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The official pro-invasionist argument at last
A review of the Aryan invasion arguments in J. Bronkhorst and M.M.
Deshpande: Aryan and Non-Aryan in South Asia
Dr. Koenraad Elst
On October 25-27, 1996, the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor hosted a
conference on "Aryan and Non-Aryan in South Asia". Its proceedings are now
available as vol.3 of the Opera Minora in the Harvard Oriental Series,
with some updates and a related more recent paper by Prof. Hans Heinrich
Hock added, and edited by Prof. Johannes Bronkhorst and Prof. Madhav M.
Deshpande:
Aryan and Non-Aryan in South Asia. Evidence, Interpretation and Ideology.
Some of the papers have but little bearing on the question of the Aryan
Invasion Theory, e.g. Pashaura Singh's paper on the 19th-century Hindu
reform movement Arya Samaj, or Asko Parpola's paper on a Kerala folk
deity. Here we will focus only on the arguments relevant to the Aryan
Invasion debate.
1. Invasion vs. immigration
1.1. Invasion, not just immigration
To start with a clear understanding about the terminology used, please
allow me me explain why I have chosen to retain the term "Aryan invasion"
where most contributors to this volume use "Aryan immigration". Some of
them have, in other forums, insisted that I drop the term "invasion" as
this represents a long-abandoned theory of Aryan warrior bands attacking
and destroying the peaceful Indus civilization. Well, I disagree.
Immigration means a movement from one country to another, without the
connotation of conquest; invasion, by contrast, implies conquest or at
least the intention of conquest. Yet invasion should not be confused with
military conquest; it may be that, but it may also be demographic
Unterwanderung.
What makes it into an invasion is not the means used but the end achieved:
after an invasion, the former outsiders are not merely
in,
as in an immigration, they are also
in charge,
just like after a military conquest.
In today's immigration debate, we can vividly see the contrast between the
two terms. Those who expect Mexicans in the US to blend in, use the
neutral term "immigrant", even when prefixed with "illegal". Some people,
however, speak of a "Mexican invasion", by which they mean that the
Mexicans, whether "wetback" or legal, have no intention of becoming
Americans, of respecting the existing system, but want to impose their
identity on Texas or California, making them Spanish-speaking rather than
English-speaking states. Likewise, some French opinion leaders, including
former president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and former actress Brigitte
Bardot, have spoken of a "Muslim invasion" in France, though most Muslims
concerned are perfectly legal "immigrants" who entered France without any
violence. What raises alarmist cries of "invasion" is the perception that
these North-Africans want to impose a Muslim identity on French society.
It is the end result which decides whether an "immigration" can be called
an "invasion". If the newcomers end up imposing their (cultural,
religious, linguistic) identity rather than adopting the native identity,
the result is the same as it would have been in the case of a military
conquest, viz. that outsiders have made the country their own, and that
natives who remain true to their identity (like Native Americans in the
US) become strangers or second-class citizens in their own country.
In the case of the Aryan invasion, the end result clearly is that North
India got aryanized.
The language of the Aryans marginalized or replaced all others. In a
popular variant of the theory, they even reduced the natives to permanent
subjugation through the caste system. So, whether or not there was a
destructive Aryan conquest, the result was at any rate the humiliation of
native culture and the elimination of the native language in the better
part of India. It is therefore entirely reasonable to call such
development an "invasion" and to speak of the prevalent paradigm as the
"Aryan invasion theory" (AIT).
1.2. Was there a military conquest?
There is a hard variety of the AIT, mostly upheld by Dalit activists and
Dravidian separatists (and their American Afrocentrist allies) which
insists on such a conflictual scenario, with Aryans devastating the cities
and civilization of the natives. But most scholars deny or avoid such a
scenario, if only because the Harappan cities don't show trace of such
military conquest. However, if there was no conquest, the question should
be answered: how in the world could the Aryan "immigrants" have aryanized
the Harappan area if not by military conquest? Those who are so particular
about "immigration" as opposed to "invasion", like Prof. Michael Witzel,
ought to explain how Central-Asian immigrants could impose their language
on a far larger and culturally advanced Harappan population?
As far as I can see, the supposedly invading Aryans could only initiate a
process of language replacement by a process of
elite dominance
(that much is accepted by most invasionists), which means that they first
had to become the ruling class. Could they have peacefully immigrated and
then worked their way up in society, somewhat like the Jews in pre-War
Vienna or in New York? Moreover, the example given illustrates a necessary
ingredient of peaceful immigration, viz. linguistic adaptation: in spite
of earning many positions of honour and influence in society, the Jews
never imposed their language like the Aryans supposedly did. So how could
these Aryan immigrants first peacefully integrate into Harappan society
yet preserve their language and later even impose it on their hospitable
host society? Neither their numbers, relative to the very numerous
natives, nor their cultural level, as illiterate invaders relative to a
literate civilization, gave them much of an edge over the Harappans.
Therefore, the only way for them to wrest power from the natives must have
been by their military superiority, tried and tested in the process of an
actual conquest. Possibly there were some twists to the conquest scenario,
making it more complicated than a simple attack,
e.g. some Harappan faction in a civil war may have invited an Aryan
mercenary army which,after doing its job, overstayed its welcome and
dethroned its employers. But at least
some
kind of military showdown seems necessarily to have taken place at some
point. If invasionists now shy away from Sir Mortimer Wheeler's robust
conquest scenario for the Aryan invasion, it is up to them to first of all
think up and eventually prove the unlikely nonmilitary alternative. As
things now stand, the Aryan "immigration" theory necessarily implies the
hypothesis of military conquest.
2. The racial interpretation of the AIT
2.1. Awareness of colour difference
Two participants have dealt with the old assumption that Arya and Anarya
are racial categories. Thomas R. Trautmann ("Constructing the racial
theory of Indian civilization") acknowledges that ancient Hindus already
had an awareness of skin colour, as when Râjashekhara in his
Kâvyamîmânsâ
describes the people of northern India as
gaura,
"fair", those of eastern India as
shyâma,
"dusky", those of southern India as
krshna,
"black", and those of western India as
pandu,
"pale". No colour discrimination is implied there, merely a description of
facts, yet a preference for fair complexion in brides is reportedly
attested as early as
Vâsishtha Dharma Sűtra
18:18. Most famously, Patanjali the grammarian described Brahmins as
gaura,
"fair". Trautmann asks: "How can one argue against the racial theory in
the face of such facts?" (p.289)
First of all, none of these quotations pertain to an opposition between
natives and newcomers from the northwest, only one between different
sections of the population of India, which even today varies in skin
colour from almost white in the northwest to purely black in the south,
just as in Europe, hair colour varies between white and black. Long before
the 19thcentury wave of race theories, Europeans have described one
another as red-haired or dark-haired or flaxen-haired, without implying
inferiority or foreign origin.
That Brahmins were once recognizable as
gaura
is only logical when you consider that the heartland of the Vedic
tradition was to the west of the Yamuna river, and that people in that
northwestern region were (and could still be) characterized as
gaura,
this being the skin colour of Panjabis rather than of Europeans. Of
course, at that time already Brahmins were swarming out over India, being
invited by kings to settle in Tamil Nadu or Bengal, intermarrying with
local women, and ending up as dusky Bengal Brahmins or black Tamil
Brahmins. Which is why Patanjali's early commentators already rejected his
confinement of Brahmins to
gaura-skinned
people as absurd.
The preference for white skin is very widespread among populations which
certainly have no Aryan invasion history, e.g. the harems of the Caliphs
and Sultans were full of captured white women. More generally, we find
white and black having positive c.q. negative connotations among non-white
populations, e.g. white is the sacred colour for many Indian tribals
(which is why they select white goats or chicken for sacrifice).
Conversely, they do not necessarily have these connotations among white
people, e.g. the
gaura
North-Indian Hindus have white as their colour of mourning, as do the
whitish Japanese, for whom black is an auspicious colour. At any rate,
even the preference of Indians for any one colour need not prove that this
was their own colour, much less that they originated in a non-Indian
region where everyone wore that colour on his skin.
