8.23am: Tony Blair's appearance at the Iraq inquiry today is one of the most eagerly-awaited political events of the early, possibly one of the most eagerly-awaited events of the last 10 years. But exactly what sort of event is it going to be?
A war crimes trial? No. Sir John Chilcot has made it clear that no one is on trial at the Iraq inquiry and there is no evidence, from the questions they've been asking, to suggest that Chilcot and his team believe that Blair did anything corrupt. Blair will get asked about claims that he exaggerated the intelligence case, but the inquiry panel – unlike Blair's critics – seem to take the view that exaggerating isn't the same as lying.
A truth and reconciliation commission hearing? No. Blair has given countless speeches and interviews about Iraq over the last seven years and there is no evidence to suggest that he has been harbouring some extraordinary secret relating to what happened that he is suddenly going to share with the world today.
A contemporary history seminar? We will get that, but Blair must know that the public expects much more than a dusty account of who said what when. The Iraq war is now hugely unpopular and it has tainted Blair's legacy. Today he will have to defend it.
So what will we get? I'm not really sure. But Blair was probably the best advocate/communicator of his political generation and today could turn out to be his last really big performance on the British political stage. It should be an extraordinary day.
8.29am: I thought I was in early, but Blair got to the QE2 centre at 7.30am today. There are "scores" of protesters outside the conference centre, but they are outnumbered by police. Here's what the Press Association is saying.
There was a stand-off between police and leaders of the Stop the War Coalition, who accused the Metropolitan Police of breaking agreements on where protesters would be allowed to stand.
The demonstrators were prevented from gathering on a grassed area outside the main entrance to the QEII Centre.
Police had erected two lines of barriers overnight, forcing them to stand on the pavement opposite Westminster Abbey.
Many of the demonstrators wore T-shirts bearing the slogan "Jail Tony".
8.31am: If you haven't already, do read Patrick Wintour's account of what Blair is likely to say today. It's all good stuff, but I particularly liked his explanation of why the secret letters Blair wrote to George Bush won't be published. Patrick quotes an ally of Blair's who said:
I do not believe any of them show he is saying he will commit British troops unconditionally. He is supportive, but Bush is quite a simple man who won't read beyond the first paragraph if you don't say you are with him. I don't think they can be published. They go the heart of the UK-US relations. They are full of scurrilous remarks about other people, including [Jacques] Chirac.
8.36am: It is taken as fact that the Iraq war is now viewed by most members of the public as a mistake, but it's hard to find good polling evidence that backs this up.
The most recent poll I'm aware of that asked about Iraq was one conducted by YouGov earlier this month. Annoying, YouGov did not ask a simple question about whether the war was right or wrong. But they did find that 52% of respondents said that Blair "deliberately said out to mislead the public" and that 23% said Blair "knowingly misled parliament and the public and should be tried as a war criminal", which does give a reasonably good insight into public opinion.
The YouGov website has also got a chart showing how the public response to the "was the war right or wrong" question changed from 2003 from 2007. On March 18 2003 (the day of the Commons vote) 50% of people supported the war, and 42% were opposed. By April 10 2003 support for the war hit 66%, with 29% opposed. But by April 2007 only 26% supported the war, and 60% were opposed.
8.51am: Blair is now being criticised for arriving at the QE2 centre through a side door. This is what Lindsey German, convener of the Stop The War Coalition, is saying:
He doesn't have the decency or honesty to face up to the public, military families, and Iraqis who will be here today in huge numbers to show their opposition to the war. He does not have the integrity to come and face the people. Sliding in by a back door entrance is typical of his lies, deceit and evasion.
8.58am: Denis MacShane, the former minister, has just been on News 24 defending Blair. He deserves a mention because he has written the best of the pro-Blair Iraq articles to appear in the national press over the last week or so. Admittedly, he has not had much competition, but if you want to read the Blair case, MacShane's article in the Independent is worth a read. Here's a flavour of it.
Which of the many senior politicians caught in the long-running debate over the Iraq conflict said that Saddam Hussein "most certainly has chemical and biological weapons and is working towards a nuclear capacity" and that the now famous dossier "contains confirmation of information that we either knew or most certainly should have been willing to assume?"
Not Jack Straw nor Geoff Hoon, whose evidence to Sir John Chilcot is central to the inquiry. Not an Alastair Campbell parrot but the Right Honourable Sir Menzies Campbell MP QC, speaking in the debate in the Commons in September 2002 when the now infamous dossier was published. The point is made not to mock Ming Campbell, whose views changed as events unfolded, but as a reminder that the Chilcot Inquiry is taking an increasingly surreal turn as it discusses not the history of what happened but the contemporary passions of protagonists nearly a decade later.
9.06am: Several papers have published their version of the "10 questions Blair must answer" piece. Our contribution to the genre is here. But, if 10 isn't enough for you, do read this, from the Plaid Cymru MP Adam Price. He has produced 63 questions for Blair to answer. I do like the fact that he settled on 63. You can be confident that he hasn't just made some up to reach a nice round number.
9.11am: News 24 are saying there are about 200 protesters outside the QE2 centre now.
9.16am: In the interests of competition and pluralism, here are some links to the other live blogs or Twitter feeds covering the hearing.
Channel 4's Iraq Inquiry blogger on Twitter
The Daily Telegraph's live blog
Iraq Inquiry Digest's live blog
Sky News Glen Oglaza's Twitter feed
9.31am: They're about to start.
9.31am: We won't be getting new documents today, the BBC says.
9.32am: Sir John Chilcot starts by reminding members of the public in the room that they have to behave properly.
The lunch break will last for an hour and a half, not an hour as is usual, to allow time for members of the public to take their seats for the afternoon session, Chilcot says.
He says today's hearing is "much anticipated". He will set out what today's hearing will and will not cover. The relatives of those killed in Iraq want to know why Britain went to war. The inquiry will ask those questions, and identify lessons to be learnt.
The committee is not a trial ... We come to our work with no preconceptions.
This is Blair's first appearance.
But there will be further hearings later in the year. If necessary, the inquiry iwll speak to Blair again.
First news item: Blair told he may be recalled.
9.35am: Chilcot says the hearings will concentrate on how the Iraq policy developed, how it was presented to the British people and the later diplomacy. The hearing will then move on to the planning for the aftermath, what happened after the war, the deterioriating situation and the sectarian violence.
9.37am: Chilcot says people have written to the inquiry wanted to know why Britain went to war.
Sir Roderic Lyne gets to ask the first question. He wants to asks about the origins of Blair's Iraq's policy. Containment had "prevented Saddam Hussein from threatening his neighbours or developing nuclear weapons". But there were concerns about the policy.
(Lyne is being very long-winded today. Lord Goldsmith complained about him asking a question with 18 sentences in it. This one seems almost longer!)
Before 9/11, how did Blair view containment.
(At last. 10 minutes after they started, Blair gets to speak.)
Blair says:
Up to September 11, Saddam was still a problem.
