THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release October 7, 1993
PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER,
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LES ASPIN
AND ADMIRAL DAVID JEREMIAH
The Briefing Room
5:59 P.M. EDT
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Good afternoon. You've just
heard the President explain the reasons why American forces went to
Somalia, what they have accomplished and the reasons why the forces
will remain there.
From the standpoint of American foreign policy, the
steadiness of purpose that the President showed is absolutely
essential for the effective conduct of a foreign policy. Any less
resolute a course would certainly have been damaging, and I am very
pleased that this determined course has been set.
In a few minutes, Secretary Aspin will describe the
military aspects, and Admiral Jeremiah will speak to an aspect of
that as well. But first, I'd like to discuss our diplomatic strategy
under the policy that the President laid down today.
We've been pressing the United Nations to refocus the
Somalia operation on the political process of national
reconciliation. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali will travel to the
region later this month, and he has indicated that the U.N. will
pursue rapid progress on the political track. At the same time,
we're sending messages to 30 countries that contribute various kinds
of support to the UNISOM effort, asking that they remain in the
country until it's secure.
The United States has carried the heaviest part of the
load in Somalia. We're now asking certain other countries to
increase the number of their troops there to finish the job. We have
also asked Ambassador Oakley, who served as Special Envoy to Somlia
from December through March, to meet with leaders in the region to
obtain their support for the political strategy. He is leaving for
the region tonight. We've sent a message to President Meles of
Ethiopia, asking him to help bring about an early cease-fire. We'll
be working with President Meles to establish an independent
international commission to investigate and resolve the issues
stemming from the attacks on UNISOM and from the other acts of
violence in Somalia.
We're also sending messages to the leaders of Eritrea,
Kenya and Djibouti, asking for their help in achieving a political
settlement in Somalia. We're asking the organization African Unity
to take an active role in bringing together the different factions in
Somalia. We've solicited the support of Egyptian President Mubarak,
who is this year President of the OAU. We'll be sending a similar
message to the OAU Secretary General Salim Salim.
The United States intends to work with -- particularly
closely with President Meles, the OAU and the Somalis to try to
arrange a Somali leadership conference as soon as possible. Almost a
year ago when the United States responded heroically to the question
of mass starvation on Somalia; now, we, together with the United
Nations, neighboring countries and the OAU must work urgently to help
the Somalis find a settlement to the problem and to mobilize the
humanitarian rescue.
We're looking to the African leaders to help us find an
African solution to an African problem. We're going to be relying
heavily on such leaders as President Meles, President Issaias and
others in the region to help fashion a solution to the problem, which
goes along with the military track that Secretary Aspin and General
Jeremiah will be talking about. As I look back, one of the things
that happened over the last several months is that we focused very
heavily on the military track, and we lost focus on the political
track. We're now asking the U.N. to refocus on the political track
and to try to seek a national reconciliation in Somalia so that that
country can get on with its life and well-being.
Secretary Aspin.
SECRETARY ASPIN: Thank you, Chris. Let me just do a
brief statement, and then let me talk a little bit about the military
deployments, and then turn it over to Admiral Jeremiah, who has also
got some information on the deployments.
First, I want to say that the American men and women
that we have sent to Somalia have performed their mission with
unmatched distinction. They represent the very best that this nation
has to offer. There are no words to describe our pride in the
bravery they demonstrated under fire, our agony over the loss of
their precious lives and the suffering of our wounded and detained.
There are, however, words available to send a clear message to those
who are illegally detaining an American serviceman. The message to
Mr. Aideed is this: Do not underestimate American resolve. Do not
think that any harm you do to our servicemen will be forgotten by me,
the President, or by the American people. We intend to have our man
back. And we hold you personally responsible for his safety.