2.2. How the racial interpretation was popularized
Trautmann goes over the historical record of early Indology to show how
the race theories of the 19th century forced racial interpretations on
text fragments which had never been read in that sense before, e.g. how
the
single
reference to the enemies as
an-âs,
"mouthless" (i.e. "of defective speech", meaning "not groomed in Vedic
culture", Sayana's reading consistent with the traditional cultural
interpretation) was read as
a-nâs,
"noseless",
i.e. "flat-nosed" by Max Müller, then cited by anthropometrist H.H. Risley
as a racialdescription which the Vedic Aryans
often
made, and finally adopted in that version by most textbooks. (p.287-288)
Trautmann likewise points out that there is no contextual evidence
supporting the nontraditional interpretation of
varna,
"colour, caste" as "skin colour": "On the evidence of use it appears that
varna here simply means 'category, social group'." (p.288) Until recently
such criticism of the racial interpretation of the ethnic data in the Rg-Veda
was only made by the non-invasionist school.
Hans Hock ("Through a glass darkly: modern 'racial' interpretations vs.
textual and general prehistoric evidence on
ârya
and
dâsa/dasyu
in Vedic society") also points to the genesis of the racial interpretation
in the context of the "scramble of the European powers to divide up the
non-European world", in which "the British take-over of India seemed to
provide
a perfect parallel to the assumed take-over of prehistoric India by the
invading 'Aryans'" (p.168). He argues that "such notions as 'race',
defined in terms of skin color, are an invention of (early) modern
European colonialism and imperialism and thus inappropriate for the
prehistoric contact between ârya and dâsa/dasyu", citing as example the
absence of racial considerations in the Roman empire. (p.159)
2.3. The evidence
Prof. Hock provides a detailed survey of the Vedic verses which have been
cited as proof of a racial antagonism between the Vedic people and their
enemies (verses containing terms like
asikni
and
krshna,
"black"), and concludes that the racial interpretation "must be considered
dubious". (p.154) He points out that "early Sanskrit literature offers no
conclusive evidence for preoccupation with skin color. More than that,
some of the greatest Epic heroes and heroines such as Krshna, Draupadi,
Arjuna, Nakula and (...) Damayanti are characterized as dark-skinned.
Similarly, the famous cave-paintings of Ajanta depict a vast range of skin
colors. But in none of these contexts do we find that darker skin color
disqualifies a person from being considered good, beautiful, or heroic."
(p.154-155)
About Patanjali's description of Brahmins as
gaura,
he notes that "there is nothing in the passage that forces us to view this
difference as one of inherited skin color" (p.155 n.29): it may be the
difference between one who lives indoors or sits teaching his pupils in
the shadow of a tree, as opposed to labourers or soldiers whose occupation
exposes them to the elements. In Europe too, the distinction between the
sun-tanned peasant woman and the lily-white lady of the castle was
familiar until the recent vogue of sun-bathing.
But as already noted, since the North-Indians have been described by
Rajashekhara as
gaura,
the
gaura-skinned
Brahmins do not really stand out by skin colour. Since
gaura
does not strictly mean European-white, we would need something more
specific to indicate northern origins. Reference to fair hair would
certainly qualify, but according to Michael Witzel, there is in Sanskrit
literature exactly "one
'goldhaired' (hiranyakeshin)
person that is not a god, the author of HShS", i.e. the
Hiranyakeshin-Shrauta-Sűtra named after him. (p.390, emphasis in the
original) Quite possibly, even the author called
Hiranyakeshin
or Goldhaired was not goldhaired at all, but had one of the epithets of
the solar deity Vishnu as his given name, just as people called
Nîlakanth,
"blue-throated" like Shiva after he swallowed poison, are not
blue-throated at all.
But suppose that we have at last found one Nordic-looking Vedic Aryan
here. Considering that fair hair and blue eyes are recessive traits
(meaning that in mixed genetic settings, they tend to diminish and
disappear) and that fair hair is still common among certain communities in
Afghanistan and even in Pakistan among the Kalash Kafir and ex-Kafir
populations around Chitral (also known as
Arya-e-Koh,
"Aryans of the mountains"), it stands to reason that before the Christian
era, fair hair was not all that uncommon along the Indus and farther
northwest. But the Vedic texts make no mention of fair hair as a mark of
friend or foe, of ethnic us or them.
Loss of pigmentation seems to be a selected trait of northern latitudes,
because it favours the intake of ultraviolet rays needed for the
production of vitamin D (in tropical latitudes, by contrast, pigmentation
protects against excessive intake of ultraviolet). The neat picture of
whiteness and fairness originating in the north is upset somewhat by their
common occurrence among the Australian aborigines, but let us still assume
it for now. Then, the white and fair people have most likely descended
from the north to the subtropical latitudes during the Ice Age, when the
northern regions were even more inhospitable. There is no trace of their
descending on India after 8000 BC, since when the skeletal record shows
the same population living in the Indus basis as lives there today.
Perhaps there was a kind of white penetration of northwestern India
sometime in the Glacial age, but that immigrant group need not at all have
been IE-speaking. Given the known fact that IE has crossed racial
frontiers during its expansion, it remains perfectly possible that a
darkish group of PIE-speaking Indians moved out to Central Asia and beyond
in ca. 5000 BC, mixed with ever-whiter successive groups of natives,
imparted their language through elite dominance, but lost their genetic
distinctiveness after a sufficient number of generations of expansion and
thinning out.
3. The political dimension
3.1. Racism vs. Hindu nationalism
It may be noted in passing that before arguing for the non-racialist
interpretation, Prof. Hock apologizes "if some of my findings are
superficially convergent with those of the nationalistically inspired
groups". (p.147) At least he has grasped that in this debate, it is the
hated Hindu nationalists who take the non-racialist position. Indian
polemicists like Yoginder Sikand ("Exploding the Aryan myth",
Observer of Business and Politics,
30-10-1993) had tried to amalgamate Hindu nationalism, through the term "Arya(n)",
with "racism", and many gullible Westerners have fallen prey to this
deliberate confusion. Which brings us once more to the inevitable
political dimension of the debate.
Most ivory-tower philologists have little understanding of the political
aspects of the AIT debate. I will not try to support that statement with
examples giving names and references, for enough bad blood has flowed
already, so instead I will just indicate a general tendency. Most of them
think that in the West, the chapter of Aryan politics has been closed for
good in 1945, thus exonerating themselves from a charge still frequently
made by Indians, viz. that their acceptance of the AIT is motivated by
racism.
In their own case, I will gladly assume that none of them is motivated by
racist doctrines, though they do work within a framework which is still
indebted, through inertia, to ideas developed in an age when racist or
colonial or missionary motives did play a significant role. They also have
a personal stake in maintaining the status quo, for their own previous
papers would suddenly look obsolete if the AIT were discarded,-- and not
only AIT-related papers, for all indological papers contain innocuous
chronological references, of the type "Upanishads (ca. 800 BC)", which
would be far off the mark if the AIT-based low chronology were replaced
with something closer to the indigenous high chronology.
Most Western scholars also know little of the contemporary Indian politics
concerning the AIT. They generally link the questioning of the AIT to
Hindu nationalism, of which they turn out to have a very exaggerated and
demonizing image, without noticing that the Hindu-nationalist aversion to
the AIT is in fact a reaction to an already old, widespread and
well-entrenched political use of the AIT by its believers and propagators:
Christian missionaries, Dalit separatists, Dravidian separatists, and to a
large extent the Marxists. The latter case requires some explanation.
3.2. Two faces of Indian Marxism
Prof. Hock has once, just once, encountered an expression of Dravidian
chauvinism in the AIT context (a Tamil professor walking out from a
lecture in which it was shown that there is no pre-Vedic Dravidian
substratum in Indo-Aryan, as Dravidian influence trickled into Sanskrit
only from the later-Vedic stage onwards, p.146), illustrating once more
how near-innocent Western scholars are of the intense and widespread
political use made of the AIT by various separatist movements in India.
But he is quite aware of the polarization on Marxist/anti-Marxist lines in
the AIT debate. He was consequently surprised to find "a highly positive
review" of anti-invasionist books by David Frawley, N.S. Rajaram, Subhash
Kak and Georg Feuerstein "on the neo-Marxian Postcolonial List, in spite
of the fact that authors such as Frawley heavily inveigh against the
Marxists". (p.147)
This admittedly unusual phenomenon really only restores the natural order
of things: in most Third World countries, Marxists are nationalists to the
extent that they want to revalue the contributions of non-European peoples
and deconstruct colonialist views, i.c. the AIT. Earlier Marxists like S.K.
Chatterjee only accepted the AIT because it was the dominant paradigm and
seemed satisfactory enough, and they were by no means as militant about it
as their present-day successors prove to be. Today's Indian Marxists have
joined the broad anti-Hindu front, allying themselves with ideological
forces of which they used to be as critical as of Hinduism in the days
when they were more self-confident.
