On the Ethics of Citing Nazi Research
by Talia

Determining the appropriate way to go about citing the Nazi experimental data is complicated on many levels. First, one must decide whether it is right to cite it at all, and if so what the best way to do so is. Additionally, a person must consider whether the data is valid and valuable, and what the arguments are for and against using the information. It is an exceptionally sensitive topic for many reasons, including the ramifications of citing the data. Using the Nazi research in any context brings up scientific, ethical and practical questions, with arguments on both sides raising moral, philosophic and historical points. The question must be approached with simultaneous caution and assurance to attempt to reach a firm practical solution for this very real and current issue.

Analyzing the reasons for the Nazi's experimentation on Jews is difficult in many ways. It is important to understand its modern day pertinence in the scientific world, the intentions behind the experimentation, and what it is specifically about the experiments that makes us so resistant to publishing them. The issue lies in how the experiments were conducted, rather than that they were. What becomes clear from the method of experimentation is that there was another goal beyond scientific advancement. The people whom the Nazi doctors experimented on were ones that they considered subhuman, and consequently the Nazis felt they had the right to be treated with subhuman standards. There were deliberate, torturous parts of the experiments simply because the subjects were Jews and therefore could be experimented upon with no concern for their well-being. It is a researcher's duty to express concern for the ramifications of the experiment on the subject and attempt to minimize the negative effects, clearly not what went on during the Nazi experimentation.

The entire argument in favor of citing the results of Nazi experiments rests on the assumption that they are scientifically valid. There would be absolutely no moral or scientific reason to use the results in any context if there was nothing to be gained from their further publication. For this reason, the decision of whether or not to use them must be preceded by a determination of the experiments scientific validity and applicability.

This ruling has been largely disputed within the scientific community since the experiments were conducted. For the most part, the experiments have been discarded due to their scientific failings along with their blatant ethical wrongs, but there are a few sections in the corpus of Nazi medicine that have survived because of their possible scientific use. The major group of experiments still up for discussion is the Dachau human hypothermia series. Needless to say, nothing of its kind has been repeated, not because of a lack of medical interest in hypothermia, but because it is impossible to learn about hypothermia in the same way that the Nazis did without exposing subjects to the kinds of atrocious conditions that the Nazis employed. Robert Berger describes many of the scientific issues in an extremely detailed article¹ and comes to the conclusion that for the most part, the experiments have so many inconsistencies and issues of scientific concern that they are scientifically invalid and their further citation is useless. If Berger is correct in his assertion that the Dachau experiments have no scientific merit, then I would agree with this recommendation that no further citing of these experiments is necessary other than a citation in the Alexander report as a documentation of a time of scientific and ethical depravity. However, though he presents many reasons why the experiments have no worth there are those who disagree with him. Jay Katz brings references from the Nuremberg Trials to support his assertion that the science is good, and should be used. Dr. Franz Vollhardt, an expert witness for the defense contended that " 'scientifically speaking the planning was excellent'…and that the results of these [hypothermia] experiments 'were a wonderful thing for all seafaring nations'"².

Whether or not the science is merely valid or exceptionally useful, it is imperative, as both Kirsten Moe and Jay Katz state in their articles defending the validity of the experiments, that the data be cited only when it is the only information of its kind available.^{3 4} As John S. Hayward of the University of Victoria in British Columbia said, "I don't want to have to use this data, but there is no other and will be not other in an ethical world."⁵ He, along with others, also acknowledges the scientific flaws that exist and attempts to account for them by only using the results unaffected by the unreliable aspects of the research. For example, Hayward uses the Nazi measurement of the rate of body cooling in cold water, but doesn't use the data that shows the points at which prisoners became unconscious or died because they were performed on emaciated and unhealthy individuals and therefore are not representative of the general population. In this scientific sense, it seems possible to distinguish between parts of the experiment and use the applicable and sound pieces, though this does not account for the ethical implications of using data from experiments that were so clearly cruel and immoral. Based on the majority of the sources that I have seen, I will assume that the science is sound as well as applicable. Even if in the future it is somehow determined that the science is flawed, at present the research is being cited, and so it is important to deal with the philosophic consequences of that choice.

