Ah… The 2007 accession states of Bulgaria and Romania… What to make of them? At the time I was both optimistic and pessimistic all at once. A year and a half on…?

After Bulgaria being told off last month (for, y’know, little things like being economically backward, corrupt, and ignoring human rights and the rule of law) now EU agricultural funds have been suspended to Romania due to dodgy management.

Oh dear… Doesn’t look like letting them in was such a good idea now, does it?

The thing is, though, unlike Bulgaria’s blatant unsuitability for EU membership, I reckon this simply shows how much Romania’s getting into the spirit of things. The Commission has suspended payments of just 28.3 million euros to Romania - that’s three times less than France was fined back in 2006 for dodgy use of CAP funds. Mismanagement of EU agricultural payments is a long and noble tradition - by following the examples of France, Britain, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Ireland, Romania is merely underlining its commitment to European values.

Makes you proud, doesn’t it?

Popularity: 17% [?]

It’s a question I’ve asked before, not least when the backwards Balkan oddity first joined. And now, finally, the EU powers that be seem to have noticed that, erm… letting in a notoriously corrupt, organised crime-ridden country with a dodgy economy and poor track record on human rights may just have been a bad idea.

And so EU funding to Bulgaria has been cut off, with hefty warnings for that other bastion of economic might and social liberalism, Romania.

A handy summary of the European Commission’s report on Bulgaria has a number of highlights - all of which would tend to suggest that, erm, Bulgaria wasn’t quite ready for EU accession last year, and so shouldn’t have been allowed to join:

The Penal Code is outdated and is part of the reason why the judiciary is overloaded… The administrative capacity of both law enforcement and the judiciary is weak… There are signs of corruption in the health and education sectors… A strategic approach to fighting local corruption is missing. The anti-corruption Commission of the Council of Ministers has not been active in this regard… The fight against high level corruption and organised crime is not producing enough results…

And so on, and so on…

Of course, corruption alone is nothing too unusual within the EU. But Bulgaria also falls down in countless other areas, as the US State Department’s 2007 report on Human Rights in the country notes:

The constitution and law prohibit such practices; however, police frequently beat criminal suspects, particularly members of minority groups… Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported complaints of police brutality from Romani victims who were too intimidated to lodge official complaints with authorities… Human rights groups continued to claim that medical examinations in cases of police abuse were not properly documented, that allegations of police abuse were seldom investigated thoroughly, and that offending officers were very rarely punished… Prison conditions generally did not meet international standards, and the government did not allocate funds to make significant improvements… The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention; however, there were reports that police at times ignored these prohibitions… Impunity remained a problem. All complaints involving interior ministry personnel and other police forces, as well as military personnel, are adjudicated by the military court system.

And on, and on… They could also have mentioned the arbitrary arrest of political dissidents.

And it’s not as if its economy is booming either, ranking worse than Turkey’s, and - according to Wikipedia, at least - with inflation fluctuating between a low of 2.3% and high of 7.3% over the last five years, while “Bulgaria’s per-capita PPP GDP is still only about a third of the EU25 average, while the country’s nominal GDP per capita is about 13% of the EU25 average.”

Oh, and lest we forget, Bulgaria also signed a gas pipeline deal with Russia earlier this year which has caused some serious problems for the EU’s own planned Nabucco pipeline - designed to lessen Europe’s reliance on Russian gas - and thus handed the Kremlin even greater dominance over the European energy market.

So, as I say, the country is corrupt, has a poor human rights record and a dodgy economy, and seems to be making little progress with any of these, while at the same time is undermining EU efforts to stabilise the continent’s vital energy supplies - so what the hell is it doing in the EU? “Serious concerns” were being raised by the European Commission as late as May 2006 - just seven months before the country was allowed to join, so I’m genuinely fascinated to know who thought it would be a good idea…

More to the point, have any positives been gained from Bulgarian entry? - bar the amusement factor of rabidly right-wing Bulgarian MEPs making arses of themselves, that is.

The EU is meant to have standards. Membership is supposed to be a reward for having met those standards. Bulgaria patently has come up short - and yet it’s been rewarded anyway. Is it any wonder that Turkey’s getting so pissed off?

Popularity: 24% [?]