Besides that statement, let me just say a few words
about the situation as far as the military deployments goes. First,
the numbers. After this deployment has been completed, and including
the people that are already in country, the total number of American
servicemen in Somalia will be in the order of 7,100 people. In
addition to that, there will be an offshore Marine presence which
will total 3,600. So that's the numbers that are relevant. There is
an on-shore presence that will go from -- roughly, what is it now,
4,500, 4,800 -- up to 7,100, and the number will be augmented by an
offshore Marine presence which may be added to the number in country
of another 3,600.
In addition to that, there will, of course, be a naval
presence in the area, but none of them will be on shore in Somalia.
In particular, of course, there is the Aircraft Carrier Lincoln --
Abraham Lincoln, is coming into the area, and that adds about 6,000
people on board that ship all by themselves.
What this added capability will allow is three things:
First, it will allow moving the QRF to its old mission. The QRF, as
you remember, was essentially designed to be a quick reaction force
if somebody got in trouble somewhere in the fighting within all of
Somalia. The QRF was a quick reaction force to reinforce somebody,
somewhere in Somalia. What happened, though, unfortunately, is the
drawdown of the U.S. forces, the QRF got involved in day-to-day
operations in Mogadishu. This added military presence will allow the
QRF to go back to its originally designed mission as a quick reaction
force.
Second, we will be adding almost a second QRF in the
offshore Marines. The Marines will add another capability that can
be inserted at a particular time with a particular mission, and that
would add to the capability. So there's almost a second QRF
available on the offshore.
The final thing that it does is, it allows -- this
capability here includes some air power that we did not have before.
In particular, there are going to be four AC-130 gunships, and there
are going to be the aircraft off of the carrier Abraham Lincoln,
which are available for air strikes in the area.
Those are the capabilities. It will allow the United
States military to conduct the mission as described in the
President's speech, it will allow a greater presence. It is thought
that it will be a force multiplier, because with more American
presence and more American activity, we believe the allies will also
show more activity. So I think it'll be a force multiplier.
It will, I think, have an impact on the security situation in
Mogadishu. And the hope which is behind all of this, is essentially
to bring about the political agenda which we're laying out.
The military mission here is in support of the political
agenda. The military mission is in support of the political agenda.
There is -- to carry out a military solution to this problem would
require a number of people and a number -- amount of time and an
amount of commitment of money, which is beyond all reasonable
expectations. We are putting our efforts into a political solution
here, but we have military component which supports that political
process.
Let me now call upon Dave Jeremiah and ask him -- we'll
have some questions in a minute. Let me ask Dave Jeremiah for his
statement.
ADMIRAL JEREMIAH: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I thought
it would be useful to put some texture on some of these terms that
we've thrown around -- the logistic support group and the QRF. When
the American forces went into Somalia last December, Marines went
ashore, were subsequently joined by soldiers from the 10th Mountain
Division in Mogadishu, and fanned out across the depth and range of
Somalia -- southern Somalia -- with the objective of restoring order
and of permitting the transportation of food to famished people
throughout this country. That was done.
At the same time, we had allies who came in and
supported that effort under UNITAF. Over time, we stabilized the
situation in Somalia, and it came time with the introduction of
additional troops, and with a stable situation and a secure situation
and to move out and bring back American soldiers, the 20,000 that the
President referred to earlier -- 20,000 soldiers and Marines. They
were replaced by soldiers from other countries. Those countries are
listed up here in the boxes. Koreans, Nigerians, Kuwaitis, people
from the UAE, Botswana, Norway -- a host of nations. Many of those
nations do not have the ability to handle the logistics to supply
them in places like Gelilasi and Bilet Wen and Odur. In order to do
that, the United States came out as part of the continuing effort
that the President referred to, to give the Somali people a chance.
We agreed to provide the logistics network to support these folks.
I've been in Odur. It's a long way from nowhere.
It's a pretty scary place if you're out there all by yourself and a
bunch of folks come running up to you with a technical -- a bunch of
these teenage thugs come up and start to overrun a 20- or 30-man
outpost. Thus, the quick reaction force that allowed us to fly
helicopter-borne American troops quickly to the scene and reinforce a
post or an outpost in the even that we had that kind of thuggery
going on. We have not had the occasion to do it, our allies who are
in that area have been very successful in carrying it out. But the
requirement remain in the logistic support force -- the logistic
command to support this whole United Nations effort, those two
elements were our contribution to the United Nations mission to
continue the effort in Somalia to let this nation have a chance to
survive as a nation.