A common argument in favor of citing Nazi research is the 'salvaging some good from the ashes' idea; that something positive should come from all the harm that was inflicted on the victims. I would like to avoid relying on this line of thinking. I find it somewhat belittling and offensive because of the assumptions it makes about the intent of the victims. It is a retrospective apologetic argument, asserting that because it already happened, maybe the participants would want something positive to come out of it. But this is a weak assertion because the subjects of these experiments did not consent in any informed way to their participation. They were not involved in the experiments for the good of science, and assumedly would have preferred to live then to die for German scientific good. It is true that many people do not become subjects of experiments for the good of science or for the good of humanity; instead they may do it for recognition, for money or for other rewards. The difference here is that there was no reward whatsoever for these victims, on the contrary, many of them were permanently physically and mentally harmed, many even died over the course of the experiments. Those who participate in experiments for reasons other than the scientific causes have some reward, as well as, more importantly, some sort of informed consent.

Though it may be the most basic or the most obvious argument, it is unnecessary to rely on it, as there are better reasons that involve less degradation to continue to use the data then this general salvaging the good idea. If nothing else citing the Nazi data provides evidence that these experiments were carried out. Holocaust revisionists reject all historical ideas that any part of the Holocaust occurred, and the Alexander report provides a detailed documentation, at the very least, of one piece of Holocaust history. The existence of this document and Alexander's confirmation make it impossible to claim that no one was harmed in Nazi occupied Germany as it documents the systematic torture of human subjects in hundreds of comprehensive experiments.⁶

Assuming that experimentation did in fact go on, some have suggested citing it with some sort of limitation rather than making an overall decision one way or the other in order to avoid putting a blanket moral determination on the ethics of their citation. None of these solutions seem particularly effective or plausible. Citing the data without any sort of moral qualifier is disturbing and makes it seem as if there is nothing questionable about it. The suggestion to cite it with a footnote describing its ethical problems does not seem feasible in a scientific research environment, where sections of articles are often used out of context, and very often without reference to external footnotes. Moe brings the suggestion to use the data on a case-by-case basis in specifically applicable situations⁷, but in today's globalized world where information is constantly searched for to establish precedent this is an impractical option. To me, the failings of any of these options are partially based on the problem that the intentions are practically rather then ethically motivated. The goal seems to be to allow a scientist to cite the experiment without diluting the reference with an ethical qualifier while still, in some way, acknowledging the difficulties that arise in using them, but the ethics get lost in the desire to reference the data.

A serious issue with publishing the data is that many believe that medical and scientific journals should not publish studies achieved through unethical means. Publishing the articles seems to legitimize the studies as well as the means by which they were achieved and it may give a reader the idea that it is possible to achieve scientific recognition regardless of results achieved through immoral approaches.

In my view, this argument's intentions have merit, but is slightly misdirected in its execution. If the purpose is to condemn the unethical activity of the Nazis, then I believe that should be done. But I do not think that the means to address unethical behavior in science is by not addressing the experiments at all. Excluding them from articles and research removes any opportunity for response from the academic scientific community in a traditional or formal way.