War criminal arrested: cue all sorts of guff from people who should know better about how this proves the Serbian government’s “pro-Western credentials” and demonstrates “Serbia’s European aspirations”. It does nothing of the sort.

All this really means is that a thoroughly unpleasant mass-murderer has finally been arrested and can at last be brought to trial. Wider significance cannot, as yet, be drawn from this long-overdue apprehension of one of the nastiest pieces of work Europe’s seen for a while. Not while Serbia’s still being cozy with Russia and helping the Kremlin further dominate European gas supplies to gain backing in the ongoing Serbian campaign against Kosovo’s independence.

Because the thing to remember is that yes, this current Serbian government may well have made some of the right noises to flatter the EU’s ego - but it’s still a Serbian government, and Serbian governments have long been unable to decide in which direction they want to head. Little wonder as, slap-bang in the centre of the Balkans, Serbia has cultural and historical links to Europe, Russia, the Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church, and the Islamic world to the south - it’s been right at the heart of some of Europe’s most confusing and vicious territorial disputes for centuries. Little wonder as well, then, that Serbia’s identity crisis mean that it has rarely been known for either consistency or sanity ever since gaining independence from the Ottoman Empire back at the start of the 19th century. It was no accident that the First World War kicked off thanks to the actions of a bunch of Serbian assassins - with the first declaration of war being between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Serbia. (Which then escalated, lest we forget, thanks to Serbia’s old friendship with, erm… Russia…)

So, what does Karadzic’s arrest mean? Probably not a lot in the long-term, because hardly anything ever means much in the long-term when it comes to Serbia. It is, however a potentially handy short-term bit of PR for the current Serbian government:

With Serbs refusing the accept Kosovo’s loss and angry with the EU for sanctioning it, the liberals needed other areas where they can show they are ready to co-operate with Brussels… It was particularly beneficial for [Serbian President] Mr Tadic that Mr Karadic was captured with the help of Serbian security officers because the arrest provides clear evidence of Belgrade’s willingness to co-operate with the war crimes tribunal.

But PR is all that this is - and PR largely aimed at the outside world. Within Serbia, nationalist feeling remains high despite the current government’s supposedly “liberal” credentials, and the arrest of a nationalist figurehead could just as easily cause trouble for a more moderate government still trying to prove to the Serbian people that it’s just as pissed off about the Kosovo situation as anyone. Having already overseen the independence of Montenegro, losing Kosovo as well puts Tadic’s government in a very tricky situation indeed - and he’s too canny an operator not to ensure that he has all bases covered. Why else would he be sucking up to both Russia and the EU at the same time?

Popularity: 17% [?]

“Oh noes!” Say the eurosceptics. “Teh Lisbon tweety dat am weely teh constitootion am gonna make teh EU a state and stuff! Got foreign minister! Oh noes! Dat mean common foreign policy! Our sovereignty gone bye-byes! Waaah!”

I really can’t ever hope to summarise the likelihood of this particular bogeyman coming into being any time soon better than Nanne at DJ Nozem, so instead I’ll just reproduce it in full. :

EU Foreign Ministers fail to agree on the most basic issues about the status of a small breakaway Yugoslav province (population: 2 million est.) that declared its independence over the weekend.

An issue that had been on the horizon for about, oh, nine years.

How’s that common foreign policy coming along?

He he he!

I do like how many intriguing questions the Kosovo situation is helping to raise. And how many answers it’s providing to boot…

Popularity: 29% [?]

After the little-reported grenade attack on a UN court on Sunday afternoon, it seems that Kosovo’s Serbs aren’t going to accept independence without a fight.

Reuters: U.N. police pulled out from a Kosovo border post that was destroyed on Tuesday by Serbs who vowed never to submit to the authority of Kosovo’s Albanian government and its Western backers.

It was one of two border posts, between Kosovo and Serbia, attacked and set on fire by Kosovo Serbs earlier in the day in the Serb-dominated northwest corner of Kosovo.

Sofia Echo: Serbs also attacked a check point near Zubin Potok. The police officers hid in a tunnel while about 1000 protesters tried to tear it down…

hundreds of Serbs set fire to the temporary passport control premises in Banja.