There was an attempt to put in place smart sanctions. The first military action Blair had taken was against Saddam in 1998.
I would fairly describe our policy up to September 11 as doing our best ... but with a different calculus of risk assessment ... The crucial thing after September 11 was that the calculus of risk changed.
9.42am: Blair says he could not get support for the smarter sanction proposals.
He says he has gone back through his speeches prior to 9/11.
Their impact is regularly ... I am saying Saddam must comply with the UN resolutions and force is an option.
But Iraq was not a top priority for him.
At his first meeting with George Bush, in February 2001, Blair discussed Iraq. But it was in the context of trying to get a better sanctions regime.
Blair says:
After Septermber 11, our view, the American view [of the risk posed by Saddam] changed dramatically.
9.45am: Lyne suggests that, objectively, the threat from Iraq did not change after 9/11.
Blair says he mentioned this in his statement to the House of Commons immediately after 9/11.
He says IRA terrorism was directed towards a political purpose. "It was within a certain framework that you could understand."
But 9/11 was different. If the al-Qaida could have killed more people, they would have done.
That completely changed our assessment of where the risk lay .. From that moment, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Iraq ... all of this had to be brought to an end.
9.49am: Lyne says Saddam was not linked to al-Qaida. Had the threat from Iraq increased?
Blair says he agrees with the assessement given by Jack Straw. The perception of risk changed, he says.
Lyne asks if containment remained an acceptable strategy.
Blair says he has looked at this carefully. There were "billions of dollars that were being illicitly used by Iraq". Saddam had money. But he was not using it to buy food and medicine for his people. And he had been successful in blaming the West.
The issue was whether smart sanctions would be a valid way of containing him.
Blair says he wants to mention a document. It is the March Cabinet Office options paper.
Lyne says it is in the public domain. It's on the internet. But he is not certain if if has been declassified yet "by the government elected under your leadership".
9.57am: Blair says containment through sanctions "had basically been eroding". There was a new sanctions framework. But it had been watered down to get it through the UN.
Blair says this is set out in a book by Ken Pollack, The Gathering Storm. He offers to send a copy to the inquiry.
Lyne says they have plenty to read already, but that they are always happy to read something else.
10.00am: Blair says there was a lot of discussion in government about whether the new sanctions framework would be effective.
The conclusion was that you couldn't rely upon it.
Lyne asks about a meeting that Blair had at Chequers, a briefing meeting before Crawford. But there was no "structured" debate, he suggests.
Blair says there was a structured debate. It just took place at Chequers, not Downing Street.
Lyne asks if there was an input from people "with a real knowledge of Iraq".
Blair says he was never short of people who would challenge. He mentions Robin Cook and Clare Short.
Lyne says they were not at the Chequers meeting.
Blair says they talked about Iraq often.
But they did not get the March options paper, Lyne says.
Blair repeats the point he made about discussions going on all the time.
This is the first time he has come under any pressure.
10.05am: Blair says he wanted to sent a "powerful, clear and unremitting message" after 9/11 "that if you were a regime engaged in WMD, you had to stop".
Lyne suggests that by now - spring 2002 - Blair had become committed to regime change. He mentions Blair's Chicago speech of 1999 (the one that Sir Lawrence Freedman helped to write) and the speech Blair gave in Texas in April 2002. Did Blair regard removing Saddam's regime as a valid objective for the government's policy?
No, Blair says. The absolute priority was disarming Iraq, he says.
Blair says:
In the Chicago speech in 1999 what I was doing was setting out what I thought the consequences were of an interdependent world.
In the new world, countries could not be divorced from what was happening elsewhere in the globe. Blair says he has the speech with him.
If you read the speech, you will see very clearly that the basis for what I'm saying is not ... that we should now apply a moral test.
He was making the point that "a problem in a different part of the world can come back and hit us [in our part of the world]".
He was in favour of intervening in Kosovo because he believed the consequences of not acting would affect Britain.
Blair quotes from the speech he gave in Texas in April 2002, the day after his meeting with Bush.
On Iraq, he said in the speech he would proceed in a "calm, measured way".
For me the issue was very, very simple. It was about the need to make very clear that you did not defy the international community on WMD.
Blair says he has read the evidence given to the inquiry and wants to say that there is no "binary distinction" between regime change and WMD. A regime with WMD is a greater threat. He is worried about Iran having a nuclear device because of the nature of the regime.
Lyne asks about Blair's interview with Fern Britton.
Blair says:
Even with all my experience of dealing with interview it still indicates that I've got something to learn.
He says the interview was recorded before the inquiry began its public hearings.
He did not use the words regime change in the interview and he did not mean to change the basis for his justification for war.
A breach of UN resolutions on WMD was the cause of the war. That was the position in 2003 and that remains his position.
10.16am: Blair delivers a pithy riff about it was his job to protect Britain, how he viewed Saddam as a monster, how he was sceptical about the sanctions regime before 9/11, and how after 9/11 he took a completely new approach to risk. It has a slight rehearsed feel to it, but it sounded punchy. I will try to put up the quote in full when I get a chance.
10.20am: Lady Prashar asks about regime change. Blair says that regime change was US policy. And it became US policy because Iraq was in breach of its UN obligations.
It's more a different way of expressing the same proposition.
10.22am: Chilcot says that he is going to publish two new documents that have been mentioned in the hearing. I presume one is the March Cabinet Office paper that is already available on the internet. The two documents are not on the inquiry's website yet.
10.25am: Prashar asks about the meeting at Chequers before Crawford. She says Michael Boyce, the then chief of defence staff, did not remember being at the meeting. Blair says he remembers Boyce being there.
10.26am: Prashar turns to Crawford.
Blair says he wanted to find out what Bush wanted to do.
Prashar asks what was decided at Blair's one-to-one dinner with Bush.
Blair says "nothing was decided" at the meeting.
But it is important for leaders to establish a "close and strong relationship", he says.
As I recall that discussion it was less to do with specifics ... the principle part of my conversation was really to try and say in the end we have got to deal with the various different dimensions of this whole issue.
Blair says he wanted to persuade Bush "on the broader issue".
Prashar asks if Blair gave Bush any commitment.
Blair says:
The only commitment I gave ... was to deal with Saddam. That was not a private commitment. That was a public commitment.
Blair says he said this in his press conference.
Bush was expressing his "fear" that if the US was not prepared to act in a strong way, it would sent a "disastrous signal to the rest of the world".
Blair says he cannot explain why people have come to a view that something different was agreed at that meeting.
The one thing I was not doing was dissembling [at the press conference] in that position.
Blair quotes from what he said at the press conference.
He said in the press conference that it had always been his position that Iraq would be a better place without Saddam.
The position was not a covert position. It was an open position.
Prashar asks what Bush understood. She mentions what Alastair Campbell said about the "tenor" of their exchanges.
Blair says Bush would have got the message that Blair gave in public.
Prashar asks if Blair set conditions for his support.
Blair suggests he did not impose conditions. The US/UK relationship is "an alliance", not a "contract".
