to the exigencies of the moment the principles of the future stages of the revolution” (1968, pp.276-7).

‘Critique of the Russian Revolution’ criticises the Bolsheviks on the dispersal of the constituent assembly, the foundation of the soviet system, the red terror, and the denial of civil rights to the bourgeoisie. Lukacs response is to dig more thoroughly into Luxemburg’s method, this time by going back to her famous polemic with Eduard Bernstein. She writes, “the relations of production of capitalist society become increasingly socialist but its political and legal arrangements erect an ever loftier wall between capitalist and socialist society” (cit p.277). Luxemburg agrees with the need for revolution, for a violent break with the old order, but the way she sets up revolution – as being against the ‘political and legal arrangements’ that are preventing socialism from emerging within the womb of capitalist society – is very close to resembling a political revolution (see Legality and Class Consciousness). What Lukacs is getting at here is that Luxemburg seemingly believed that if the bourgeois barriers are removed (through revolutionary means), the socialist tendencies in the economy would be free to develop. But more than just a violent break is needed – violent social revolution, the forced expropriation of the expropriators is the necessary precursor to the society of associated producers. This is more thoroughgoing than anything Luxemburg envisaged. She overplays the mechanical or ‘organic’ movement of history relying on it to bring socialism is about.

Luxemburg’s organic conception of socialism is the root of her critique of soviet power. In the Russian revolution, and revolutionary situations before and since, soviets, or workers’ councils, have been a tried and tested method of organising the class. This reached its highest mode of expression in the early phase of the Russian revolution when the soviets seized power under a Bolshevik and Left Socialist Revolutionary coalition government. This state, the workers’ state, then organises its power against the bourgeoisie. Unlike capitalist states, which, on the whole, are reactive and tend to intervene economically and politically after the fact, the workers’ state is an activist state. It consciously fights the class struggle and seeks to steer development in the socialist direction, which in turn will lead to further, conscious socialist construction, and thereby gradually undermining the basis for its existence. This is not socialism by decree, but, initially, the workers’ state is the primary agent for organising and building the democratically planned economy. Thus socialism comes into the world as the fruits of conscious action. It cannot be otherwise. Luxemburg did not see things this way. For her the soviet organisation of the workers’ state was “premature” – rather it is the form of governance proper to the higher phase of developed socialism.

Lenin and Luxemburg’s differences on the party question turn on the conscious and organic perspectives. Lenin and the Communist International insisted upon the organisational independence of revolutionaries to better contest for the leadership of the working class. For Luxemburg the struggle against opportunism and reformism should remain within the mass workers’ parties. These bodies had been thrown up organically by class struggle and were, therefore, the mass repositories of proletarian experience. Social democracy (as was) provided a party home for all kinds discontented anti-capitalist elements of non-proletarian origin as well. In a revolutionary situation, she supposed the spontaneous revolutionary spirit of the class would well up and cause the entire working class to join battle simultaneously, dragging all its social democratic allies in its wake.

Unfortunately, Luxemburg’s commitment to the organic perspective of organising workers meant she overlooked the extent to which the mass workers’ parties had been compromised by the first world war, despite her frequent and trenchant polemics with revisionist elements.

The fact was that almost without exception an influential section of the leadership in the workers’ parties openly went over to the side of the bourgeoisie while another group was tacitly and secretly in league with it. That both these groups have succeeded in retaining their hold on the crucial strata of the proletariat both intellectually and organizationally must be made the point of departure for the analysis of the situation and the tasks of the revolutionary workers’ party (p.288).

The lesson to be drawn from this that ideological struggle in the mass parties would not resolve the situation. They cannot be “reclaimed”. Nor will the working class adopt a revolutionary leadership as a result of the blind play of capitalist laws of motion. It has to be consciously fought for, and this is only possible if the revolutionary party has the freedom and independence to intervene in struggle and win over the working class by virtue of its actions (more about communist organisation in the final post).