Of course, with any luck this is just a small-scale bit of initial frustration from local ethnic Serbs and it won’t escalate any further. Fingers crossed, eh?

But considering UN troops so far don’t seem to have clear instructions about what to do (abandoning the border posts of a territory they’re meant to be protecting? What’s all that about?), how long is it going to be before Serbia - or perhaps Russia? - steps in with its own “peacekeeping” troops to “protect” Kosovo’s Serbian minority from the ethnic Albanian majority?

Popularity: 26% [?]

Spotted in a decent French article on Kosovo’s independence, a throwaway line that made me ponder:

L’indépendance du Kosovo se fera sous supervision internationale. Malgré ces divisions, l’Union européenne a décidé, sans l’aval de l’ONU, de déployer au Kosovo une mission de quelque 2 000 policiers et juristes pour « accompagner » les débuts de l’indépendance du Kosovo.

Or, in other words:

The independence of Kosovo will be under international supervision. Despite this, the European Union has decided, without UN approval, to deploy in Kosovo, a mission of some 2000 policemen and lawyers to “accompany” the beginnings of the independence of Kosovo. [emphasis mine]

Of course, a significant reason why the anti-war protests back in 2003 felt so justified to so many was the lack of a UN resolution supporting military action against Saddam Hussein in Iraq. There are no such protests about unilateral military action in Kosovo - nor have there really ever been during the last decade of NATO deployments there.

Is this because Kosovo is too low-profile for anyone to really care - or is there a more significant, wider-ranging reason?

Kosovo has declared independence. Many western countries - including the UK and US - are likely to declare their official recognition. Russia has explicitly stated the declaration to be illegal - and China has also made disapproving noises.

With two members of the UN Security Council opposed to Kosovo’s independence, it cannot be recognised by the UN - and so will not legally be a state, despite thinking it is. Likewise, the situation in Darfur is officially not a genocide (despite all the evidence) thanks to the UN having failed to declare it as such - partially thanks to pressure from China, keen to preserve her arms trade.

In situations such as these, is it acceptable to bypass the UN? If so, why here and not five years ago in Iraq? And, if bypassing the UN is sometimes acceptable, what useful purpose does this supposed final arbiter of international law actually serve any more? And does the lack of protests over military action in Kosovo indicate an acknowledgement of this?

Popularity: 33% [?]

As you may have noticed, I’ve been pondering the EU’s proposed mission to Kosovo quite a lot over the last day or two, and getting increasingly concerned that the province’s impending independence hasn’t been quite thought through. Overnight, a rather succinct comment was left that neatly summarises much of what I’ve been coming to think - as well as noting a few things I’d missed (criticising, I’ll add for my ego’s sake, an article I’d linked to, rather than anything I’ve written so far - though it also applies to my stuff to an extent):

No mention is made of the 55% of Kosovo albanians who did not vote in the recent elections, surely a sign of no-confidence in the politicians that claim to present them?

No comment on Kosovo’s economic situation or other critical problems either, nor how long the patience of the average Kosovo albanian will last if things don’t improve fast after ‘independence’

No comment on how much it will cost the EU. The EU itself quotes EUR 250m over approximately 3 years. If tens of billions of IMF dollars spend on the region by Tito hasn’t helped, then what makes the ‘EU’ thinks its paltry sums will succeed? Most of all, what about the cost of this indeterminate subsidy to the EU tax payer?

The EU’s policy can be summed up as ‘Independence and Pray’.

Neither does the ‘analysis’ really address the matter that Serbia’s stability as critical to the EU’s ’stabilization’ of the Balkans. Sure, Serbia under Nikolic may be made a ‘Pariah’ by the EU, but that will also damage neighboring states such as Bulgaria and Romania, much as the economic damage that sanctions caused in the 1990s, something that very few commentators care to address nor comment upon.

More on this, no doubt, over the next couple of weeks. I’m working on a theory about what’s going to happen when the EU gets more closely involved in the Balkans, but it’s going to take a bit more work…

Popularity: 22% [?]