Prashar says Sir Christopher Meyer claimed Blair was saying "yes, but".
Blair says Meyer was not present at the key meeting. Blair was setting out a position.
Blair says he had never regarded 9/11 as an attack on America. "I regarded it as an attack on us." He said that he would stand "shoulder to shoulder" with America. He did so in Afghanistan. He wanted to do so again.
Prashar asks what Bush should have taken from the meeting.
Blair says he should have got the impression that if there had to be military action, Britain would be with America.
Force was always an option.
What changed after September 11 was that if necessary ... we were going to remove him.
Blair says the Middle East peace process was not a "tactical" issue for him. He wanted Bush to pursue it because it thought that was necessary if they were going to deal with Islamist extremism.
10.39am: Lyne asks if Blair had to persuade Bush to go down the UN route.
Blair says that even at Crawford Bush was open to the idea of going down the UN route.
Lyne says Jack Straw said Blair was "relentless" in trying to persuade the Americans to make faster progress on the Middle East peace process. Ultimately it was a matter of "huge frustration" that progress did not happen as quickly as the British wanted. Lyne asks why Bush did not do more for Blair on the Middle East.
Blair says he did not trade one policy for another. "I would not have done Iraq if I had not thought it was right."
The Americans tended to regard Iraq and the Middle East as separate, he says.
Ultimately, the Americans did adopt the Road Map.
But was "relentless". And he was always "frustrated" about what was happening.
(Is that a hint of criticism of the US? If so, it's about the first we've heard.)
He goes on:
I wish we had made better and faster progress on Palestine.
Should he have made it a precondition, Lyne asks.
No, Blair says. That would have been wrong.
He says he thinks it would be easier to deal with Iran now if the Israel/Palestine issue were "moving forward".
10.48am: Blair says that Arab leaders in the region were "glad to see the back of Saddam". He was "a menace on the Middle East peace process".
Of course it would have been better to have had the Middle East process moving forward in 2002, says Blair. But he says that one point he wants to make in Bush's defence is that that was a very difficult period in the peace process.
He goes on:
I was always disappointed and frustrated on this.
They stop for a break. I'll summarise the key points in a moment.
10.54am: Here are the main points.
• Blair strongly denied doing any secret deal with Bush at the meeting in Crawford in April 2002. He said he was quite open about his determination to deal with Saddam Hussein. He insisted that he made this point publicly in the press conference he held with Bush. (See 10.26am)
• He said that did not set conditions when he told Bush that he would support him in his drive to deal with Iraq. Blair said the US/UK relationship was an alliance, not a contract. (See 10.26am)
• He suggested that there was no real difference between wanting regime change and wanting Iraq to disarm. (See 10.20am)
• But he also admitted that he made a misake when he gave an interview to Fern Britton last year and said that he would have wanted to get rid of Saddam even if he had know Iraq had no WMD. (See 10.05am)
• Sir John Chilcot signalled that Blair is likely to be called to give evidence again. (See 9.32am)
• Blair said he was "frustrated" by George Bush's unwillingness to make more progress on the Middle East in 2002 and 2003. (See 10.39am and 10.43am)
11.12am: They're back.
Prashar says Blair was being pressed in the autumn of 2002 about what kind of military package the UK would offer the Americans. She says the MoD wanted the larger package because that would be good for morale.
How did Blair decide what level of troops to offer, she asks.
Blair says the first question was whether it was right to be involved. If it was right, he then had to decide what was the appropriate force level.
Blair says that he had been through this before. His first approach was to ask the military. They "were up for this", he says, and they wanted to be "at the centre of things".
Did Bush ask for a particular level of contribution, Prashar asks.
Blair says Bush didn't ask for a certain number of troops.
Did Britain have to make a large contribution, Prashar asks.
Blair says he saw Iraq as a threat to UK security.
If we think it's right, we should be prepared to play our part fully.
He says the armed forces are "prepared to do the difficult things".
Prashar asks if "influence" played any part.
Blair says influence should not be a reason for making a big contribution. But once he had decided to send a large force, his influence increased.
11.18am: Sir Martin Gilbert asks about the WMD intelligence.
Was there no other aspect of the Iraq regime that could justify UN action, Gilbert asks.
Blair says there are many regimes he would like to see the back of. But you have to justify miliary action on the basis of a security threat.
He says he read the description of Saddam's use of chemical weapons in Halabja. That had a powerful influence on him, he says.
Blair says Saddam had used WMD. He "definitely had them".
It would have required quite strong evidence the other way [to believe that Saddam did not have WMD.]
Gilbert quotes from something Blair said at a press conference in February 2003 about the links between terrorism and WMD.
Blair says the link in his mind was this: there was a proliferation threat that was growing, and he feared that states that were highly repressive would construct an alliance with terrorists.
He says that he fears this more strongly today than he did in 2003.
He says Iran has links with terrorist groups. A large part of the destablisation in Iraq comes from Iran, he says.
11.27am: Sir Lawrence Freedman says Iran, Libya and North Korea were seen as a greater threat than Iraq. Why was Iraq singled out?
Because Iraq was in breach of UN resolutions, Blair says.
Countries did adapt their behaviour as a result of the US/UK approach to Iraq. Iran changed its approach to WMD, Blair says. Libya gave up its WMD programme at the end of 2003. And AQ Khan, the Pakistani nuclear weapons scientist who had been selling nuclear secrets to other countries, was subsequently put under house arrest, Blair says.
11.32am: Freedman asks about the September dossier.
He starts with the 45-minute claim. Is it fair to say the intelligence referred to munitions for short-scale battlefied use and that this was not made clear in the dossier.
Blair says he has said on many occasions it would have been better to correct the impression given by the 45-claim (ie, the Brits "45 mins from doom" headline suggesting Iraqi missiles could hit British troops in Cyprus). But he cites figures showing that it was not an important issue in the run up to the war. Some 40,000 parliamentary written questions were tabled about Iraq, Blair says. None of them mentioned the 45-minute claim. And only 2 of the 5,000 oral questions on Iraq during this period mentioned the allegation.
11.37am: Freedman asks if he was concerned about the intelligence having an "exaggerated sense of importance" when he saw the headlines about the 45-minute claim.
Blair says that the dossier was seen as dull when it was published.
Freedman suggests that, if the dossier was seen as "old news", that might have been because the government had already successfully established the idea that Iraq was a threat.
Blair says it was not just the government that was saying Iraq posed a threat.
Freedman says the quality of the intelligence was important because Blair was going to pursue the UN route.
He turns to the foreword of the September dossier, in which Blair said the intelligence showed "beyond doubt" that Iraq had WMD. Was that wise?
Blair says he said in the foreword that he believed the intelligence was "beyond doubt".
I did believe it. And I did believe it beyond doubt.
Beyond anyone's doubt, Freedman asks.
Blair says that if he had said it was "clear" Iraq had WMD, that would have had the same impact.
If he had the chance to do it again, he would just publish the joint intelligence committee reports, Blair says.