In the 1950s and 60s, when the Soviet and Chinese models were in the
ascendant, Marxists didn't mind offending everyone else. In parallel with
Chinese propaganda against Tibetan "feudal society", Dev Raj Chanana could
freely expose the numerous social injustices in which Buddhists
participated, including the use of slave labour by monasteries and
wholesale collaboration with feudal aristocracies and militaristic
dictatorships, making a mockery of the pious claims by neo-Buddhists that
Buddhism stood for social reform and equality. Today, the demoralized
Indian Marxists flatter Buddhism ("revolt against Brahminical oppression")
as well as Islam ("egalitarian mass movement against Meccan trade
monopolists", later "welcomed by the oppressed masses in India") and all
other possible enemies of Hinduism.
Now, these anti-Hindu forces are exploiting the AIT to the hilt, infusing
crank racism in vast doses into India's body politic. Read e.g. Kancha
Ilaiah's book
Why I Am Not a Hindu
(Calcutta 1996), sponsored by the Rajiv Gandhi Foundation, with its
anti-Brahmin cartoons: move the hairlocks of the Brahmin villains from the
back of the head to just in front of their ears, and you get exact
replicas of the anti-Semitic cartoons from the Nazi paper
Der Stürmer.
This crank Dalit tendency is strongly patronized by the Christian
missions, witness the distribution of one of the Bahujan Swayamsevak
Sangathan's anti-Hindu pamphlets at the Indian Catholic bishops' Delhi
press conference just before the Pope's visit in November 1999.
Many of V.T. Rajshekar's brochures (Dalit Sahitya Akademy, Bangalore) are
transcripts of speeches given at Christian conferences. Like pure Indian
Marxism before, this lumpen anti-Brahminism is also well-liked and even
patronized by Western academe. Thus, Ilaiah was invited to contribute to
the American University Press book
Democracy in India, a Hollow Shell
edited by Prof. Arthur Bonner.
Another movement which puts Marxism in the shadow is Islamic militantism.
Its rise goes against Marxism's predictions and sympathies, and has taken
the lives of thousands of Marxists in Iran and Afghanistan. But it is so
undeniably successful, even gaining a lot of sympathy and patronage in
Western academe (witness e.g. Asghar Ali Engineer's contribution to
Bonner's book, or Syed Shahabuddin's contribution to John Esposito's book
Islam in Asia)
that Marxists have decided: if you can't beat them, join them. It is no
surprise, then, to find Marxist professors Irfan Habib and R.S. Sharma
pleading the anti-temple case in the employ of the fundamentalist Babri
Masjid Action Committee during the Ayodhya controversy.
Against this background, it is not so strange anymore that Indian Marxists
have become zealous defenders of a colonial-originated thesis about ethnic
movements of four thousand years ago, simply because that thesis is
functioning as the war-horse of the united anti-Hindu forces. The greying
Indian Marxists are trying to widen their shrinking base by uniting with
forces they would once have denounced as obscurantist and
populist-retrograde.
But then, not all Indian Marxists have followed their vanguard in taking
this new ideological turn. One of the important contributors to the anti-invasionist
case is a Marxist,
Bhagwan Singh, author of
The Vedic Harappans
(Aditya Prakashan, Delhi 1995), who has predictably focused on the
economic and industrial aspects of the Vedic and Harappan evidence. During
the past half-century, in most Third World countries, Marxism and
nationalism have often gone hand in hand. That is why some Marxists and
some RSS activists have recently joined hands in protesting against new
footholds of the multinationals in India and other aspects of economic
globalization. It should, then, also clear up Prof. Hock's puzzlement at
occasional displays of Marxist sympathy for the non-invasionist argument.
3.3. Non-invasionism and Hindu nationalism
A wholly different political element in Prof. Hock's contributions
concerns his characterization of the non-invasionist school. He repeatedly
identifies it as the "Hindu nationalist" school. But this mistakenly
attributes a political identity and motive to a scholarly hypothesis about
ancient Indian history. I don't call the AIT party "the European racist
school" or the "Dravidian chauvinist school" eventhough those terms do
explain the motives behind at least a part of the pro-AIT polemic, past or
present.
A number of anti-invasionist authors are not Hindu nationalists. I don't
know if Klaus Klostermaier, Georg Feuerstein, François Gautier or Michel
Danino considers himself a Hindu, but if so, he would (like David Frawley,
a convert to Hinduism) definitely not be a Hindu nationalist: a non-Indian
Hindu is a living denial of the Hindu nationalist identification of
Hinduism with India. To whom it may concern: the present writer, at any
rate, is neither a Hindu nor a nationalist. Even among those non-invasionists
who are Hindu Indians, there may be some who are not "Hindu nationalists",
as Prof. Hock acknowledges of BHU linguistics professor Satya Swarup Misra
(p.1).
From the identification of a historical theory with a much-maligned
political movement, worse things follow: "But given the nature of the
politics of authenticity and of its practitioners, I doubt that a
meaningful dialogue with any of the nationalistically motivated groups is
feasible, just as I doubt that any meaningful dialogue is possible between
evolutionists and creationists." (p.147) It is to Prof. Hock's credit that
he acknowledges the existence of Tamil-chauvinist and tribal-separatist
"nationalistically motivated groups" alongside the alleged "Hindu
nationalists" as interested parties in the Aryan invasion debate. After
Western academics have been effectively supporting the first two while
demonizing the third one, it is perhaps a welcome progress that he puts
them indiscriminately in the same bag: "In fact, given the unfortunate
consequences in my native country, Germany, of a nationalism that sought
authenticity in non-scholarly interpretations of history and prehistory, I
am extremely uncomfortable with any of the modern Indian nationalisms
briefly referred to earlier." (p.148)
But what evidence does Prof. Hock have for the "non-scholarly
interpretation of history" by the non-invasionist school? It is not given,
but it ought to be strong stuff, for he goes as far as to exclude all the
"nationalistically motivated groups" from the history debate by equating
them with Biblical-fundamentalist creationists. The one similarity he
cites is that scholarly disagreements between different invasionists (e.g.
identifying the Harappan language as Dravidian vs. Munda vs. Burushaski
etc.) are exploited by non-invasionists to discredit the whole invasionist
paradigm: "Creationists and various types of nationalists look upon such
disagreements as indictments of scholarly methodology; but such
disagreements are the very foundation of scholarly enquiry." (p.147)
Well, I haven't seen that polemical tactic in most non-invasionist
publications. Probably the reference is to Prof. N.S. Rajaram, who has
very substantial scientific contributions to the debate to his credit, but
who once pointed out the controversies between linguists as an extra
argument for not taking the soft evidence of linguistics too seriously. I
repeat that I (along with Hindu authors like S.S. Misra and Shrikant
Talageri) have always disagreed with the Indian skepticism vis-ŕ-vis the
linguistic evidence, yet here, Rajaram has a point.
If invasionist linguists still disagree on the IE Homeland by a margin of
5,000 km, from northern Germany (L. Kilian, J. Haudry) through Anatolia
(T. Gamkrelidze & V. Ivanov, along with archaeologist C. Renfrew) and
South Russia (Gordon Childe, Marija Gimbutas and most
Journal of IE Studies
contributors) to Xinjiang (A.K. Narain), it is not unreasonable to
question the capacity of the linguistic data to yield decisive information
on the location of the IE Homeland. Indeed, Prof. Hock himself accepts
that pinpointing the exact location in this vast stretch of land is a
question which "may, in fact, never be settled". (p.17) But if it is too
early to exclude any part of this territory from possible Homeland status,
is it so crazy to suggest that the exclusion of India may have been
premature as well? In this case, the plurality of opinions does prove that
there is as yet no solid evidence basis for deciding the Homeland
question, which does not preclude that decisive evidence will be found in
the near future. And which does not amount to asserting that faith and
faith alone should decide the Homeland question.
3.4. Why there is so little genuine debate
In various discussion forums, I have repeatedly seen the same pattern of
Aryan invasion debate. Invasionists, supposedly sobre scholars with no axe
to grind, attack non-invasionists as religious obscurantists, flat-earthers,
"lunatic fringe", Atlantis freaks, Nazis (apparently unaware that Hitler
was an AIT believer), creationists, and what not: terms they would never
use among each other. Even more than most people, invasionist academics
prove to be
mimophants:
like the touch-me-not mimosa, they are extremely sensitive,-- at least
when they themselves are criticized; and like the elephant, they are
extremely insensitive,-- at least when it comes to throwing insults at
others.