A popular objection to using the Nazi data, voiced in particular by representatives of scientific journals, is the fear that scientists will somehow assume that they are separate from the rest of society; that ethical rules and moral norms do not apply to them when they are doing research in 'the name of science' or for 'the good of mankind'. There is value in the suggestion to ban citation of the research even if only to prove that science is not above common moral law, that "[scientists] do not have carte blanche to treat human…subjects any way they like, in the interest of science"⁸. This is a valid point, and one that I think should and can be focused on through this issue. But the same counterargument stands as it did before - silence is not an effective method of deterrence. The Nazi data absolutely can and should be a reminder of the intrinsic relationship between science and human values, and it "can be a reminder to scientists that they do not inhabit a 'value free' morally neutral world merely by virtue of their discipline's methodological concern with objectivity"⁹. This article against citation emphasizes memorial, but not citing the data creates only a silent memorial. Additionally, in trying to find what is in the victims' memories' collective best interest, the unfortunately historically typical Jewish silent resistance does not best fight off Nazi cruelty. Citing the data need not automatically give glory to the researchers; there is room for exactly the opposite response. Citing the data gives the writer an opportunity to accept the science while simultaneously verbally and outwardly condemning the methods. "To make a statement you make a statement, you don't fail to make a statement. Silence is ambiguous and often amounts to the uncomfortably averted gaze, whether consciously intended or not…"¹⁰. Here, Benjamin Freedman has hit upon a crucial point. By not citing the data, there is no fight, no opposition to the experiments. Instead, the issues are simply avoided without any sense of consequence from the researchers, which seems to be the reverse of the argument against citing the data. Those who are opposed to including the citations claim that using Nazi research legitimizes it, that it appears that the research community has noticed the data and is appreciative of it. But not citing them leaves the scientific community silent. It is a counterproductive measure. There is no peer recourse at all, nothing that shows that they deny the methods. Omission is not rejection; it is merely omission. Arguments against the Nazi data must be made, and they must be made powerfully in print, not in silence. By citing the material the authors are able to use the legitimate aspects of the research while addressing the moral issues at the same time.

The positions of both those who oppose citing the data and those who support it rest partially on a Utilitarian argument. Arthur Schaefer articulates the opposition's argument by assessing the risk benefit ration as one that is not worth taking. He claims that the "wickedness of the means" is so great that the data must be "transcendentally important" in order to make it morally acceptable to use the data.¹¹ I agree with him on this point, and I wonder what benefit could be of enough "transcendental importance" to somehow balance out the cruelty inflicted by the Nazis in these experiments. However, he is using the Utilitarian position as a means to claim Utilitarianism as an inappropriate method of addressing this issue in a practical way that weakens the structure of his argument a bit. He limits Utilitarianism by portraying it in a somewhat limited and biased way by showing that it sometimes works and sometimes does not, yet he still relies on its reasoning.

On the other hand, Freedman uses a Utilitarian platform by rejecting Utilitarian reasoning to support citation. He asserts that banning the use of the data or even describing it as "unethical" is not a fitting punishment or a logically appropriate consequence.¹² The act that is being measured is not the act of the experiments, rather the act of their citation. By citing the data while using a Utilitarian argument, one must be willing to say that the act is justified because of the good that it is doing, and scientifically, it may be. But it is difficult to make that assessment because it is nearly impossible to measure the evil of the experiments, consequently making it impossible to effectively measure the potential good in relation to that evil. Nazi cruelty far surpasses anything that could be weighed in any sort of 'ends justifying the means' balance. I can not imagine a risk-benefit ratio that could avoid being monumentally insulting, because by necessity it would have to imply that there exists some measure that make the experiments retroactively worthwhile.

Due to all the above-mentioned reasons, my personal recommendation is that citing the Nazi data is appropriate. In addition to the benefits of using the data for its scientific value, using the experiments has a moral benefit. Citation gives the opportunity to address the issue and to condemn it, something that cannot be done too many times. It may be possible for scientists to admit that they would have used the research, but because of its immorality will not. This is an option, but then the scientific value that the experiments may have is lost. I think that citation with some sort of explanation is a forward thinking solution as it uses the information without justifying it. This being said, I consequently have to qualify my recommendation by echoing Katz's sentiment at the end of his article- "there are no final answers to these tragic questions".¹³ I do not feel one-hundred percent comfortable with this suggestion, knowing the opposing arguments and the sensitivity and meaning of the issue at hand. Understanding what happened in the past does not provide complete answers or total guidance as we move towards the uncertainty of the scientific future.