He says that if someone read the summary of the document, which was produced by the JIC, he cannot see how anyone could produce a different intepretation.
When you are prime minister and the JIC are giving you this information, you have got to rely on the people who are doing it.
Freedman asks if Blar considered alternative hypotheses (ie, the theory - which turned out to be true - that Saddam was claiming that he had weapons he did not possess because he did not want to lose face in the region.)
Blair says he would have been criticised if he had not responded to the intelligence he was getting.
Freedman asks if he was "too trusting".
Blair says politicians get judged by what happens after the event.
Your worry is not simply is the intelligence correct ... It's, if it is correct, what am I going to do about it.
Blair says the Iraq Survey Group report has resolved "some of these riddles about what Saddam was up to.
Freedman asks about "groupthink", a term used in the Butler report on the use of intelligence in the run up to the war.
Blair says at the time no one disputed the points he was making about Iraq's WMD.
At the time there were people saying "I don't want military action under any circumstances". But there were also people saying [he should act more quickly].
Blair quotes from what William Hague said in a debate at the time. Hague was pressing Blair for firmer action.
Freedman says at the UN a "higher standard of proof" was required.
Blair says there are different views in situations like this. As prime minister, he had to take a decision.
11.51am: Sir Roderic Lyne asks why Blair thought the WMD threat from Iraq was "growing". At previous hearings, Lyne has suggested that there is no evidence to support this claim, which Blair made when he presented the September dossier to parliament.
Blair says he had been told that Iraq was continuing to produce chemical weapons. That meant the threat it posed was growing. And he had received intelligence about Iraq having mobile laboratories for the production of WMD. That intelligence later turned out to be wrong. But Blair did not know that at the time, he says.
Blair says after 9/11 he was not prepared to take any risks.
In the end, it's a matter of judgement.
This is not about a lie, or a deceipt, or a conspiracy or a deception. It's a decision .... I believed, and in the end so did the cabinet and so did parliament, incidentally, that it wasn't right to run that risk.
He says Britain will have to make similar judgments again.
My judgment is that you don't take any risks.
11.57am: There's a very strong "Iran is a threat" theme running through Blair's evidence today. He has mentioned Iran several times, and the comment he made at 11.51am - about having to take Iraq-style decisions again in the future - seemed to be aimed at Iran.
12.00pm: Freedman asks about the suggestion that Blair should have been more open about the fact that he was planning for war.
Blair says if at any point the military had said he would inhibit their ability to be ready for war if they were not alllowed to start ordering equipement, he would have accepted that. He says that eventually they got to this point in October.
(Geoff Hoon said he and Michael Boyce, the chief of the defence staff, told Blair that they wanted to start making logistics planning in the autumn of 2002 but that Blair told them they could not, because the public would realise the government was planning for war. Boyce said this caused a problem. Blair now seems to be saying that if Boyce felt that strongly about it, he should have insisted on being allowed to do what he wanted.)
12.05pm: Freedman asks about the need to get a second UN resolution. Blair says that, having gone down the UN route, he wanted to continue going down the UN route.
Freedman asks what George Bush wanted.
Blair says that Bush's view was that a second UN resolution was not necessary, but that he was prepared to work for one.
Freedman says Blair was told that the propose start date for the war was March 10. Did the military planning set the terms for the diplomatic strategy?
Blair says he made one final attempt to get an agreement in the security council. He drafted a resolution with Hans Blix, the UN weapons inspector.
Freedman says Blair had six weeks from the end of January. How did Blair think he would get a resolution through in such a short period of time?
Blair says after 1441 France, Germany and Russia moved to a different position. (He said Germany, but I think he might have meant China.)
I think it's fair to say the only reason Saddam was having much to do with the inspectors ... was because we had 250,000 troops down there.
Blair says the British military were concerned that if the soldiers stayed on the borders of Iraq for months, there would have been difficulties.
But if Saddam had "done a Gaddafi" and cooperated fully with the inspectors, things would have been different.
Lawrence says that if Saddam had said he did not have WMD, the Americans would not have believed him.
Blair says he can understand the point. He refers to the Iraq Survey Group report again. That is the report that Blix could have produced if the Iraqis had cooperated. But Saddam was deliberately concealing documentation from Blix. And he was not allowing his scientists to be interviewed.
Blair says he received information saying that Saddam told his scientists that if any of them agreed to be interviewed outside Iraq by the inspectors, they would be treated as a spy.
12.19pm: Freedman asks if Blair was hoping that Blix would reinforce his view that Iraq was not cooperating with the inspectors.
Blair says he became increasingly frustrated by the process because it became clear that Saddam had no intention of cooperating with the inspectors.
He says 1441 decided that Saddam did not just have to give access to sites; he had to allow Iraqi scientists to be interviewed.
Freedman says Blix was not keen to interview people outside Iraq.
Blair acknowledges this. Blix was worried that the scientists, or their relatives, would be killed if they agreed to be interviewed outside Iraq. Blair says that itself revealed something about the nature of the regime.
12.23pm: Blair says he was struck by the report Blix produced on February 26. The Iraqis had made a commitment to allow interviews. But scientists were reluctant to allow themselves to be interviewed.
Blair says this shows that, even if Blix had been allowed to continue, he would never have got to the truth about Iraq's WMD.
Blair says sometimes it is important not to ask the March 2003 question, but instead to ask the 2010 question.
I think it is at least arguable that he was a threat and had we taken that decision to leave him there ... with the oil price $100 a barrel, he would have had the intent and he would have had the means, and we would have lost our nerve.
(Another powerful sounbite that sounds pre-rehearsed. But "intent" to do what? Blair did not say.)
12.29pm: Blair says:
If you've got a regime that you believe is a threat, you may change them through sanctions, but they've got to be sustainable.
But the best way is for the regime to have a "change of heart", he says.
Blair says the Blix reports suggested that Iraq had not had a change of heart.
12.31pm: Freedman asks if Blair's decision to try to get a second resolution suggested he was trying to curtail the inspections process because of the needs of the military planning.
Blair says it was the other way round.
He sat down with Blix to construct "tests" for Iraq. The most important one involved being allowed to take Iraqi scientists out of the country.
But Blair did not have enough time, Freedman suggests.
Blair says he could have got the resolution together.
We were trying desperately to get this last route out.
Some Arab countries were keen on "getting Saddam out" if there was a second resolution.
(That's interesting. But Blair does not elaborate.)
12.35pm: Freedman says support for war was "moving away" in the security council. Would it not have been a good time to "take stock"? He says that David Manning and Jeremy Greenstock both told the inquiry that the inspectors should have been given more time.
Blair says he thought he could have got the nine votes necessary for a security council vote in favour of a second resolution if it had not been for the French and the Russians making it clear that they were vehemently opposed.
Blair says Blix takes a certain view now.
I have to say, in my conversations with him then, it was a little different.
(Jack Straw made a similar point about Blix. He and Blair both think Blix has changed his story since 2003.)