The EU’s lack of action over the Yugoslav Civil War is surely the Union’s biggest embarrassment. “The EU has brought 50 years of peace to the continent”, they claim, always looking a bit shifty lest anyone remind them that they allowed a genocide to kick off on their doorstep, and then had to rely on America to help sort out the ongoing mess. Ever since, the drive for an EU rapid-reaction force has been stepping up. Now, with Kosovo on the brink of declaring independence from Serbia, the EU is on the brink of committing to a common military policy - a significant step, and one that could well have major implications.

Serbia’s recent elections may well have seen the less nutty option chosen, but it’s still not looking too promising. Because those elections were for the president, not the more powerful parliament - and so current Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica remains the real power in Serbia. (If the name sounds familiar, that’s because he’s the guy who succeeded Milosevic as Yugoslav president after 2000’s peaceful revolution.)

Kostunica is sorely opposed to the independence of Kosovo - so much so that last week he blocked a cabinet meeting that was to set Serbia well and truly on the road towards European Union membership, a step Kostunica sees as all but guaranteeing that Kosovo goes its own way. EU aspirations may well exist, but not at the expense of what Kostunica and co see as Serbian territorial integrity. Nationalism trumps internationalism, it would seem.

Kostunica has the support of the ultra-nationalist Radical Party (the one whose leader is currently on trial for crimes against humanity in The Hague) and Milosevic’s old Socialist Party, so doesn’t really need the more moderate Democrats on board, even though he’s still their leader. Yesterday, however, he kissed and made up with his party, before making his intentions over Kosovo crystal clear:

“We have made a decision that the Serbian government will on Thursday, in advance, annul all acts that are against the law which concern a unilateral proclamation of the independence of this fictitious state on Serbian territory…

“We shall not allow such a creation to exist for a minute. It has to be legally annulled the moment it is illegally proclaimed by a leadership of convicted terrorists.”

So, what does this mean for Serbia’s EU hopes, now that every Serbian party is so explicitly opposed?

Well, the general consensus is that in uniting against Kosovo’s independence, Serbia has now decisively chosen to stay out of the EU - Serbia’s territorial integrity trumping its long-term economic development. Hence Monday’s “No alternative to Europe” pro-EU protests in Belgrade, led by precisely the same sort of people who started the anti-Milosevic movement back in the 90s, but - with no Serbian party prepared to accept the loss of Kosovo in exchange for EU integration - with rather less chance of success.

Kosovo’s independence is coming, of that there can be no doubt. But with Serbia refusing to acknowledge such a move and Kosovo itself potentially unable to survive on its own, the Balkans could well turn into another major flashpoint - and another massive challenge for the EU. What to do? Back Kosovo, and risk a return to civil war, or back Serbia, and risk a return to guerilla attacks?

So far, it’s all been Kosovo. Pretty much every EU member state has declared an intention to recognise the wannabe country’s independence when it comes, and has been working towards building up Kosovo’s economy and legal system in preparation. Now, it seems, the EU is even preparing to offer military support.

As well as being a significant symbolic moment for EU integration (an EU army long having been central to political integration among federalists - ever since it was first proposed by Winston Churchill - and a key fear of anti-EU types), this potentially could see another ongoing spat escalate yet further. Because Serbia has the support of Russia, which is on the record promising to block any United Nations recognition of Kosovo’s independence.

With Russia throwing her weight around to get Ukraine to do what she wants, and increasingly setting herself up in opposition to the EU, could the protesting Belgrade students have got it wrong?

For ex-communist countries with struggling economies trying to get over the problems of the Cold War years, Brussels has long seemed the obvious point of aspiration. The carrot of European Union membership has helped many in the drive towards democracy - and continues to help in many states, like Bosnia, Croatia, Moldova and Ukraine. The EU was seen as the best - perhaps only - hope for a speedy route to prosperity.

Now, however, Russia’s control of so much of Europe’s energy supplies, healthy arms industry and willingness to trade with even the dodgiest of dodgy regimes has given an alternative. Europe’s last dictatorship, Belarus, has happily survived for nearly two decades thanks to Russian support. If Belarus can do it, why not Serbia?

It may not seem like much of a choice to sensible Westerners - the EU route seems sure to offer a far better standard of living, as well as all the benefits of human rights and democracy. But Serbia is, lest we forget, a country filled with people who were happily murdering each other in their thousands only a decade ago…

Anything could happen - and whatever does, the EU is going to be right at the heart, trying to mediate and, at the same time, prove that it is truly a world power. Failure is not an option, for that would be the final nail in the coffin of an EU working as one, the final proof - after failure to act in the 90s and failure to agree a common stance on Iraq and Afghanistan - that when action is needed, the EU can only dither.