Then, when someone draws attention to their unusual
ad hominem
language, so unbecoming of scholarly company, they blame the non-invasionists:
with such "Hindu nationalist" freaks, what else do you expect? Though
quite untrue, that analysis is not really mendacious, merely prejudiced:
Western indologists are so conditioned by a wild enemy-image of Hindu
nationalism that they genuinely associate anyone rightly or wrongly
counted as a Hindu nationalist with trouble and fury. So, when they see a
debate degenerate into a slanging-match under their own impact, they
wrongly yet sincerely attribute this to the input of the non-invasionists.
At best, they pick up the quarrel in the middle, muse about how "the AIT
debate doesn't bring out the best in people", and decide that it is best
to suspend the debate.
Let me put on record here that in my 9 years of close involvement in this
debate, I have seen time and again that it is the invasionist school
which, when it did not refuse the debate, has spoiled the debate by
replacing argument with mud-slinging. There are exceptions, of course, and
the publication of the volume under discussion is a great step in the
right direction.
4. The Saraswati river
4.1. Which Saraswati?
The frequent Rg-Vedic references to the Saraswati river are seen by
both sides as a key to the solution of the Aryan question. Non-invasionists
have pointed out that the biggest concentration of Harappan cities was
along the Saraswati river, and that it nearly dried up synchronously
with the decline of Harappan city culture. Therefore, the Rg-Veda
cannot be post-Harappan, though it may be pre-Harappan.
To this, Prof. Hock argues that there is a lot of ambiguity about this
name: Saraswati can be the goddess of learning (a personification
derived from the river's status as the feeder of the heartland of
civilization?), so the number of references to the river may be
smaller. Moreover, even as a river name, it has two referents: the
Indian Saraswati river and the Afghan river known in Iranian as
Harahvaiti, now as Helmand. Clearly, we are witnessing the result of a
typically colonial process of name transfer by colonists (cfr. from
"Paris, France" to "Paris, Texas"). Question is: did Indians bring the
name to Afghanistan, or did Afghans bring it to India?
The last alternative is a favourite among invasionists. They suggest
Afghanistan-based Aryan explorers reached that river in India and gave
it the name of their familiar river in the old country. Some of them,
e.g. Rajesh Kochar ("Learning about India's past",
The Hindu,
7-11-1999), practically ignore the Indian Saraswati and assert that
Afghanistan was the real setting of Rg-Vedic history, so that Rg-Vedic
Saraswati references are to the Harahvaiti. Most, however, accept the
contextually obvious location of the Rg-Vedic Saraswati in
Haryana-Panjab-Rajasthan after the Aryan invasion, and place the
Afghan origin of the Saraswati name in the pre-Vedic and pre-invasion
past. But most of these scholars fail to make the obvious deduction
from the Vedic references to this dried-up Indian river, viz. that it
places the Rg-Veda in the Harappan or pre-Harappan period, as the
drying of the Saraswati was connected with the decline of the Harappan
cities.
From the etymology of the name, the location of the river cannot be
deduced: "the river name [Saraswati] must mean 'provided with (many)
ponds'. This describes the Iranian and Panjabi Sarasvatî much better:
both rivers end in the desert, in a series of meandering branches,
with lakes and ponds. The etymology is clear (saras,
IE
selos,
no connection with
sar,
'run, move speedily' < IE
*sar)".
(Michael Witzel, p.376) While the ending in the desert has little to
do with this etymology, and may not have applied in the case of the
ancient Saraswati, the "series of meandering branches with lakes and
ponds" seems to be common to both the rivers. This similarity at once
explains why Indo-Iranian settlers in Afghanistan chose the Saraswati
from among the rivers they remembered as the one to impart its name to
the Helmand.
4.2. The Helmand in the Rg-Veda?
Prof. Hock thinks that while "Saraswati" in the Rg-Veda mostly refers
to the Indian river, in some instances it may be the Afghan river.
Firstly, RV 7:95:2 describes the Saraswati as flowing "from the
mountain to the sea". While seemingly trivial, since
all
rivers ultimately carry their water to the sea, this innocuous phrase
becomes an important argument, if not against the AIT, at least
against the identification of the Helmand as the Vedic Saraswati,
because the Helmand, exceptional among rivers, does not carry water to
the sea but to a lake on the Iranian plateau. To this, Hock replies
that
samudra,
"sea", may well also mean a "lake", such as the
Hâműn-i-Helmand
lake into which the Helmand flows. (p.165) True, it is not uncommon
for terms for "lake" and "sea" to overlap, cfr. German
die/das See,
or the West-Germanic word
meer,
Dutch for "lake", German for "sea". But is there any indication that
this is the case of
samudra
in Vedic Sanskrit? Even if so, all that is proven is that the Afghan
identification of "Saraswati" is a possibility, not that it is likely
or contextually warranted, let alone certain.
While conceding that the Saraswati is described as the most divine
among the rivers and other superlatives in RV 2:41:16, Hock reminds us
that the Sindhu is also glorified in superlatives in RV 8:26:18. The
8th book of the Rg-Veda is the most northwesterly book, the one which
mentions Afghan flora and fauna (8:5, 8:46, 8:56). From that
perspective, the Sindhu is the greatest nearby river, even in the
heyday of the Saraswati which was at any rate far more to the east,
beyond even the five main auxiliaries (Panj-âb)
of the Indus. But the 8th book is younger than the family books (2 to
7), which are unambiguously located in India and near the Indian
Saraswati. If the Sindhu becomes more prominent than the Saraswati at
some
point, this amounts to a movement from east to west, from Panjab to
the frontier (Indus) to Afghanistan. Incidentally, the superlatives
for the Saraswati in RV 2:41:16 are an unlikely description of a
relative backwater like the Helmand except for absolute provincials
who had never seen the nearby Oxus or Indus.
Hock also points out that the Sindhu is once described as the mother
of the Saraswati (RV 7:36:6), in a verse about rivers "coming together
longingly". Indus and Saraswati both flowed into the Arabian Sea, more
or less forming a common delta. It seems that before drying up, the
Saraswati had changed its course and flowed into the Indus at a more
northerly location. At any rate, in the case of the Indian Saraswati,
this imagery of the Sindhu being its mother and coming together with
it makes sense. That is not the case for the Helmand, which forms a
separate basin from that of the Indus and does not flow into the same
sea.
Finally, Prof. Hock has found a possible reference to the Helmand
outside the Rg-Veda: "Identification of at least some of the Vedic
occurrences of the river name Sarasvatî with the Iranian Helmand/Harahvatî
may further help explain a puzzle in the Vedic tradition which, to my
knowledge, has so far resisted explanation. A passage in the
Vâjasaneyi-Samhitâ (34:11) states that
five
rivers empty into the Sarasvatî, contrary to what is known about the
Sarasvatî of Kurukshetra. As it turns out, according to some of the
more detailed maps that I have seen, this is exactly the number of
major tributaries of the Helmand/Harahwatî." (p.166)
The number of tributaries is a sometimes changing and at any rate very
relative matter: it depends on what size of tributary you consider big
enough for mention on the map you are making. I have a
Bartholomew
map of South Asia which shows seven permanent tributaries to the
Helmand plus some seasonal rivers;
The Times Atlas of the World's
mini edition shows three. But if we accept this count, and if we
accept that the Vâjasaneyi-Samhitâ is really referring to the Afghan
Helmand, and if we remember that most of the Rg-Veda with its numerous
mentions of the Indian Saraswati is older than the Vâjasaneyi-Samhitâ,
then that would indicate an India-to-Afghanistan movement. Here again,
and contrary to what the AIT predicts, we do not find the Afghan
references in the earliest parts of the Rg-Veda, but in the later
parts.
4.3. When did the Satlej change course?
Prof. Michael Witzel has thought up an original objection concerning
the Saraswati, which supposedly dried up when tectonic movements
redirected some of its tributaries elsewhere: "The Beas, however, is
mentioned in the somewhat older hymn 3:33 [i.e. older than the river
hymn RV 10:75], together with the confluence of Satlej and Beas. This
will provide, incidentally, a date
ad quem
for this part of the RV, once the relevant geological and geographical
data have been confirmed (and it speaks against the current
revisionist fashion of assigning a pre-Harappan date to the RV)."