Freedman asks if Blair asked Bush for more time.
Blair says Bush told him that he could get the second resolution, he would support it.
Freedman goes on: "But he wanted to get on with it."
Blair says:
A judgment was being made - and I can't honestly say that I will disagreed with it - that more time would not solve this.
They break for lunch. Chilcot thanks those in the room for behaving appropriately (ie, for not shouting at Blair!) He has not had to do that before.
I'll sum up the main points from the last 90 minutes in a moment.
12.47pm: Here are the main points from the second half of the morning.
• Blair said that if Saddam had not been removed in 2003, he would pose a greater threat now. He described this as the "2010 question". Instead of asking whether it was right to remove Saddam in 2003, the inquiry should ask what would have happened if he had not been removed. He also insisted that Britain might have to take action to deal with a rogue state posing a WMD threat again. (See 11.51am and 12.23pm)
• Blair appeared to say that publishing the dossier on Iraq's WMD was a mistake. He said it would be better to publish the reports from the joint intelligence committee. (See 11.37am)
• He said he disagreed with witnesses like Jeremy Greenstock and David Manning who said the weapons inspectors should have been given more time. (See 12.35pm)
• He said it would have been impractical for British and American troops to remain on the border of Iraq for months. (See 12.05pm)
• He insisted that there was evidence to suggest that the WMD threat from Iraq was "growing". (See 11.51am)
• He denied claims made in earlier hearings that he stopped the Ministry of Defence ordering vital equipment when it wanted in 2002 because he did not want people to find out he was preparing for war. He said that if the MoD had insisted that it needed to start the procurement process earlier, he would have agreed. (See 12pm)
• He said that some unspecified Arab countries told him they were keen on "getting Saddam out" if there had been a second UN resolution. (See 12.31pm)
• Blair appeared to criticise Hans Blix, the UN weapons inspector, for changing his story about what happened in 2003. (See 12.35pm)
• Blair said that the military wanted to make a large contribution to the war because they wanted to be "at the centre of things". (See 11.12am)
• He identified William Hague, the former Tory leader, as one of the politicians urging him before the war to be more aggressive towards Iraq, not less aggressive. Denis MacShane made a similar point in the article I mentioned earlier. (See 11.37am)
1.23pm: I'm glad I'm not having to write the news story. Blair has said plenty of things that are interesting, but there is no single "line" that is obviously stronger than all the others. But I'm really struck by the tone of his evidence. Most other witnessses who have defended the war have done so with reservations. Alastair Campbell was gung-ho, but spoke about the past, and the removal of a terrible dictator. Blair appears to have no doubts about what he did and he explains this by looking to the future. Saddam would have been even more of a threat if he were still in power, Blair said. He suggested that the threat from rogue states is now even more serious than it was in 2003 and that Britain will have to launch an Iraq-style attack in the future. And he has singled out one country as a special menace. This hearing is meant to be about Iraq. But what is really fascinating is the point Blair is making about Iran.
1.54pm: Here is the full quote from Blair about the "2010 question". (See 12.23pm)
Sometimes what is important is not to ask the March 2003 question, but to ask the 2010 question. Supposing we had backed off this military action, supposing we had left Saddam and his sons who were going to follow him in charge of Iraq - he had used chemical weapons, caused the death of over a million people. What we now know is that he retained absolutely the intent and the intellectual know-how to restart a nuclear and a chemical weapons programme when the inspectors were out and the sanctions changed, which they were going to do.
Now, I think that it is at least arguable that he was a threat, that had we taken that decision to leave him there, with an oil price not 25 dollars but 100 dollars a barrel, he would have had the intent, he would have had the financial means, and we would have lost our nerve.
1.57pm: Nick Robinson on the World at One says that Blair seemed to display "sheer terror" at the start of the hearing. Robinson was in the room and he says Blair's hands were shaking. He looked more nervous than at any point since he was running for Labour leader in 1994, Robinson says. But Robinson says the nerves seemed to fade once Blair got into his stride.
2.01pm: They're back.
2.02pm: Do read the verdict on this morning's hearing from our Comment is Free panel (Jackie Ashley, Jonathan Freedland and Martin Kettle). It's just gone up.
2.05pm: Sir Roderic Lyne asks about the French position before the war.
Blair says he kept good relations open with the French. He wanted the security council to be able to unite after the war. But it became clear that the French would not support a second resolution.
Lyne asks if Blair used the French veto as an excuse to withdraw the second resolution so that he could meet the American military deadline.
Blair does not accept that. He thought it was worth having "one last ditch chance" to see if he could bring people together.
2.09pm: Lyne asks about the post-conflict preparations.
Did Bush offer to "go it alone"?
Blair says that at one point, before the Commons debate, Bush said that he would understand if Britain could not join the war.
But Blair thought it was right to go to war.
In the EU, 13 out of 25 members were with America. Japan and South Korea were with America.
Lyne says it was a difficult situtation.
Blair replies:
It was a really tough situation ... My judgment, ultimately, was that Saddam was going to remain a threat .... We had been down a UN path that I genuinely thought would work.
Lyne asks about the "plan B" floated by Jack Straw. That would have involved partial military involvement.
Blair says this was a "possibility". But the military "to their credit" wanted to be full involved.
Blair says:
It would have been a very big thing for us to have kept out of the aftermath as well.
Lyne suggests that, if Britain had not been involved in the invasion, it might have been easier for Britain to send troops into the aftermath.
Blair says deciding to do "option 3" - the full military involvement - was seen as the best option militarily and politically.
If Britain had pulled back, it would not have indicated the strength of support that Blair thought it was right for Britain to exhibit.
2.17pm: Lyne says he is going to turn to the legal issues.
He says he is going to summarise what the inquiry has heard already. (That's new. It's not a procedure they have used before.)
Lyne says there was no legal basis for regime change. Laywers in the US favoured the "revival argument", using the authorisation for the use of force contained in UNSCR 678. But the UK lawyers felt there had to be a fresh UN resolution. The UN adopted 1441. But there were different interpretations as to whether that authorised war without a second resolution. Lord Goldsmith was telling Blair until February 2002 that there would have to be a second resolution. Is that a fair summary, Lyne asks.
Blair agrees.
Lyne continues his summary. Goldsmith then submitted his advice. He said a second resolution would be the "safest course". But he said a "reasonable case" could be made that a second resolution was not necessary. Goldsmith said a reasonable case did not mean he would be confident of winning if the case ever went to court. By this stage Goldsmith had parted company from the Foreign Office lawyers. Goldsmith said he was then asked to provide a "yes or no" decision. By March 13 he had decided to give a clear statement saying there was no need for a second resolution. But Goldsmith did need a determination that Iraq was in breach of its UN obligations. The Foreign Office lawyers thought that only the security council could give that determination. But Goldsmith said a member state could give that determination. He got Blair to provide a statement to that effect.
Is that a fair summary, Lyne asks.