Popularity: 25% [?]

Rather than wait until after the elections, Serbia’s already signed that gas pipeline deal with Russia, effectively scuppering the EU-backed alternative.

Now we’re going to end up with a president of Russia, Medvedev, who’ll not only be the former head of Gazprom (the company that controls 97% of Russia’s vast gas reserves, and has shown no compunction about using threats of supply cut-offs to gain political advantage - or to act on them) but also have complete dominance of the supply chain through to continental Europe.

Time for Europe to say bye bye to independence.

Popularity: 24% [?]

Monday sees the first round of the Serbian presidential elections - and they could well prove vital for the future of Europe. If power shifts we could all, to coin a phrase, end up exponentially screwed.

But surely, you might think, pro-Western sitting President Boris Tadić is going to keep his job? After all, since he got the gig in 2004 he’s been working hard to ensure that Serbia acts a little more civilised, helped to oversee Montenegran independence with little apparent ill-humour, hosted the Council of Europe’s meeting of ministers, last summer was awarded the European Prize for Political Culture (sweetly donating the prize money to a hospital in Kosovo), and has repeatedly declared his hope that one day Serbia will be able to join the EU. Yes, he may be against Kosovan independence, which has miffed some international observers, but that’s because he hopes for reconciliation with that much put-upon province, not to finish the job started by Slobodan MiloÅ¡ević. At the same time, Serbia’s economy’s been growing by around 6% a year under his tenure, and its GDP has doubled since 2003 - unemployment may still be high at around 20%, but it’s an improving situation.

Sounds like he’s doing pretty well, right? After seeing his country devastated by nationalist and religious violence, what better route than democratic liberal internationalism, encouraging economic growth, and increasing ties to the country’s biggest trading partner (the EU)? What Serb could possibly contemplate voting for anyone else - especially anyone tainted by association with the violence of the recent past - when that way lies a return to violence, hatred and economic disaster?

But the thing is, the Balkans seem to have a high proportion of idiots.

What else can explain the fact that Tomislav Nikolić - a former Vice President under MiloÅ¡ević, a man who’s only running for President because his party’s proper leader is currently on trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Hague - looks to have a very good chance of winning? (And this isn’t the first time - in the 2004 elections, Nikolić beat Tadić in the first round…)

To add to all that, some suspect Nikolić of being involved in the assassination of pro-Western Serbian Prime Minister Zoran ĐinÄ‘ić (Tadić’s predecessor as leader of the Democratic Party) in March 2003, and there have been several calls for him to be prosecuted for war crimes due to suspected involvement in the massacre of villagers in Antin, Croatia, in August 1991 (a massacre Nikolić himself claims never happened).

Oh, and Nikolić’s preferred option for Serbia’s future? To join with those bastions of human rights Russia and Belarus to form a post-communist superpower. (Not as mad an idea as you might think: over the last decade or so Russia and Belarus - Europe’s last dictatorship, and a country so fond of Soviet times that its secret police are still called the KGB - have held numerous largely unreported discussions about just such a move.)

With the Kosovo situation as uncertain as it’s been since the crisis of 1999 with the victory of former ethnic Albanian guerrilla leader Hashim Thaçi in the elections there two months ago, a tight election result in Serbia on Monday could - if the second round fails to provide a clear winner - very easily spark more of the protests and violence for which the region has become known.

While 2000’s pro-democracy anti-MiloÅ¡ević protests were both non-violent and successful (and in turn inspired similar movements in places like Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus), the popularity of Nikolić amongst Serbia’s fascists could easily lead to serious trouble.

If Nikolić wins, of course, the situation would naturally be infinitely worse. With Thaçi elected in Kosovo and Nikolić in Serbia, we’d have the most obvious indication yet that the Kosovo question is boiling down to a clash between the perpetrators of the late-90s genocide and its victims. (A couple of days ago, Thaçi addressed the UN (despite Serbian protests) declaring Kosovo’s readiness for statehood; the same day, Tadić (desperately trying to prove his nationalist credentials ahead of the elections) warned that Serbia was prepared to “act” to protect Kosovo’s Serbian minority.)