(p.371)
Prof. Witzel is referring to the hypothesis that the Satlej, which now
joins the Beas in southwestern Panjab to jointly flow into the Indus,
originally flowed into the Saraswati, and that the Satlej's changing
course was responsible for the drying up of the Saraswati. That a
reference to the confluence of Satlej and Beas would turn this change
of course into a
terminus post quem
for the third book of the Rg-Veda, would indeed seem logical. But
things may be more complicated.
While the shifting course of the Satlej may have played a role at some
point, Prof. Witzel is mistaken if he thinks that that is where non-invasionists
have sought the key to the decline of Harappa. N.S. Rajaram and David
Frawley have noted that "it appears that the Yamuna stopped flowing
into the Saraswati at an earlier era some centuries before 1900 BCE,
perhaps before 2300 BCE, which is what current archaeology suggests.
As this westward flowing Yamuna would have made up most of the waters
of the Drshadvati, which is identified with this
region, it suggests that much of the Rg-Veda reflects a period when
the Yamuna flowed west, which places it yet earlier into the Harappan
or Pre-Harappan era." (Vedic
Aryans and the Origins of Civilization,
Voice of India, Delhi 1997, p.96)
Later, the Yamuna slightly changed course, joined the Chambal and
started throwing its waters into the Ganga at Prayag, which had
already been the confluence of Chambal and Ganga for long,-- meaning
that the lower course of the Chambal, now joined to the Yamuna, was
henceforth called Yamuna. Something similar must have happened to the
Satlej. This was the name of a river joining the Beas, or possibly the
lower course of the Saraswati (near present Bahawalpur), but a change
of course at that point would make little difference to Vedic and
Harappan history, because it was downstream from the Vedic Kurukshetra
region and from the greatest concentration of Harappan cities along
the Saraswati, so it made no difference to them. So, the Satlej may
have started flowing into the Beas before RV 3:33 was composed,
without adverse effect on the Harappan cities upstream. What is more,
the Satley may (and as we shall see, must) always have joined the Beas,
yet may have replenished the Saraswati with its waters at the same
time. How can that be?
The Satlej gets its water from
several
tributaries, and can definitely continue to exist and join the Beas
even at a time when one of its tributaries goes missing. The
tributaries did not adapt their course to that of other tributaries,
but simply obeyed the law of gravity and flowed from higher to lower.
So, their waters already flowed more or less where they flow now,
joining each other to form a single river, now called Satlej, and
ultimately meeting the Beas at some point. In the densely populated
region where Beas and Satlej meet, both rivers obviously had a name,
and there is no reason why the Satlej was not already called the
Satlej (or Shutudri) back then. Later, in its upper course, it was
joined by a new tributary, a river originating near Mount Kailash in
Tibet and originally flowing into the upper course of the Saraswati.
When you follow a river upstream, you come across confluences where it
is a matter of choice which tributary to consider as the river itself,
and which one as a mere tributary. In this case, when the Satlej was
enriched with a new and mighty tributary, the Kailash-originated
former tributary of the Saraswati, the tendency may have caught on to
continue the name Shutudri/Satlej upstream along that river rather
than its original source.
The place where the mountain river which now counts as the upper
course of the Satlej once joined the Saraswati has reportedly been
identified: "Satlej too, owing to tectonic movements, took a sharp
westward right-angled diversion and this is evident from the sudden
widening of the Ghaggar paleochannel south to Patiala." (V. Prabhu
Kumari: "Antiquity of the Vedic river Saraswati", in Bhu Dev Sharma,
ed.:
Revisiting Indus-Saraswati Age and Ancient India,
WAVES, p.120) At any rate, even if this change of course took place in
post-Rg-Vedic times, the Beas must have been joined already before
that by a Satlej river consisting of its other tributaries.
This issue will only be definitively decided by serious geological
research, and possibly the technical answer is already available in
some geology journal. Meanwhile, it is remarkable how scholars who
fail to acknowledge the main implication of the Saraswati's centrality
in the Rg-Veda, viz. that the Rg-Veda cannot be post-Harappan (the
decline of Harappa being connected with the drying of the Saraswati),
can make so much of a related but minor issue.
5. Inconclusive types of evidence
5.1. Archaeological evidence
In a joint paper, "Migration, philology and South Asian archaeology",
two of the participating archaeologists, Jim Shaffer and Diane
Lichtenstein, confirm and elaborate their by now well-known finding that
there is absolutely no archeaological indication of an Aryan immigration
into northwestern India during or after the decline of the Harappan city
culture. It is odd that the other contributors pay so little attention
to this categorical finding, so at odds with the expectations of the AIT
orthodoxy.
The absence of archaeological evidence for the AIT is also admitted,
with erudite reference to numerous recent excavations and handy
explanations of the types of evidence recognized in archaeology, by
outspoken invasionist Shereen Ratnagar in her paper: "Does archaeology
hold the answers?" It then becomes her job to explain why the absence of
material testimony of such an invasion need not rule out the possibility
that an invasion took place nonetheless. Thus, there are parallel cases
of known yet archaeologically unidentifiable invasions, e.g. the Goths
in late-imperial Rome (p.222) or the Akkadians in southern Mesopotamia
(p.223). So, in archaeology even more than elsewhere, we should not make
too much of an
argumentum e silentio.
To quote her own conclusion: "We have found that the nature of material
residues and the units of analysis in archaeology do not match or fit
the phenomenon we wish to investigate, viz. Aryan migrations. The
problem is exacerbated by the strong possibility that simultaneous with
migrations out of Eurasia there were expansions out of established
centres by metallurgists/prospectors. Last, when we investigate pastoral
land use in the Eurasian steppe, we can make informed inferences about
the nature of Aryan emigration thence, which is a kind of movement very
unlikely to have had artefactual correlates." (p.234)
Agreed, but this agnostic position does at least cut both ways: if there
is no evidence for a migration, then migration theories for either
direction are without proof. Obviously, if the Aryan invasion does not
stand disproven by the absence of definite archaeological pointers, then
neither does an Aryan emigration from India. However, there is one
difference. Because several generations of archaeologists have been
taught the AIT, they have in their evaluation of new evidence tried to
match it with the AIT; in this, they have failed so far. However, it is
not at all certain that they have explored the possibility of matching
the new findings with the reverse migration scenario. At least
psychologically, they must have been much less predisposed to noticing
possible connections between the data and an out-of-India migration than
the reverse. Perhaps evidence of an Aryan emigration was staring the
archaeologists in the face but wasn't recognized as such because they
weren't intellectually ready for it? Therefore, a scrutiny of the
evidence in the light of an alternative hypothesis is called for.
We must thank Prof. Ratnagar for her authoritative hint at one of the
possible scenarios of out-of-India aryanization: "expansions out of
established centres by metallurgists/prospectors". An economic
metropolis has a tendency to establish trading outposts (cfr. ancient
Greek outposts as far as the Crimea peninsula or Massilia/Marseilles),
settlement colonies (cfr. Carthage founded by Phoenicians, and then
Carthagena in Spain founded by the Carthaginians, or the Greek
settlement colonies in Sicilia), military outposts to protect trading
routes, mining and production outposts. Therefore, it is completely
logical to suspect pre-Harappan and Harappan expansion into Central
Asia. This may have been how Aryan expansion out of India started.
A half-serious aside: in her acknowledgments (p.234), Prof. Ratnagar
thanks her colleagues Deshpande, Trautmann, Witzel, Hock and Bronkhorst
for their "ethics and honesty, rare amongst scholars working on the
Indian past". So there you have it from the horse's mouth: a JNU
professor daily surrounded by Indian Marxist historians flies out to
attend a conference in Ann Arbor with US-based scholars, and is
pleasantly surprised to find scholarly "ethics and honesty" at last.
5.2. The horse evidence
In his paper "Out of India? The linguistic evidence", Hans Hock gives
the two arguments which have, all through the 1990s, kept myself from
giving my unqualified support to what he calls the "out of India"
theory. These are the dialectal distribution of the branches of the IE
language family (see below) and the sparse presence of horses in
Harappan culture. About the horse, he says very little, but summarizes
the problem very well: "no archaeological evidence from Harappan India
has been presented that would indicate anything comparable to the
cultural and religious significance of the horse (...) which can be
observed in the traditions of the early IE peoples, including the
Vedic Aryas. On balance, then, the 'equine' evidence at this point is
more compatible with migration into India than with outward
migration." (p.13)
Let us first get one thing straight: a number of horses
have
been identified in the bone record of Harappan and pre-Harappan sites,
a few even to the southeast of the Harappan area, in India's interior.
