www.fgks.org   »   [go: up one dir, main page]

August 25, 2009

Being popular abroad does not necessarily bring America influence

John_bolton-1 John Bolton for The American Blog:

"The justifiable disgust over Abdel Baset Ali al-Megrahi’s release underlines what amounts to a spectacular failure of American diplomacy. “Obamamania” overseas is a dominant theme of the media, which endlessly recounts how the U.S. position in the world has improved since President Bush’s departure. “Engagement” with friend and adversary alike is the Obama administration’s hallmark, with diplomatic advances expected to flow like wine.  So what happened? The State Department said on Friday that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton worked “for weeks and months” to persuade Britain not to release the murderer. Both Washington and London all but begged Gaddafi not to hold public celebrations on Megrahi’s arrival in Tripoli. Yet Britain, the other half of the “special relationship,” ignored Clinton’s efforts, as did Libya, which only recently resumed full diplomatic relations with America."

Posted at 09:50 AM in Barack Obama, Europe-America, General US foreign policy, Libya | | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

November 20, 2008

Gideon Rachman: Obama will be a splitter on the Middle East

GideonrachmanGideon Rachman writes for the Financial Times:

"Historians are sometimes divided into lumpers and splitters. The splitters like to chop problems up into lots of small bits. The lumpers like to link them altogether.

"Would-be Middle East peacemakers can be categorised in the same way. The lumpers want a "comprehensive peace settlement" that links together all the problems in the region - Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Israel-Palestine, even Iran. The splitters want to deal with all these problems separately."

"The attractions of lumping are obvious. The idea of fixing the whole of the Middle East in one go is delightful. And it is true that all of these problems are linked. To take just one example, Iran's poisonous relationship with the US has encouraged it to make trouble in Lebanon and Palestine, by sponsoring Hizbollah and Hamas.

"But while lumping works as an argument, it risks failing as a policy. There are three obvious problems. First, there is the risk of being over-ambitious. If nothing is resolved until everything is resolved there is a risk that you will end up with nothing.

"Second, there is the problem of which end of the lump you attack first. The much-reviled neoconservatives were also lumpers. But they thought that change in Iraq was the key to the transformation of the Middle East. Mr Miliband, in common with most mainstream European politicians, sees an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement as the key to the lump.

"This brings us to the third problem with the lump thesis. It is not clear that progress in one area will necessarily unlock the others. Let us say that the Iranians are miraculously persuaded to abandon their nuclear ambitions. Does that automatically lead to the establishment of a viable Palestinian state? Clearly not. Or put it the other way round: let us say the Israelis are miraculously persuaded to grant the Palestinians a viable state. Does that persuade the Iranians to abandon all thoughts of pursuing nuclear weapons? Clearly not. In fact, linking Iran and Israel-Palestine could inadvertently do the Iranians a favour, by tacitly conceding them a legitimate role in Gaza and in Lebanon.

"What probably is true is the more modest claim: significant progress in one area would improve prospects in another. So if there were a rapprochement between Iran and the US that involved the Iranians cutting off support for Hamas, the Israelis would feel more secure - and that might make a Middle East peace settlement easier to achieve. Similarly, the establishment of a proper Palestinian state would remove a source of anger and anti-western grievance across the region, and so undermine an angry, anti-western regime such as Iran."

"I think, as a matter of practical politics, Mr Obama will have to be a splitter. The state of the American economy is going to eat up most of his working day. When he turns to foreign policy, the Israeli-Palestinian problem will come fairly low down his list of priorities - behind, in rough order of urgency, Iraq, Afghanistan, climate change, Iran, international economics and Russia."

Posted at 06:27 AM in Barack Obama, General US foreign policy, Iraq, War on terror | | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

November 07, 2008

Gerard Baker: America is still a centre right nation

Baker_gerry Gerard Baker, The Times:

"Even as Mr Obama’s party was winning votes across the country, people were expressing strong support for conservative policies. In the most-watched ballot initiatives (plebiscites) on social issues in many states, there was little sign of a radical new beginning. Voters in California, Florida and Ari-zona supported constitutional amendments to outlaw gay marriage. Voters in Arkansas banned adoption by unmarried couples. In Nebraska a measure to end affirmative action in state hiring practices passed easily. Most remarkably, for all the transformation in US politics wrought by the past four years, Americans themselves do not seem to have undergone any great ideological conversion. In 2004 exit pollsters asked voters how they would identify their politics. The answers were 21 per cent liberal (Left), 45 per cent moderate, 34 per cent conservative. On Tuesday, the same question elicited these responses: 22 per cent liberal, 44 per cent moderate, 34 per cent conservative. President Obama and his jubilant supporters in Congress will surely not need reminding that this is still a centre-right country."