Now, let me turn to the other chart and simply show
you the range of forces and how we draw forces into a particular
situation around the globe. Every day that we have dealt with crises
over the last three-and-a-half years that I've been the Vice Chairman
we have brought to bear the men and women of the Armed Forces of the
United States: the 10th Mountain Division from New York, the 24
Mechanized Division from Georgia. We brought some forces in from the
Mediterranean where we had the Marines deployed on Navy amphibious
ships. We brought in some Air Force AC-130s, and you can see the
composition, the numbers of people and the organizations that they
represent. We brought the nuclear powered carrier Lincoln down from
the Persian Gulf in order to provide the firepower that the Secretary
mentioned. And we brought the amphibious forces -- the Marine
amphibious forces embarked on amphibious ships just off Malaysia,
they're en route as well.
So we have drawn a total force of on the order of
20,000 people together to carry out this mission in Somalia to
support the political objectives that Secretary Christopher and
Secretary Aspin mentioned, and that the President of the United
States placed upon us as we discussed this current problem. Thank
you.
Q Admiral Jeremiah, do you think this is this
enough? Do you think there are enough folks going in here to protect
Americans?
ADMIRAL JEREMIAH: On the ground in Mogadishu today
there are on the order of 16,000 to 18,000 troops from Allied nations
-- the Pakistanis, the Malaysians have contributed to the action on
Sunday, a number of other -- the Egyptians, forces from the UAE,
Nepalese will soon be there. There are a number of nations, and I
don't want to offend them by omitting one, but there are a number of
nations there. They have contributed, with our support, to protect
our troops. In their logistics function this will go well, and I
think we have the necessary troops on the ground to do our function
and to protect our forces on the ground. But I'll tell you that if
there is a problem, there is but I'll tell you that if there is a
problem, there is enormous fire power in ways that are quite
different than anything that the people who oppose the U.N. effort in
Somalia have not seen before, except when we first put troops on the
ground in Somalia, here and in the amphibious forces offshore.
Plus, there are people that they are familiar with.
They've seen some of the troops in the 10th Mountain Division.
They've seen the Marines. There are a lot of people in Somalia who
owe their lives to those forces, and I think it will be a help.
Q Secretary Christopher, could you answer the
question, what happens on April 1st if there is not a political
structure in place in Somalia to really maintain the government there
and the food operation? Will the United Sates pull out by then,
anyway?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: The President said there was no
assurance of success. We're putting in place a plan that we think
maximizes the opportunity for success on the political track. But
there is no assurance of success and the commitment the President
gave for the withdrawal of virtually all of our troops by that time
is one that will be met.
Q Will the Marine force -- 3,600 Marines -- will they
remain off the coast after the other troops, the inland troops have
been withdrawn? Is that the plan?
SECRETARY ASPIN: No, they would be part of the
withdrawal -- I don't think it's worked out, the timing of all of
this. We hope that part of the 7,100 can be removed before March
31st deadline. I would expect the Marines to stay there until the
end, but I don't expect them to be there beyond that.
Q Recently, we understand that Secretary Powell, on
behalf of General Montgomery in Mogadishu, has requested armor and
that you had turned it down. Is that true? And if so, why, sir?
SECRETARY ASPIN: Let me tell you that the decision as
to deploy any troops anywhere in the world is the job of the
Secretary of Defense, and that's the job that I carry out. General
Montgomery had made a request that for some additional armor of four
tanks and about fourteen Bradley fighting vehicles, plus some
artillery. He made that request. General Hoar looked at the
proposal. He scrubbed it, took out the artillery part and sent the
proposal forward.
General Powell and I discussed it on several occasions.