Blair makes one point. What was important to him about 1441 was not just that it declared Saddam in breach, but that it said a failure by Iraq to comply unconditionally and immediately constituted a further material breach, Blair says.
Lyne asks if Blair sought legal advice from Goldsmith while he was preparing for war in 2002.
Blair says he got a paper from the Foreign Office in March.
Lyne asks why he did not consult Goldsmith at that stage.
Blair says that what the Foreign Office was saying was consistent with what Goldsmith thought at that stage.
Lyne says Goldsmith did not attend cabinet meetings. He was being excluded. Why was he not included more closely?
Blair says that Goldsmith was involved in that he decided to write to Blair "of his own initiative" in July.
Lyne says that when Goldsmith went to cabinet on March 17 2003, that was only his second appearance at cabinet.
Blair says Goldsmith was a "lawyer's lawyer". He was a lawyer "of the first rank". He would give advice whether it was wanted or not.
Lyne says that when Goldsmith wrote to Blair in July 2002, he got the impression his advice was "not particularly welcome".
Blair says that he had many other issues to consider. But getting the advice was "very helpful". It focused Blair's mind. Goldsmith wanted to make the point that it was not just important to get a UN resolution. It had to be the right resolution.
2.38pm: Lyne says Goldsmith told Downing Street he thought 1441 would not justify war without a second resolution in late 2002. Goldsmith was not asked to offer formal advice. Would it not have been better if he had submitted formal advice at that point, Lyne asks.
Blair says he had begun military preparations before he got 1441. He had to do that. But if Goldsmith had said the war was illegal, Britain would not gone to war.
Lyne suggests it would have been better to get that advice before troops were despatched to the Gulf.
Blair says he knew what Goldsmith thought.
Lyne says Goldsmith was not giving Blair options. He was saying there had to be a second UN resolution. Would it not have been better to know then that he did not need a second resolution?
Blair says there was a disagreement about 1441. (He is not answering Lyne's question.)
Blair says Goldsmith came to the view that the breach by Saddam of 1441 was sufficient.
Lyne asks about the legal advice given by Goldsmith on March 7 2003. What discussions did Blair have with Goldsmith after March 7 and before Goldsmith firmed up his advice?
Blair says the whole point about 1441 was that it was a "last chance" for Iraq.
He recalls a conversation with Bush in October 2002. He said to Bush: "If he complies, that's it."
Lyne asks about evidence saying the British told the Americans in early 2003 that a second resolution was essential.
Blair says that was the legal advice at the time.
Lyne suggests it must have been a "considerable relief" when Goldsmith said there was no need for a second resolution.
Blair accepts that.
Lyne points out that Goldsmith was in disagreement with the Foreign Office lawyers.
Were other countries arguing in favour of the revival argument, Lyne asks.
Blair says countries that supported the war thought it had a legal basis.
2.51pm: Lyne asks about the possibility of a legal challenge. How convinced was Blair that he had a strong legal case?
Blair says he needed to know from Goldsmith that the war was lawful. Blair says that as a laywer he wrote many opinions himself. They tended to have a "on the one hand, on the other" character. But, in an opinion, you have to come down on one side. Goldsmith did come down on one side, Blair says.
2.56pm: Prashar asks now about planning for the war. She says MoD guidelines said the army needed six months to prepare for a conflict. David Manning told the inquiry that Blair sought to delay planning for as long as possible. Was Blair told of the implications of a delay?
Blair says, as he explained this morning (see 12pm), that he did not want to make the planning "visible" until he had to. But in October Geoff Hoon said they had to start planning at this level. At that point it happened.
The military say "very bluntly" what they need, Blair says.
If anyone at any stage had said it was not safe to go ahead because of lack of military preparation, "I would have taken that very, very seriously indeed," Blair says.
Blair says he did not refuse a request "for money or equipment" from the MoD at any time when he was prime minister.
He says the army regarded themselves as "ready". And they performed as "ready".
Prashar asks why Blair did not want prepartions to be "visible" in 2002.
Blair says he did not want people to think war was inevitable, because it wasn't.
3.03pm: Prashar asks about the post-war planning.
Blair says there was an immense amount of planning.
The real problem was that our focus was on the issues that in the end did not cause us difficulty.
The "vast bulk" of pre-war planning was about the possibility of a humanitarian catastrophe.
Prashar says Clare Short was writing to Blair complaining about the preparations. Prashar says these letters have been declassified.
Blair says he responded to Short's concerns. In the event, there was no humanitarian catastrophe.
Blair says everyone assumed there would be a functioning Iraqi civil service. But when the British went into Basra, they found a "completely broken system".
Prashar asks if Blair realised Britain would be an occupying power under the Geneva Conventions. Lord Turnbull told the inquiry that, if Britain had not made such a big military contribution, it would not have been the occupying power.
Blair says he knew from January that Britain was going to be in charge of Basra. (He does not refer to the specific point about being an occupying power.)
Prashar asks why Blair accepted Britain being a joint occupying power.
Blair says he did so because he thought it was right. He says he felt strongly that Britain should not walk away from Iraq.
Prashar asks why so many witnesses have said the aftermath planning was deficient.
Blair says various reports in the US have laid out the problem with postwar planning.
If we knew then what we know now, we would of course have done things differently.
Prashar asks why Lord Turnbull told the inquiry that Britain had been "fobbed off" by Bush when Bush promised a "vital" role for the UN in post-war Iraq.
Blair says Kofi Annan, the UN secretary general, did not want to take charge of post-war Iraq.
Blair again says the Americans have admitted they made mistakes in relation to the aftermath.
It is very clear that things could have been done differently. I think the American adminstration has accepted that.
3.18pm: Blair says he did not plan for two things: first the absence of a civil service infrastructure; and, second, the role of Iran and al-Qaida.
He suggests that, if the lack of a civil service was the only problem, the coalition would have been able to copy.
It was the introduction of AQ and Iran that very nearly caused this mission to fail.
Blair says there is a "huge lesson" in that because those forces are still at work in the region.
3.21pm: Chilcot asks about the government's failure to anticipate what might happen in a worst case scenario.
Blair says he did try to "drill down" and investigate these issue.
In the future you are best to make this kind of assumption ... If you are required to go into this kind of situation again, you might as well assume the worst.
It was always going to be tough. The issue was whether Britain was prepared to engage for the long term.
Blair says this is one of the lessons to be learnt.
Chilcot makes a point about this being a very expensive lesson.
Then he stops for a break.
3.26pm: The last 80 minutes have been verging on the tedious. I could not quite spot where Sir Roderic Lyne's legality questions were heading, and the post-war planning exchanges weren't illuminating. But there were some revelations. Here they are.