Posted at 08:52 AM in American politics | | Comments (3) | TrackBack (0)

November 04, 2008

Mary Dejevsky: Afghanistan will be the first big test of Obama's relationship with Europe

20071018074043frontline_0001 Mary Dejevsky writing in The Independent:

"Mr Obama would not be the accomplished politician he has shown himself over the past year, if he did not exploit his honeymoon with a joyful Europe to demand a vastly increased force contribution for Afghanistan. Those countries deemed not to have pulled their weight will be called upon to do so; saying no will not be an option. Even in Obamaland it will be argued that two futures crucial to our mutual well-being are on the line: a stable Afghanistan free of terrorist camps, and the continued existence of the transatlantic alliance. Except that it is not at all clear how far European leaders, and more particularly their electorates, will accept that analysis. Does a lawless Afghanistan represent a potential terrorist threat of such an order that a costly war has to be fought and won there? Europe has its own backyard to patrol, notably in the Balkans. Might Afghanistan be the point at which Europe calls an end to fighting wars declared in Washington? Do we risk defeat in Afghanistan only because the terrain is tough, or because Nato, without the cold war enemy, is unsustainable?This question, lurking since the collapse of communism, will be posed with some urgency, whether Europe finds itself dealing with Obamaland or McCainia. The paradox is that a more congenial and communicative partner could foster straighter talking – and with it mutual recognition that it may be time for our two destinies to move apart."

Posted at 07:34 AM in Afghanistan, Europe-America | | Comments (3) | TrackBack (0)

October 24, 2008

Rens Lee: Reasons for America to rethink the embargo on Cuba

Writing to Foreign Affairs, Rens Lee makes the strategic and economic case for America to rethink its embargo on Cuba:

"Current U.S. policy makes Cuba a target of opportunity for a resurgent and increasingly hostile Russia. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin talks openly about "restoring [Russia's] position in Cuba," and hints are surfacing in Moscow that Russia might reestablish a military and intelligence presence on the island in response to the planned U.S. missile defense shield in eastern Europe. Points of cooperation under consideration include using Cuba as a refueling stop for long-range bombers and for reconnaissance ships and aircraft and reopening a gigantic Soviet-era electronic monitoring and surveillance facility near Havana."

"Also, it is hardly coincidental that the warming of Cuban-Russian ties and the discussion of a renewed military relationship have followed closely on the accession of Raul Castro as the de facto Cuban leader. Moscow has historically regarded Raul's brother Fidel as emotionally volatile, a view stemming from Fidel's erratic behavior during the Cuban missile crisis, when, in the Soviets' view, Fidel was trying to provoke a U.S.-Soviet nuclear conflict. With Raul -- who resembles a Soviet-style apparatchik -- in charge, Russia may feel more comfortable deploying strategic or intelligence assets on the island."

"Another good reason to reevaluate U.S. Cuba policy relates to Cuba's huge potential energy reserves in the Gulf of Mexico, which the U.S. Geological Survey says could contain 4.6 billion barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas."

"In sum, current strategic and economic realities argue for dealing with the communist Cuban regime as is -- not insisting on regime change as a precondition for improving relations. Opening trade with Cuba could, as many argue, plant the seeds of democracy and free enterprise and give Americans some leverage to moderate the regime's police-state characteristics. But positioning the United States to participate in a potential Cuban energy bonanza and keeping Cuba out of the orbit of both regional drug kingpins and the United States' geopolitical competitors represent more immediate challenges."