I found that the views in the Pentagon were kind of mixed on the
issue as to whether we ought to grant that. And I think they were
mixed for good reason. We were, at that time, talking about a
withdrawal of our presence in Somalia. We were beginning to think in
terms of our withdrawal of our presence. This was about the end of
September.
Q Mr. Secretary --
SECRETARY ASPIN: Let me finish, if I might. The finish
the end of withdrawal -- the end of -- we're already thinking about
withdrawing it, the forces, and trying to reduce our presence. This
would have been a great additional presence. In addition, it would
have been a very visible part of it. In addition, we were already
looking at the possibility, also, of deploying forces to Bosnia. We
had just increased the forces in Somalia less, about a month earlier
with the Rangers.
All in all, the decision was deferred at the time that
it came to my attention. I did not -- the presentation of that data
was -- the presentation of the need for that mission was in
protecting the logistics supply lines.
Q What was the roster?
SECRETARY ASPIN: Let me finish, please, Wolf. Hold it.
It was to protect the logistics supply lines. We did not think of it
in terms of any use as a possible rescue operation as we saw it might
have been used on Sunday. Had I known -- if I could please, just let
me finish this statement.
Q Let me know when you finish.
SECRETARY ASPIN: I'll let you know.
Q wave a handkerchief?
SECRETARY ASPIN: I'll wave a handkerchief. Had I known
at that time what I knew after the events of Sunday, I would have
made a very different decision. I saw that it could have been used
very usefully after the events on Sunday. As I say, this is my
decision, somebody has to make the decision. This is the decision
that I get paid for, and I made the decision as best I could with the
information and the knowledge that I had at the time.
Q Secretary Christopher, will the leadership
conference that you spoke of involve Mr. Aideed? Who will the ceasefire
be arranged with in the country of Somalia? How does he factor
in this nation building that you have now embarked on?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: That will be up to President
Meles and the other African leaders in the region. We'll leave it to
them as to how they want to organize the conference of those in
Somalia. I think it's particularly appropriate that that decision be
taken by the leaders in the region.
With respect to General Aideed, let me remind you what
the President said. The President said that we would try to
depersonalize the situation, but nevertheless, we would keep the
pressure on any of those who would interrupt the humanitarian
supplies or otherwise cause trouble for the United Nations forces
there.
General Aideed will not be the principle focus of our
activities in the future but we certainly don't rule anything out in
the context of keeping the pressure on anyone who would interfere
with the humanitarian efforts, or the U.S. troops or any of the
UNISOM troops.
Q Mr. Aspin, there are some Republican members
of Congress, including Senator D'Amato of New York, are suggesting
that you resign because of that decision. What is your intention?
SECRETARY ASPIN: Not to resign.
Q I'd like to ask if you know how many
American troops are being held by the forces of Farah Aideed?
SECRETARY ASPIN: It really wouldn't serve a good
purpose for me to try to identify anything further than the fact that
we know that one American serviceman is being held. And beyond that,
I think it's unwise for me to try to give any precision to the number
who might be held as detainees.
Q Secretary Christopher, could you please
explain to us what it is that you said to these other nations? As
the President is announcing that we're getting out on March 31st,
you said you've sent letters asking them to stay. Why should they
stay if we're leaving?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: Well, Mary, one good reason
for them to stay is that we've done the heavy lifting up to this
point. We had 28,000 troops in there at the beginning, we conducted
a major humanitarian operation which was highly successful. I think
it's time for the burden to be shared with others. But the President
is determined that we'll have the maximum opportunity for others to
participate in this endeavor, and that's why we're staying, that's
why we're not leaving immediately. We want to leave in a responsible
and prudent way.
Q Mr. Secretary, you said that you're going to
keep the pressure up on people who would interfere in future
operations, but the United Nations Security Council has put out an
arrest order on General Aideed. Are we now going to ignore that in
an effort to depersonalize this?
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER: We certainly won't ignore
the arrest order. As I say, if we have opportunities, we don't rule
out anything. Thank you very much.
END6:18 P.M. EDT
|