Against Prof. Michael Witzel's curt and sweeping claim that "horses
were introduced from Central Asia only ca. 1700 BC" and that "all
reported earlier finds are hemiones (half-asses)" (p.353), it may be
noted that international experts have certified the earlier existence
of true horse in India. Thus, the precise identification of equid
remains in Surkotada has been conducted by Hungarian expert Prof.
Sandor Bokonyi: "The occurrence of true horse (Equus Caballus L.) was
evidenced by the enamel pattern of the upper and lower cheek and teeth
and by the size and form of incisors and phalanges (toe bones)."
(quoted by Prof. B.B. Lal from Bokonyi's letter to the Director of the
Archaeological Survey of India, 13-12-1993, in
New Light on the Indus Civilization,
Aryan Books, Delhi 1998, p.111; Lal took the trouble of quoting
Bokonyi precisely because the latter's expertise had falsely been
cited in favour of the opposite view, viz. that the horses found were
really hemiones)
Lal mentions other finds in Rupnagar, Kalibangan, Lothal, Mohenjo-Daro,
and terracotta images of the horse from Mohenjo-Daro and Nausharo.
Many bones of the related onager or half-ass have also been found, and
one should not discount the possibility that in some contexts, the
term
ashva
could refer to either species.
Nevertheless, all this is still a bit meagre to fulfil the expectation
of a prominent place for the horse in an "Aryan" culture. I agree with
the "out of India" school that such paucity of horse testimony is
explainable (cfr. the absence of camel and cow depictions, animals
well-known to the Harappans, in contrast with the popularity of the
bull motif, though cows are usually more numerous than the concomitant
bulls), but their case would be better served by more positive
evidence. On the other hand, the evidence is not absolutely damaging
to an Aryan Harappa hypothesis, both outcomes remain possible.
5.3. The linguistic horse
The word
*ekw-o-s,
"horse", is a later formation in PIE. The oldest vocabulary had
athematic stems (e.g. Latin
lex
from
leg-s),
the thematic stems (e.g. Latin
corvus,
"raven") belong to a later generation of PIE words. This can be taken
as an (admittedly very small) indication that the horse was not part
of the scenery in the PIE homeland. To be sure, there are many
newer-type formations for age-old items, e.g. the species
lup-u-s,
"wolf", was most certainly known to the first PIE-speakers. But in the
present case, another argument for the late origin of
ekw-o-s
has been added (by Winfred Lehmann, I believe), viz. its somewhat
irregular development in the different branches of IE, e.g. the
appearance from nowhere of the aspiration in Greek
hippos.
If this is not really a compelling argument, at least the converse is
even more true: the clinching linguistic evidence for a horse-friendly
Urheimat is missing. We should now count with the possibility that the
Proto-Indo-Europeans only familiarized themselves with the horse
towards the time of their dispersion. A possible scenario: during some
political or economic crisis, adventurers from overpopulated India
speaking dialects of PIE settled in Central Asia where they acquainted
themselves with the horse. More than the local natives, they were
experienced at domesticating animals (even the elephant, judging from
RV 9:47:3 which mentions an elephant decorated for a pageant), and
they domesticated the horse. While communicating some specimens back
to the homeland, they used the new skill to speed up their expansion
westward, where their dialects became the European branches of the IE
family.
The horse became the prized import for the Indian elite, which at once
explains both its rarity in the bone record and its exaltation in the
Vedic literary record. The rumour of new and undreamed-of
possibilities in horse-rich Central Asia attracted many more
fortune-seekers from India: "Go northwest, young man!" Which in turn
explains the dialectal diversity of the PIE expanders and their large
numbers which proved sufficient for the linguistic conquest of the
natives of Central Asia and Europe. Just a possibility...
6. Linguistic evidence
6.1. From PIE to Sanskrit
Most linguistic arguments given here by Prof. Hock and Prof. Michael
Witzel cause no serious problem to the theory that the IE family
originated in India.
Prof. Hock updates the old arguments against the fairly popular Indian
(and late-18th-century European) belief that Sanskrit is the mother of
all IE languages. Thus, you can explain Skt.
jagâma
from PIE
*gegoma
as a palatalization of the initial velar (before
e/i)
followed by the conflation of
a/e/o
to
a,
implying that the kentum forms and the forms with differentiated
vowels as attested in Greek and other IE languages represent the
original situation, while the Sanskrit and other Indo-Iranian forms
represent an innovation. This means that Sanskrit is not PIE, that it
has considerably evolved after separating from the ancestor-languages
of the other branches of IE. I entirely agree with those arguments,
and expect the same of most readers, so I need not elaborate on them
here.
Hock addresses this part of his paper to the Sanskrit-as-PIE argument
of Satya Swarup Misra (The
Aryan Problem, a Linguistic Aproach,
Delhi 1992), practically the only non-in-vasionist who has discussed
the linguistic evidence in some detail. While Misra's book contains
valuable points, his equating Sanskrit with PIE is untenable and would
probably make him the butt of ridicule if his work were better known
in the West. Hock's polite and technical handling of the argument,
otherwise a normal matter in scholarly debate, deserves some praise in
the present case of the AIT controversy.
Note that Misra is one example of a scholar who originally believed in
the AIT but developed doubts: his Ph.D. thesis on (meaning
against)
the laryngeal theory in the 1960s entirely accepted the AIT and the
low chronology (1200 BC) for the Vedas. Likewise among archaeologists,
a number of the present critics of the AIT used to be believers in the
AIT, and this includes top-ranking experts like Prof. S.R. Rao and
Prof. B.B. Lal. I am not aware that the AIT can boast of such
converts. But I agree that winning converts is not a criterion to
decide questions of history.
6.2. Dialectal distribution of the IE proto-languages
Even when I learned about findings which indicate that something is
wrong with the AIT, one nagging doubt which has always kept me from
simply declaring the AIT wrong was the geographical distribution of
the branches of the IE family. This argument has been developed in
some detail by Prof. Hock, who shows his mastery by skipping obsolete
arguments like glottochronology and linguistic paleontology (still
brought up by too many scholars in this debate) and going straight to
this crucial point. He explains that "the early Indo-European
languages exhibit linguistic alignments which cannot be captured by a
tree diagram, but which require a dialectological approach that maps
out a set of intersecting 'isoglosses' which define areas with shared
features (...) While there may be disagreements on some of the
details, Indo-Europeanists agree that these relationships reflect a
stage at which the different Indo-European languages were still just
dialects of the ancestral language and as such interacted with each
other in the same way as the dialects of modern languages." (p.13)
Isoglosses, linguistic changes which are common to several languages,
indicate either that the change was imparted by one language to its
sisters, or that the languages have jointly inherited it from a common
ancestor-language. Within the IE family, we find isoglosses in
languages which take or took geographically neighbouring positions,
e.g. in a straight Greece-to-India belt, the Greek, Armenian, Iranian
and some Indo-Aryan languages, we see the shift
s > h
(e.g. Latin
septem
corresponding to Greek
hepta,
Iranian
hafta).
In the same group, plus the remaining Indo-Aryan languages, we see the
"preterital augment" (Greek
e-phere,
Sanskrit
a-bharat,
"he/she/it carried"). Does this mean that the said languages formed a
single branch after the disintegration of PIE unity for some time,
before fragmenting into the presently distinct languages?
No, for this group is itself divided by separate developments which
the member languages have in common with non-member languages. Best
known is the
kentum/satem
divide: Greek belongs to the Kentum group, along with Italic, Celtic,
Germanic, Anatolian and Tocharian, while Armenian and Indo-Iranian
share with Baltic and Slavic the Satem isogloss (as well as the "ruki
rule", changing
s
to
sh
after
r, u, k, i).
So, like between the dialects of any modern language, the IE languages
share one isogloss with this neighbour, another isogloss with another
neighbour, who in turn shares isoglosses with yet other neighbours.
The key concept in Hock's argument is
neighbour:
the remarkable phenomenon which should ultimately support the AIT is
that
isoglosses are shared by neighbouring branches of IE.
Thus, the Kentum languages form a continuous belt from Anatolia
through southern to western and northern Europe, and the Satem
isogloss likewise covers a continuous territory (only later fragmented
by the intrusion of Turkic) from central Europe to India. To be sure,
there are serious exceptions here, e.g. there are Kentum languages far
removed from Europe, viz. Tocharian in Xinjiang and proto-Bangani in
the western Himalaya; and there is a later satemizing tendency within
the Kentum group, viz. in the Romance languages (none of which
pronounces its word derived from Latin
centum
with a
k
sound), Swedish and English (where
wicca
became
witch).