The organic conception of socialism is a tendency that needs combating. In Luxemburg’s case, her commitment to revolutionary politics was able to mitigate its effects. But she was very much on the extreme left wing of this tendency. For others of a more centrist or reformist persuasion, the organic conception of socialism was a recipe for fatalism and non-activity. However, it is tempting to suggest that Lukacs makes the opposite error – that his emphasising the conscious basis of socialism is another way of advancing an essentially voluntaristic perspective. I think this would be a mistake. Throughout History and Class Consciousness Lukacs has philosophically sketched out a conception of the working class struggling through history and gradually becoming aware of its position in capitalist society, its interests, and the possible destiny that awaits it. Trade unions, labour parties and communist parties are milestones in the development of this consciousness. The argument could be made that this process of becoming is itself an organic process driven forward by blind social forces. But Lukacs is absolutely clear that the class-conscious proletariat is the fundamental prerequisite of socialism. There comes a historical point where conscious activity has to take over if the socialist potential capitalism has made possible is going to be realised.

A complete list of History and Class Consciousness postings can be found here.

Lukacs's essay, 'Legality and Illegality' is more than just a meditation on the revolutionary party's adoption of legal and illegal methods of work. He looks at the law as a potent ideological weapon used by the bourgeoisie in the class struggle, the level of drag it has on proletarian class consciousness, and the changing functions of legalism once the working class have assumed power. But Lukacs begins not with the question of black letter law, but how laws, in the social scientific sense, function to reproduce the capitalist state and society. He argues "the organs of authority harmonise to such an extent with the (economic) laws governing men's lives, or seem so overwhelmingly superior that men experience them as natural forces, as the necessary environment for their existence. As a result they submit to them freely. (Which is not to say that they approve of them) (Lukacs 1968, p.257).

For example, we are not forced to go to work and perform a set of tasks in the workplace on pain of legal sanctions, we do so because we need the wage to reproduce ourselves as physically, and as individuals with the necessary set of basic cultural competencies. But that millions upon millions do this every day without a gun held to our heads reproduces the appearance of this as a force of nature, which, of course, grants the exploitative relations that stand behind it a (mostly unacknowledged) legitimacy that is very difficult to dislodge. Contrast this with societies whose rulers depended heavily on the use of force, such as with capitalist dictatorships. Its reliance on force to meet oppositional upswells from below means they are more prone to revolutionary situations than liberal democracies. Repeated state violence does not allow for the appearance of natural harmony between authority and the economy to emerge. Instead power appears as something illegitimate, and that threatens not just the regime, but can lead to a revolutionary movement against capitalism itself.

Therefore Lukacs makes a distinction (familiar to Trotskyists) between political revolutions, whose outbreak effects only the political form of the state and, in capitalist societies, replaces the old regime with a legal superstructure more in tune with the 'natural' motion of the economy. Social revolutions, on the other hand, are more thoroughgoing: they aim to change the system itself. Unsurprisingly, "any such change violates the instincts of the average [bourgeois] man so deeply that he regards it as a catastrophic threat to life as such, it appears to him to be a blind force of nature like a flood or earthquake. Unable to grasp the essence of the process, his blind despair tries to defend itself by attacking the immediate manifestations of change that menace his accustomed existence" (p.258). The revolution does not appear as such to the movement of our class, provided it has become fully conscious of its position in capitalist society and the role it will be playing in the construction of socialism.

The existence of Marxism, as the theoretical distillation of the experience of the proletariat, and awareness of its theoretical and practical consequences does not means its outlook has been incorporated in the consciousness of the class. Some layers are more passive than others. Parts of the working class are concentrated in large workplaces, others may lead a more solitary work life. In short the variations among our class in conditions when consciousness is low can leave it prey to the effects of reification and alien ideologies. This helps explain how the differences in working class politics, between the Marxists, and the reformists, social democrats and labourists, are sustained. The objectives of the two camps are qualitatively different. The Marxists seek to organise against the state. Reformist politics struggle against their bourgeois counterparts for control over the state - not to strike a blow for workers' power but for the privilege of managing the common affairs of the capitalists. In so far as class enters the reformist world view, the state is an organ that rises above and is neutral in the struggle between the classes. It fetishises the trappings of authority, especially those that appear in congruence with the "natural" appearance of capitalism. The law, which is the ideological guarantor of legitimate authority, is likewise defended as something that is above class struggle. They collude in capitalism's naturalist conceit.