• Blair blamed Iran and al-Qaida for the problems with post-war Iraq. He said that the absence of a functioning civil service also created difficulties, but he said that Britain and American could have coped if that was all they were up against. It was the intervention of outsiders that brought things to a crisis point. (See 3.02pm and 3.18pm)
• He said that as prime minister he had never refused a request for money or equipment from the MoD. I think he meant a request for money or equipment for a specific operation. We know that the MoD complained about the settlement they got in the spending review during Blair's premiership. (See 2.56pm)
• Blair said the Americans had made mistakes with their postwar planning. But he did not personalise this and he expressed this diplomatically, saying that Washington accepted this because various American reports have exposed the problems. (See 3.03pm)
• He insisted that Britain had planned for the aftermath. But it had focused on averting a humanitarian catastrophe, not the breakdown of law and order. (See 3.03pm)
• He said that Bush told him that the US could go to war without the UK. (See 2.09pm)
3.45pm: During the break Sky devoted much of its coverage to criticising the quality of the questioning. Is this a sign that, with Blair not making any dramatic revelations or concessions, the media may decide that the real story is "Blair being let off the hook"?
3.49pm: They're back. Sir Martin Gilbert is asking about MoD funding. He says the Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) - the MoD requests for money for operations - diverted funds away from other parts of the MoD budget.
Blair says he was not directly involved in that issue. But he says that if anyone had come to him and asked for more resources, he would have responded.
What became clear, over time, was that the problem in Iraq in late 2003 was not a lack of resources, but a lack of security, Blair says.
3.55pm: Blair is talking again about the problems caused by the Iran. He says he "tried" with the Iranians. He reached out to them.
The Iranians, whatever they said, were a major destablising factor in this situation, and quite deliberately.
Lyne says that if there had been a "really rigorous risk assessment" before the war, these problems could have been predicted.
Blair says this is a good point.
He says he did ask for an assessment on Iran before the war.
The conventional wisdom at the time was that you might get elements of the Revolutionary Guard playing about ... but that they had no interest in destablising [Iraq].
Blair says he has "little doubt" that Iraq would now be competing with Iran in acquiring nuclear weapons and in supporting terrorist groups if Saddam had not been toppled.
The British thought the Iranians would be pleased to get rid of Saddam.
Blair says he spoke to the Iranian president in 2002. He said he wanted a new relationship.
4.03pm: Lyne asks if Britain was consulted about the proposals to disband the Iraqi army and impose de-Baathication - the sacking of Iraqi civil servants who belonged to the Baath party.
Blair says the Britsh were "on the case" as soon as they realised it had happened.
He says he is not sure in his own mind about these issues. Some level of de-Baathification was inevitable. The Iraqis "detested" the Baathists.
Lyne asks if the British should have been consulted.
Blair says there should have been a discussion. Lyne takes that as a yes.
Blair says it would "probably" have been better not to take those decisions in that way. But that is still an issue for debate.
Within days of the two policies being announced, the Americans were trying to "scale back", he says.
4.07pm: Sir Lawrence Freedman asks when Blair realised there was no WMD in Iraq.
Blair says looking for WMD was a major part of the operation. In the early stages, he was getting reports every day about sites were WMD might be present.
Freedman says that, once it became clear there was no WMD, the quality of post-war Iraq would become the test of the value of the war.
He asks if Blair was aware of a debate in the US about whether there should be more troops on the ground for the post-war period. One general argued there should be 500,000 soldiers in Iraq. But he was over-ruled by the Pentagon.
Blair says he was aware of the debate.
He says nation building is a different task from war fighting.
Freedman says Donald Rumsfeld, the US defence secretary, was not interested in nation building.
Blair says security is what went wrong.
The very purpose of the people we ended up fighting was to stop the reconstruction.
Blair says before the war some argued that the Americans could do fighting, but that the British were better at peace making. But it's not as simple as that, he says.
He says the Americans were fighting while the surge was underway.
4.16pm: Blair says that when the Americans attacked Fallujah in April 2004, he initially thought they were going in "too hard". Now he is not so sure.
He says that, as one Iraqi put it to him, having beaten the tyranny of Saddam, Britain should beat the tyranny of the terrorist.
Freedman comes back to the point about more troops being needed.
Blair mentions the surge.
Freedman says 2004 was not the same as 2007. The forces were trained for the job. And the political conditions were different.
4.22pm: Blair says what happened in Iraq was this. There was one conflict, that was over quickly. There was the aftermath. And then, by 2006/2007, there was a different type of conflict.
He says four things were required to win this: "political buy in", Iraqi military capability, more troops, and the determination to "stick at it".
4.24pm: Freedman asks about Abu Ghraib. Did Blair know that was going to come out?
Blair says the revelations took the White House by surprise. He says he was shocked when he saw the pictures and he acknowledges it caused damage to the coalition cause.
4.27pm: Freedman quotes some figures for the documented civilian deaths in Iraq:
Jan 2004 - 570
Jan 2005 - 1,042
Jan 2006 - 1,453
Jan 2007 - 2,807
Blair says he thinks the overall figure for deaths during this period was around 100,000. He says that figures comes from the Iraq Body Count and research by the Brookings Institute.
He says the deaths were being caused by the groups attacking the British and Americans.
(This is the first time, I think, in any of the inquiry hearings I have covered that anyone has actually mentioned specific casuality figures.)
4.31pm: Blair accepts that this was a US/UK responsibility.
Freedman says this was a "very heavy price to pay for the lack of preparation" and the "cavalier" attitude to planning taken, particularly in the US.
Blair says he did not take a "cavalier" attitude to planning.
He blames Iran and al-Qaida for destabilising what the coaliton was doing.
An Iraqi told him recently that they had exchanged the "certainty of repression" for the "uncertainty of freedom". But nobody in Iraq wanted to go back.
He says a similar lesson applies in Afghanistan. The important thing is to be prepared to be involved for the long term.
4.36pm: They turn to Afghanistan. Lyne asks if Blair was concerned about having the army fighting in Iraq and Helmand, in Afghanistan.
Blair says the proposal to deploy more troops to Helmand came from the MoD.
4.38pm: Prashar asks why Clare Short's department was originally excluded from the group planning for the aftermath.
Blair says the Department for International Development was involved later. The problems that arose were not problems that would have been solved by the involvement of DfID.
He says his relationship with ministers like Jack Straw and Geoff Hoon was fine.
4.40pm: Chilcot says government papers were not circulated widely. Did cabinet ministers have enough information to understand "and challenge" the policy?
Blair says there were 25 pre-war discussions of Iraq in cabinet.
I really do not think any members of the cabinet felt they were not involved, or could not challenge.
Blair says he was in almost "constant interaction" with cabinet ministers.
Chilcot asks if there was enough space for differences to be accommodated.
Blair replies:
I really do, yes.
Some members of the cabinet would challenge Blair's position.
Whatever differences he had with Short, "the one thing I would never accuse her of being is backward in coming forward".
4.46pm: Blair says Goldsmith did not need to be able to be sitting in cabinet to be able to offer an opinon.
Prashar says that if Goldsmith did attent cabinet, there would have been better collective decision making.
Blair says the cabinet did not want to discuss the legality of the war. It just wanted to know whether it was legal or not.
On other issues, the cabinet did want to have a debate.
Chilcot asks about the involvement of legal advice in policy making.