But we get the idea, especially after studying the map which Prof.
Hock provides in Figure 2 on p.15. There, we see ten isoglosses in
their distribution over the geographically placed IE language groups,
all showing the geographical contiguity of languages sharing an
isogloss.
Why is this important? "What is interesting, and significant for
present purposes, is the close correspondence between the
dialectological arrangement in Figure 2 (based on the evidence of
shared innovations) and the actual geographical arrangement of the
Indo-European languages in their earliest attested stages. (...) the
relative positions of the dialects can be mapped straightforwardly
into the actual geographical arrangement if (...) the relative
positions were generally maintained as the languages fanned out over
larger territory." (p.16) In other words: the geographical
distribution of IE languages which actually exists happens to be the
one which would, at the stage when the proto-languages were dialects
of PIE, be best able to produce the actual distibution of isoglosses
over the languages.
6.3. Dialectal distribution: compatible with Indian Homeland?
So, the relative location of the ancestor-languages in the PIE
homeland was about the same as their location at the dawn of history.
This, Hock proposes, is compatible with a non-Indian homeland. Thus,
if the Homeland was in the North-Caspian region, the dialect
communities spread out radially, with the northwestern proto-Germanic
tribe moving further northwest through what is now Poland, the
northern proto-Baltic tribe moving further north through Belarus, the
western proto-Celtic tribe moving further west through Slovakia,
likewise the Italic tribe through Hungary, the southwestern
proto-Greek and proto-Albanian tribes moving further southwest through
the Balkans, the southeastern proto-Indo-Iranians moving further
southeast through Kazakhastan, etc. (One reason given by the early
Indo-Europeanists for assuming such radial expansion is that there is
little inter-borrowing between IE language groups, indicating little
mutual contact. However, plenty of Iranian loans are found in Slavic,
Celtic loans are found in Germanic, etc.) This way, while the
distances grew bigger, the relative location of the daughters of PIE
vis-ŕ-vis one another remained the same.
If this is a bit too neat to match the well-known twists and turns of
history, it is at least more likely than an Indocentric variant of
Hock's scenario would be: "To be able to account for these
dialectological relationships, the 'Out-of-India' approach would have
to assume, first, that these relationships reflect a stage of
dialectal diversity in a Proto-Indo-European ancestor language located
within India.
While this assumption is not in itself improbable, it has consequences
which, to put it mildly, border on the improbable and certainly would
violate basic principles of simplicity. What would have to be assumed
is that the various Indo-European languages moved out of India in such
a manner that they maintained their relative position to each other
during and after the migration. However, given the bottle-neck nature
of the route(s) out of India, it would be immensely difficult to do
so." (p.16-17, emphasis Hock's)
I believe there is a plausible and entirely logical alternative. It
remains possible that the isoglosses match a twofold scenario, part
areal effect and part genealogical tree, as follows. In part, they
reflect successive migrations from the heartland where new linguistic
trends developed and affected only the dialects staying behind or
developing later (vide e.g. T. Gamkrelidze and V. Ivanov's outlining
in their magnum opus the successive waves of emigration from Homeland
X, leading to groupings like Celtic and Italic, or Germanic and
Balto-Slavic). Thus, PIE in its Homeland was a kentum language, and
its first emigrants retained the Kentum form: Anatolian (the oldest
judging from its retaining the laryngeals), Tocharian, Celtic, Italic,
Germanic. Later emigrants developed Satem features: Baltic, Slavic.
Along with the stay-behind Homeland language, Indo-Aryan, the last
emigrants had been completely satemized: Armenian, Iranian.
The second part is that the isoglosses not explainable by the former
scenario are post-PIE areal effects, which is why they affect
historically neighbouring languages. Archaeologists (mostly assuming a
North-Caspian homeland) have said that the North-Central-European
Corded Ware culture of ca. 3000 BC was a kind of secondary Homeland
from which the Western branches of PIE spread, again more or less
radially, to their respective historical locations. Be that as it may,
that or a similar culture may well have comprised a juxtaposition of
IE-speaking communities before their further dispersal, living in
close proximity to the next (though not to all), close enough to allow
for the transmission of linguistic innovations.
Hock himself unwittingly gives at least one example which doesn't
easily admit of a different explanation: "The same group of dialects
[Germanic, Baltic, Slavic] also has merged the genitive and ablative
cases into a single 'genitive' case. But within the group, Germanic
and Old Prussian agree on generalizing the old genitive form (...)
while Lithu-Latvian and Slavic favor the old ablative". (p.14)
Clearly, Old Prussian and Lithu-Latvian lived in close proximity and
separate from Germanic and Slavic for centuries, as dialects of
proto-Baltic, else they wouldn't have jointly developed into the
Baltic group, distinct in many lexical and grammatical features from
its neighbours. So, if the Baltic language bordering on the Germanic
territory happens to share the Germanic form, while the languages
bordering on Slavic happen to share the Slavic form, we are clearly
faced with an areal effect and not a heirloom from PIE days. The
conflation of cases or case endings has continued to take place in
many IE languages in the historical period, so the example under
consideration may well date to long after the fragmentation of PIE.
A second example mentioned by Hock may be the split within the
Anatolian group, with Luwian retaining a distinction between velar and
palatal but Hittite merging the two, just like its Greek neighbour.
But not knowing that corner of the IE spectrum too well, I will not
press the point.
As far as I can see from Prof. Hock's presentation, the twofold
scenario outlined above is compatible with all the linguistic
developments mentioned by him. The one difficult case is Greek, which
shares a number of innovations with Indo-Iranian, yet has also missed
out on others just like its Western neighbours (non-merged a/e/o
vowels, Kentum). Perhaps Greek was late to leave yet had retained its
Kentum forms even when surrounded by increasingly satemized dialects,
just as the Indian-but-Kentum language proto-Bangani seems to have
managed until some time within living memory. Some dialects just
happen to be more conservative than others, e.g. Greek is usually
reckoned as the most conservative regarding the PIE vowels, more
faithful to the old vowel distinctions than any of its neighbours at
any time.
I leave it to more technically inclined linguists to look into this
more closely. For now, I must confess that after reading Prof. Hock's
presentation, the linguistic problem which I have always considered
the most damaging to an Indocentric hypothesis, doesn't look all that
threatening anymore. I do not believe that the isoglosses discussed by
him necessitate the near-identity of the geographical distribution of
the PIE dialects with the geographical distribution of their
present-day daughter languages, which near-identity would indeed be
hard to reconcile with an out-of-India hypothesis. Maybe other
linguists, or a challenged Prof. Hock, could sharpen this line of
argument and make it tougher to reconcile the distribution of
isoglosses with an Indian homeland hypothesis.
6.4. Exit Dravidian Harappa
To Prof. Michael Witzel's recent work on the non-IE substratum
discernible in Indo-Aryan, I hope to return for a fuller discussion
worthy of this important new synthesis of the substratum evidence. It
may be noted that in his contribution to the volume under
consideration ("Aryan and non-Aryan names in Vedic India. Data for the
linguistic situation, c. 1900-500 BC"), Witzel tries in passing to
counter the AIT skeptics but formally does no more than work within
the AIT paradigm, assuming it as a framework for his investigation. He
is untroubled by anomalies which he himself mentions in passing, such
as the apparent unfamiliarity with rice cultivation in "the first
post-Indus text, the Rg-Veda" eventhough rice was first farmed in the
northwest "during the late Indus period". (p.353) He unconvincingly
interprets
Parshu,
the Iranian-related Vedic ethnonym of a "northwestern tribe" which is
obviously related to "Persian" (the tribe which gave its name to the
central Iranian province Pars, now Fars), as the etymon of "Pashtu",
which he must do because the AIT is hardly compatible with a
historical presence in (and emigration from) India of the Persians.