Obviously, Marxists differ:

What is essential is to realise that the capitalist state should be seen and evaluated as a historical phenomenon even while it exists. It should be treated therefore purely as a power structure which has to be taken into account only to the extent to which its actual power stretches. On the other hand, it should be subjected to the most painstaking and fearless examination in order to discover the points where this power can be weakened and undermined. This strong point, or rather weak point in the state is the way in which it is reflected in the consciousness of the people. Ideology is in this case not merely a consequence of the economic structure of society but also the precondition of its smooth functioning (p.261)

When capitalism is in a relatively stable period it's unsurprising that the working class can be found occupying ideological positions within the limits of the system. The job of Marxism is to create a frame of mind in which the common sense natural view of capitalism and the state are seen for what they are: the products of history. This knowledge (defined as practical-critical political activity) strips both of their reservoir of latent "spiritual" strength. Spreading these insights are the key task because ideology, accepting capitalism's naturalism, is what stymies opposition. But doing this is premised on Marxists themselves achieving a revolutionary understanding of the law in relation to strategy and tactics. As we saw, reformism fetishises the legal apparatus. The flip-side of this, the ultra-left romanticism of illegality, associates all legal activity with opportunism and sees the state as a straight forward condensation of class power. This, for Lukacs, is counter-productive because the investment of illegal methods with an aura inadvertently confers the state more legal legitimacy. Thus grand gestures that vocally declare the breaking of the law can actually reinforce the preservation of its authority.

The party escapes the closed game of legality and illegality by granting special status to neither: in itself it has decisively broken with legal ideology. This is very different from movements who "specialise" in illegality. Lukacs cites the example of the Socialist Revolutionaries before and after the Russian revolution. Under Tsarism, they and their forerunners participated in several assassinations, bomb plots, peasant uprisings, etc. But this did not prevent the majority of the party from passing into the camp of capitalist counterrevolution during the civil war. For Lukacs, their commitment to illegality signified their adherence to legal ideology. But the party's indifference to legalism, its treatment of legality and illegality as merely a matter of tactics is necessary for proletarian self-education. "For the proletariat can only be liberated from its dependence upon the life-forms created by capitalism when it has learnt to act without these life-forms inwardly influencing its actions" (p.264).

Lukacs argues the successful struggle for power is only the start of the education against legalism. Once the working class has won power most are still affected by the lingering sense that capitalism is really the only properly authentic and legal social order. Thus if the soviet system can quickly seize the weapon of legality to legitimate itself it puts itself in an advantageous position vis a vis the less conscious sections of the working class. It also robs the restorationist bourgeoisie of a key ideological prop of its rule. But, Lukacs gloomily concludes, until our class has a sense of its own legality, it will be partly disarmed in front of its opponent. It would not be constructing the relations and institutions of socialism with assurance, but half-heartedly and with the guilt of the usurper.

This is probably the most problematic of Lukacs's essays. It sits rather uneasily with the thrust of the rest of the book. The emphasis up until now has rightly been on practical working class activity as the means of successfully waging class struggle., but Lukacs here falls into prioritising ideological struggle without reference to his previous insights. The essays on reification demonstrate how the relations of capitalist production give rise to the objectification of phenomena, and how class struggle is simultaneously the fight against reifying processes. But this is separated out. Reification is undoubtedly the wellspring of seeing and experiencing capitalism as a natural force, therefore his claim that ideology is the biggest obstacle to conscious opposition is erroneous to say the least. But understandable. The essay was written in 1920, after the failure of the Hungarian soviet but during the period when the revolutionary window of opportunity was open. It appeared the objective circumstances were favourable, so why wasn't the working class entering the struggle in greater numbers? Lukacs's emphasis on ideology in general and legalist naturalism in particular as his answer reflects an underestimation of the resilience of capitalism, typical of impatience. For all the thousands of words spent on the importance of totality, Lukacs loses sight of it. Even during periods of revolutionary crisis, the ideological resources of capitalism are constantly replenished to the extent waged labour exists and property remains in private hands. It is not enough to struggle against ideology, as important as that is. "Practical-critical activity" needs to patiently proceed on all fronts, and particularly in the workplace, which, after all, is where our class is concentrated.

A complete list of History and Class Consciousness postings can be found here.