He says there was a clear objective set for Iraq. But there were moments when that policy objective could have been blocked by a legal constaint. Is that unavoidable?
Blair says it was unavoidable in this case.
There could have been a major debate about the legality of Kosovo. But there wasn't because there was public support for the mission.
The law and the politics follow each other quite closely.
4.55pm: Prashar asks why no single minister was in charge of post-war Iraq.
Blair says it would be "worth looking at" the case for having a single cabinet minister in charge.
Prashar asks if Blair ever stopped and re-evaluated his strategy before the war started.
Blair says he would have done if Saddam had agreed to comply with the UN resolutions.
Prashar asks if Blair ever reconsidered his policy after the war, when it looked as if the mission might fail.
But says he did reconsider.
No one had ever considered that Iran would ever support al-Qaida. Iran is Shian and al-Qaida is Sunni. But they did work together, because they both had a common interest in destabilising Iraq.
Prashar asks what he would have done differently.
Blair says there are all sorts of things he could have done differently. He mentions having a single cabinet minister in charge. But imposing procedural changes would not have made any difference to the key decisions he had to make.
(In other words, he seems to be saying he might have done minor things differently - not nothing major.)
5.01pm: Chilcot asks Blair if he thinks it was worth it.
Blair says it is too early to say. But there are hopefully signs.
It was a very, very difficult fight indeed. It was always going to be difficult once these external factors came into play.
Blair says the latest information from the Brookings Institute shows Iraqis are "upbeat" about their future.
In 2000, 2001 and 2002 they had a child mortality rate of 130 children per 1,000, as bad as in the Congo. That equates to 90,000 deaths of children under the age of five every year. Now the figure is 40 child deaths per 1,000, which equates to 50,000 children under five surviving every year.
Blair says if Chilcot were to ask the Iraqis, they would overwhelmingly say that they were glad Saddam was deposed.
Chilcot says the war was very divisive. What broad lessons does Blair draw? And does he have regrets?
Blair says he has mentioned some of the lessons. You need to look carefully at the forces you require for nation building. You have to consider the nature of the threat posed by Iran and al-Qaida.
Blair says taking the decision was a "huge responsibility". He reflects on it every day.
If we had left Saddam in power, we would still have had to deal with him, possibly in circumstances where the threat was worse.
Many of the same arguments apply to Iran today. That's why he takes a hard line on Iran.
He believes our security is better with Saddam out of power.
If Iraq becomes the country it wants to be, Britain will look back with huge pride.
Chilcot asks if he has any regrets.
Blair says he feels responsibility, but not regret.
Someone in the audience interrupts. Chilcot tells them to be quiet.
Blair goes on:
I really think it is time we learnt as a matter of sensible foreign policy that the way to deal with on dictatorial threat is not to back another.
Chilcot asks if Blair wants to say anything else.
Blair says no.
Chilcot thanks Blair for his evidence. He closes the session.
5.25pm: Here are the highlights from the the last 90 minutes. This was probably the best part of the day, and the final few minutes - in which Blair delivered his summing up - were the most dramatic. I'll put up the full quotes in a minute, but first here are the key points.
• Blair insisted that he had no regrets about going to war in Iraq. He said that it was too early to say whether the war was worth it, but he said Iraqis were positive about their future and that thousands of Iraqi children were alive now who would not have been alive under Saddam. He said that if Saddam had not been deposed in 2003, the West would have had to take action against him later, possibly in circumstances "where the threat was worse". He also said that, although he made have done some things differently, he would not have changed any of the big decisions his took. (See 4.55pm and 5.01pm)
• He said that the government never expected Iran to intervene in Iraq after the war. He also never expected Shia Iran to work in alliance with Sunni al-Qaida. (See 3.55pm and 4.55pm)
• He said he thought around 100,000 civilians died in Iraq. (See 4.27pm)
• He said the West should stop backing dictators. (See 5.01pm)
• He insisted that cabinet ministers were properly consulted about his Iraq policy. (See 4.40pm)
• He said it was the MoD's decision to send more troops to Helmand while soldiers were still deployed in Iraq. (See 4.36pm)
• He said that if the MoD had asked for more resources after the war, he would have responded. (See 3.49pm)
• He admitted that Britain had not been consulted about the decision to disband the Iraqi army and impose de-Baathification. He said these policies were "probably" mistakes, but he said this was a matter of debate. (See 4.03pm)
5.47pm: This is what Blair said right at the end, when asked if the war was worth it.
It is too early to say right now whether the Iraqi democracy will take root ... There are really hopeful signs. If you look, for example, at electricity. If you look at income per head, which is several times what it was under Saddam. If you look at the money being spent on infrastructure. I think, yes, it was a very, very difficult fight indeed. It was always going to be difficult once these external factors came into play ...
If you look at the latest information from the Brookings Institute, and the polls that they are doing, about the right direction and the wrong direction for their country, they are actually upbeat about the future. If you look at whether they believe security and services are getting better, a majority of them think they are, despite all the trouble ...
Chilcot said the war had been "very divisive". He askedwhat regrets he had. Blair replied:
I had to take this decision as prime minister. It was a huge responsibility then and there's not a single day that passes by when I don't reflect and think about that responsibility. But I genuinely believe that if we had left Saddam in power, even with what he know now, we would still have had to have dealt with him, possibly in circumstances where the threat was worse and possibly in circumstances where it was hard to mobilise any support for dealing with that threat.
I think we live in a completely new security environment today. I thought that then and I think that now. That's why - I've said this to you a number of times today - I take a very hard, tough line on Iran today. And many of the same arguments apply. In the end it was divisive. And I'm sorry about that. I tried my level best to bring people back together again.
But if I've asked whether I believe we're safer or more secure, that Iraq is better, that our own security is better with Saddam and his two sons out of power, out of office, I believe indeed that we are. And that in time to come, if Iraq becomes, as I hope and believe that it will, the country that it's people want to it to be, then we can look back - in particular our armed forces can look back - with an immense sense of pride and achievement in what they did.
Chilcot then said: "And no regrets?" Blair replied:
Responsibility, but not a regret for removing Saddam Hussein. I think he was a monster, I believe he threatened, not just the region but the world, and in the circumstances we faced then, it was better to deal with this threat, to remove him from office, and I do genuinely believe that the world is safer as a result.
6.15pm: It was often said about Blair that he wasn't interested in detail. Today's appearance bore that out. He defended the war robustly - declining, right at the end, even to say that he had regrets about some of the aspects of Iraq policy that were lamentable (like the post-war planning) - and he kept his focus relentlessly on the "big picture". At one point he was almost dismissive about suggestions that that changing Whitehall machinery would have made any difference. He wanted us to know that he has a vision of the world in the 21st century, and of the threat posed to the UK by countries like Iraq and Iran. Given the strength of feeling on this issue, he is unlikely to have made any converts. But, if Iraq has to be his legacy, he seems determined to defend it with swank and vigour.
That's it. Thanks for the comments.
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