Posted at 04:19 PM in Cuba, Russia | | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

October 08, 2008

Henry Kissinger and George Schultz: America should build on common ground with Russia

SchultzKissinger_3Henry Kissinger (America's Secretary of State under President Nixon) and George Schultz (Secretary of State under President Reagan) argue in a lengthy piece for The Washington Post that in spite of recent disagreements over Georgia, their interests are not irreconcilable, and agreement based on common ground is possible:

"America has an important stake in the territorial integrity of an independent Georgia but not in a confrontational diplomacy toward Russia by its neighbors. Russia needs to understand that the use or threat of military force evokes memories that reinforce the very obstacles to cooperative relations that are the basis of its grievances. America must decide whether to deal with Russia as a possible strategic partner or as a threat to be combated by principles drawn from the Cold War. Of course, should Russia pursue the policies its detractors assign to it, America must resist with all appropriate measures. Those of us who had responsibilities in conducting the Cold War would take the lead in supporting such a strategy.

"We are not yet at this point. Russia's leaders undoubtedly deplore the dissolution of the Russian and Soviet empire. But if they have any realism -- and in our experience they do -- they know that it is impossible and dangerous to seek to reverse Russia's history by military means.

"Russian history displays a tale of ambivalent oscillation between the restraints of the European order and the temptations for expansion into the strategic vacuums along its borders in Asia and the Middle East. These vacuums no longer exist. In the west, NATO is a formidable strategic presence. In the east, there is a resurgent Asia, to which the center of gravity of world affairs is shifting. In the south, Russia faces a partly radicalized Islam along a lengthy border. Internally, demographic prospects are for decline in the total population and a relative rise in the percentage of its Muslim portion, which is partly disaffected. Russia has not been able to address its infrastructure and health deficit adequately. With a gross domestic product less than one-sixth that of the United States (in purchasing power parity terms) and a defense budget significantly smaller than those of the European Union and the United States, Russia is not well placed to conduct a superpower struggle. Whatever their rhetoric, Russian leaders know this.

"What they have sought, sometimes clumsily, is acceptance as equals in a new international system rather than as losers of a Cold War to whom terms could be dictated."

Posted at 07:41 PM in Russia | | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

September 30, 2008

John Tkacik: Democracies must reach consensus to balance China's rise

Johntkacik John Tkacik of The Heritage Foundation concludes that China's existing policies provide an unwelcome indicator for the future - and will soon be combined with a more formidable economic and military weight than America has yet faced. He calls for America to do more to build up an international consensus in opposition to a rising, authoritarian China:

"Managing China's rise requires a quiet, coherent, multi-dimensional, and disciplined strategy that must be coordinated with allies and friendly democracies. Crucial to achieving America's strategic policy goals is consensus among the world's democracies to "balance" China's rise. The key obstacle to consensus is China's sheer economic weight and its willingness to use that weight to punish its adversaries and reward its friends. Unless the United States is able to focus our own friends on the magnitude of the task at hand and lead them in addressing it, the world's democracies will ultimately acquiesce in the undemocratic and irredentist nature of Beijing's worldview.

"America has confronted assertive authoritarian dictatorships with absolute authority over large economies in the past. But, false perceptions of the Soviet economic strength aside, in the past century the United States has never had to deal with a competitor of such economic, industrial, political, and—soon—military weight.

"Some U.S. politicians hope to wish the problem away and "look to China" to do the right thing. President George W. Bush is "optimistic about China's future" because, he believes "young people who grow up with the freedom to trade goods will ultimately demand the freedom to trade ideas." A soothing thought, but history suggests that "freedom to trade goods" never, of itself, leads to democracy, which is why the Chinese Communist Party is comfortable with it."

Continue reading "John Tkacik: Democracies must reach consensus to balance China's rise" »

Posted at 08:00 AM in China | | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

September 29, 2008

Gideon Rose: American guarantees risk moral hazard

Gideon_rose Gideon Rose, the managing editor of Foreign Affairs, writes an important article reflecting both on US backing for Georgia and Taiwan in light of the notion of moral hazard: "offering insurance to somebody often leads them to take greater risks than they otherwise would".

"If Georgia had not been led to believe that the United States might back it in a crisis, it probably would have played its hand more carefully -- and whatever compromises it might have had to make, it would have been better off as a result. This sort of thing happens all the time, and shows why great powers need to be careful lest their dependents embroil them in unnecessary conflicts."