A clash over Kosovan independence would present the EU with one of its toughest challenges yet.

First, there’s the memory of how the EU singularly failed to act to prevent the Yugoslavian civil wars (so much for the EU bringing peace and stability to Europe…) - and then, of course, the even worse crime of dithering during the Kosovo crisis of 1999, leading to a delay in intervention that enabled MiloÅ¡ević and his cohorts to slaughter thousands of ethnic Albanians and Muslims throughout the region.

And then, of course, there’s the real problem - as so often these days - Russia.

Yep, Putin (who has repeatedly expressed his disapproval of Kosovan independence and promised that Russia will block such a move in the UN - probably thanks to the precedent Kosovo’s independence could set) is backing Nikolić - all part of a fresh Balkan power play that, surprise surprise, revolves not just around sticking two fingers up at the US and EU (both of whom support Kosovo’s right to self-determination), but also energy supplies.

On Friday, a new pipeline deal between Russia and Bulgaria was announced - a gas pipeline planned to pass through Serbia on its way to the EU. A pipeline due to be run by Russian energy giant Gazprom. Who’s boss just happens to be, erm… Putin’s designated heir and (almost certainly) Russia’s next President, Dmitry Medvedev. To secure the pipeline deal (potentially worth a lot to Serbia’s energy-poor economy) Russia is insisting that the country sell a 51% stake in its state-owned energy company NIS for a knock-down price - to a Gazprom subsidiary…

This pipeline deal - if a more pro-Russian Serbian President happened to take charge to usher it through - would in turn effectively ruin the chances of the EU-backed Nabucco pipeline ever taking off.

Designed as a way to break Russia’s ever-tightening grip on EU energy supplies, Nabucco is planned to open up access to gas from Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Egypt and Syria - all via a route that avoids Russian territories, and thus the threat of supplies being cut off on a whim, as happened to Ukraine two years ago (and as was threatened again in the run-up to the Ukrainian elections back in October). With the Russian-backed pipeline running on a similar route via Turkey, people who know more about this than I seem to think that, like the Highlander, there can be only one.

So, even ignoring the possible instability and potential renewed violence that a nationalist/Nikolić victory could bring to the Balkans; even ignoring the possible ramifications that could in turn have for the stability of the Caucasus; even ignoring the inevitable clash between the US, EU and Russia over Kosovo in the UN as and when moves towards independence become more concrete… the outcome of these Serbian presidential elections could well decide whether Russia manages to tighten its hold on Europe’s energy supplies, and thus its whole economy. Even, potentially, whether Russia is able to hold the EU to ransom in precisely the way it has Ukraine, using its near-monopoly to affect everything from trade agreements and foreign policy to elections.

And don’t think Britain’s safe from this thanks to North Sea gas. Yields there are not only falling rapidly (by 10% in 2004 and a further 12% in 2005), meaning we are increasingly having to look abroad for supplies (Britain has already become a net importer of oil in the last couple of years), but also Russia and Gazprom - the holders of the world’s largest natural gas reserves - are already targeting the UK market.

This is a situation that, if the Nabucco pipeline is scuppered by a Russo-Serbian deal, can only get worse. As I say, depending on the outcome of the Serbian elections, we could end up exponentially screwed.

Popularity: 36% [?]

Me neither. There is, however, a potentially important election going on in Serbia today, which could lead to independence for Kosovo. And we all remember how contentious that’s been, right?

To get an understanding of what’s going on, check out East Ethnia’s overview, or some analysis from Transitions Online, the Financial Times and the Economist. There’s also a vast amount at Serbianna.com (there’s a bit of a clue in the name…) - including a handy roundup of other stories on the elections from around the world.

As for why anyone from outside the region should care - Reuters and the New York Times sum it up.

Monday update: Financial Times: Serbia poll sees nationalist hardliners victory

Hardline nationalists won the largest share of votes again in Serbia’s parliamentary elections on Sunday, in a result that will keep “democratic forces” on the defensive for another four years.

EurActiv has more.

Popularity: 12% [?]