"It is only natural for small democratic states living in bad neighborhoods to seek American support and protection, and in certain cases it is entirely appropriate for the United States to give it to them. But when it chooses to do so, the U.S. should make clear that along with the backing comes the responsibility to act prudently -- and should, without sentiment, use all the tools at its disposal to enforce the deal. The Bush 43 team has recognized this in Asia but forgot it in the Caucasus. How forcefully it would handle a third such case in the Middle East during its final months remains unclear."

See also America in the World's commentary on this article.

Posted at 08:00 AM in China, General US foreign policy, Russia | | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

September 26, 2008

Seth Jones and Martin Libicki: History suggests intelligence and cooperation with local actors are key to defeating terrorism

Howterroristgroupsend_2Seth Jones and Martin Libikci are the authors of How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al-Qaeda. Their report examines the data on more than 600 terrorist groups over the last forty years and applies the lessons learned to the counterterrorist efforts of the United States and her allies. The Middle East Institute has summarised their event with the authors:

"Jones contended that by examining the historical record of past counterterrorism endeavors, the United States could formulate a more efficient and suitable strategy for combating al-Qaeda."

"Jones detailed the findings of his report. Upon testing various causal factors against historical data, Jones and Libicki concluded that the vast majority of terrorist groups have terminated due to political settlements (43%) or policing and intelligence activities (40%). Military operations, by contrast, accounted for only 7% of successful defeats. Furthermore, the authors discerned no statistical correlation between terrorist groups’ devolutions and economic conditions, political institutions, and breadth of goals.

"What implications do these results have for current US counterterrorism policy? Jones asserted that military force continues to represent a counterproductive strategy for defeating al-Qaeda because it inflicts a high civilian death toll and emboldens terrorists’ “holy war” rhetoric. Instead, Jones posited, by leveraging legitimate local actors and surreptitiously targeting key players, the United States could more credibly and effectively pursue its strategic interests. In practice this means that the US government should support indigenous police forces, target key leaders, and engage in clandestine intelligence gathering and analysis. It should also empower organizations such as the State Department, CIA, and FBI, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, to develop and implement counterterrorism policies in the United States and abroad.

"Thus far, these tactics have accrued auspicious success in places like Ramadi, Iraq where large numbers of Sunni insurgents, with American backing, have joined Iraqi police forces to help rout al-Qaeda in Iraq. Additionally, the use of local Pakistani informants and intelligence agents has led to the capture and arrest of key terrorists like Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (in March 2002 and 2003, respectively). Although Jones admitted the potential failure of these strategies if local populations refuse to cooperate or possess conflicting strategic visions, he reemphasized that the “war on terror” could not be won by military force alone."

Posted at 02:07 PM in War on terror | | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

September 25, 2008

Ted Galen Carpenter: Washington can no longer ignore core Russian interests

Galen_carpenterTed Galen Carpenter of The Cato Institute reflects in The American Conservative on lessons for Washington of the Georgia crisis:

"[I]t is ... likely that Russia’s strategic aims are modest, largely confined to its own neighborhood, and typical for a major power. Moscow’s actions also appear to be more defensive than offensive ... Russia’s actions in Georgia are not much different from the typical conduct of other great powers—including the United States—in their neighborhoods."

"The reality is that the United States can do little to protect vulnerable client states in Russia’s neighborhood—unless Washington is willing to risk a military confrontation with nuclear implications. That remains true even for clients such as the Baltic states, which are formal members of NATO."

"Russia may be capable of establishing a modest sphere of influence along its perimeter, but it does not have the strength to reconstitute the Soviet empire—much less pose an expansionist threat to the heart of Europe as the USSR did during the Cold War. American opinion leaders need to curb their alarmism. Moscow’s conduct in Georgia may have been brutal, but it is not out of the norm for a great power to discipline an upstart small neighbor. There is no credible evidence that Moscow has massive expansionist impulses. And even if it did, Russia lacks the power to achieve such goals. Russia is not the Soviet Union, and it certainly is not the equivalent of Nazi Germany. U.S. policymakers need to take a deep breath, accept that Russia has returned to the ranks of major powers, and realize that Washington can no longer ignore, much less trample on, core Russian interests."

Posted at 03:05 PM in Russia | | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Next »
Quantcast