(p.342)
For now, a few remarks. The most important thesis posited here, almost
off-hand and unexplicitated, is: there is not a shred of evidence for
the identification of Harappan culture as Dravidian. Like Vedic
culture, the oldest glimpsable Dravidian culture was centred on
transhumant herding. (p.349) Judging from the substratum of
place-names, they once were located along the northwestern coast (Sindh,
Gujarat, Maharashtra), while southern India clearly had a
pre-Dravidian population including the Vedda people, which has lost
its language but retained its ethnic identity in Sri Lanka. Witzel
quotes David McAlpin as dating the settlement of the Dravidians from
the west in the southern reaches of the Harappan civilization as late
as the 3rd milennium BC. It would seem that from there, some of them
(the ones least affected by Harappan influence) moved south and easily
assimilated the less advanced natives into their culture, while those
staying on in the Harappan sphere of influence were assimilated into
the dominant Indo-Aryan culture, bringing a few Dravidian elements
into the Gujarati language (e.g. the double "we", inclusive and
exclusive) and Gujarati culture (e.g. the Dravidian system of
kinship). (p.385)
Like the Gutians and Akkadians in Sumeria, the Dravidians settling in
Gujarat may have been outsiders attracted by the economic
opportunities offered by a rising metropolitan culture. Witzel
acknowledges the "linguistic connections of Dravidian with Uralic"
(p.349), which also point to the northwest outside India as the origin
of Dravidian. While noninvasionists probably smile at this painful
blow to the Tamil chauvinist view of Aryan barbarians invading the
native Indo-Dravidian civilization, they should be the first to
recognize the possibility of alternative explanations for the
Dravidian-Uralic connection, though speculations on that topic cannot
detain us here.
The oldest layers of Vedic literature do not contain loans from
Dravidian, not even hydronyms. Dravidian loans appear only gradually
in the next stages and are typically terms used in commercial
exchanges, indicating adstratum rather than substratum influence.
This, we may remark, fits neatly with a pre-Harappan date for the Rg-Veda,
when the Dravidians shepherds were still at some distance, while an
early-Harappan influx of the immigrant Dravidian language could make
its mark in the later Vedic literature.
At any rate, Dravidian seems now to have been eliminated from the
shortlist of pretenders to the status of Harappan high language. That
Dravidian cannot be the main "pre-Aryan" influence on Vedic language
and culture had earlier also been argued by F.B.J. Kuiper, Bernard
Sergent and others. Prof. Asko Parpola's well-known decipherment of
the Indus script as proto-Dravidian doesn't prove its own
starting-point, and may turn out to be no more than an imaginative and
admittedly magistral groping in the dark.
6.5. Pre-IE substratum in Indo-Aryan: language X
Unlike Dravidian, other languages have exerted an influence since the
earliest Vedic times: chiefly a language exhibiting Austro-Asiatic
features, hence provisionally called para-Munda, not the mother but at
least an aunt of the Munda languages still spoken in Chotanagpur; and
an unknown language with nonetheless consistent features,
provisionally called Language X. Non-invasionists strongly dislike the
seeming fondness of Western linguists for "ghost languages", but the
simple fact remains that numerous languages have died out, and that
the ghost of some of them can be seen at work in anomalous elements in
existing languages. Thus, the first Sumerologists noticed an
un-Sumerian presence of remnants of an older language typified by
reduplicated final syllables, hence baptized "banana language". Today,
much more is known about a pre-Sumerian Ubaidic culture, which has
become considerably less ghostly.
Witzel quotes Colin Masica as crediting language X with 31% of
agricultural flora terms in Hindi. (p.339) I would caution, with
Shrikant Talageri, against prematurely deciding on the non-IE origin
of a word not having parallels in other IE languages, especially in
the case of terms for indigenous flora and fauna. When Indian
emigrants stayed for a few generations in the rather different climate
and landscape of Central Asia, they would logically lose that term (or
sometimes transfer it to the similar-looking species), so its absence
in the non-Indian branches of IE would prove little. For the rest,
there is no objection to the impression that Vedic Sanskrit has
absorbed some foreign words, especially after the emigration of the
other branches of IE, so that these could not share in this process of
borrowing.
The assumption of a language X in northwestern India will be welcomed
by many as the solution to the vexing question of the origin of
retroflexion in the Indian languages. Weak in Burushaski and Munda,
strong yet defective (never in initial position) in Dravidian, strong
in Indo-Aryan but unattested among its non-Indian sister-languages,
retroflexion in its origins is a puzzling phenomenon. So, language X
as the putative language of the influential Harappan metropolis might
neatly fit an invasionist scenario for the genesis of retroflexion in
Indo-Aryan as well as its spread to all corners of India. But an
entirely internal origination of retroflexion within early Indo-Aryan
(which then imparted it to its neighbours) has always had its
defenders even among linguists working within the invasionist
paradigm. No new hard data on this undoubtedly important question have
been presented in this volume, so for now, we may let the matter rest.
6.6. How to decide on the foreign origin of a word?
Linguists like Kuiper and now Witzel (in more detail in his paper on
"Substrata in Old Indo-Aryan" in the latest issue of the Electronic
Journal for Vedic Studies) have proposed a clear-cut criterion for
deciding whether a word attested in ancient Sanskrit is IE or not.
They argue that a word in a given language cannot take just any shape,
e.g. a true English word cannot start with
shl-, shm-, sht-(though
these German sound patterns are now becoming familiar to
English-speakers through loans like
schnitzel,
often Yiddish words and names like
schmuck, schlemiel, Wasserstein).
Likewise, a Sanskrit word cannot contain certain sound combinations,
which would mark a word as a foreign loan.
However, there are several problems with this rule. Firstly, and
invasionists should welcome this one, if a sound is too strange,
chances are that people will change it to something more manageable,
resulting in a loan which differs in pronunciation from its original
form, but which is no longer recognizable as a loan by the present
criterion precisely because it has conformed itself to the more usual
sound patterns of the receiving language. Thus, in Sino-English (Hong
Kong etc.), a boss or upper-class person is called a
taipan,
Chinese for "big boss"; there is nothing decisively un-English about
this string of consonants and vowels. The one feature of this Chinese
word which could have marked it as un-English, is its tones (tai
fourth tone,
ban
third tone),-- but precisely that typically foreign feature has been
eliminated from the English usage of the word. The same is true in
Japanese, which has adopted hundreds of Chinese words after stripping
them of tones and other distinctively Chinese phonetic
characteristics. Likewise, Arabic has a number of sounds and phonemic
distinctions unknown in European languages, which are systematically
eliminated in the Arabic loans in these languages.
So, if a word looks Sanskritic, it may still be of foreign origin.
With historical languages, better known than proto-para-Munda or
"language X", the assimilation into Sanskrit sound patterns is
well-attested, e.g. Greek
dekanos
becoming
drekkana,
Altaic
Turuk
becoming
Turushka,
Arabic
sultan
becoming
sűratrâna,
etc. Sometimes this phonetic adaptation gives rises to
folk-etymological reinterpretation, often with hypercorrect
modification of the word; the latter can also take place even without
etymological interpretation, just for reasons of "sounding right".
Thus, it is often said (also here by Witzel, p.358) that
Yavana,
vaguely "West-Asian", is a hypersanskritic back-formation on
Yona,
Ionia, i.e. the Asian part of Greece (ethnically cleansed of Greeks by
Turkey in 1922). While I am not entirely convinced in the case of
Yavana,
I do accept that this principle underlies the Sanskrit looks of many
foreign loans in Sanskrit.
Witzel uses this phenomenon to explain the Sanskrit looks of 35 river
names: "Even a brief look at this list indicates that in northern
India, by and large, only Sanskritic river names
seem to survive". (p.370) Quoting Pinnow, he notes that over 90% don't
just look IA but "are etymologically clear and generally have a
meaning" in Indo-Aryan. He attributes this unexpectly large
etymological transparency to "the ever-increasing process of changing
older names by popular etymology". Note, however, that in some cases
he is open to surprising IE etymologies for names usually explained as
loans, e.g.
Sindhu
might be an "Indo-Iranian coinage with the meaning 'border river,
ocean' and fits Paul Thieme's etymology from the IE root
*sidh,
'to divide'". (p.387)
Meanwhile, numerous words have wrongly or at least prematurely been
classified as foreign loans on the basis of the said criterion. The
point is: how do you decide what the standard shape of a word in a
given language should be? Witzel calls
Bekanâta
(with retroflex
t)
"certainly a non-IA name" (p.364) citing as reason the retroflex
t
(though in Vedic, the dental/retroflex distinction is sometimes merely
allophonic, representing a single but phonetically unstable phoneme)
and the initial
b-.
While
b-may
be rare in Old IA, there is no good reason to exclude it altogether
from the acceptable native sounds of the language. What threatens to
happen here, is that the minority gets elbowed out by the majority,
that the majoritarian forms are imposed as the normative and only
permissible forms.
Compare with the argument by Alexander Lehrman about accepting or
excluding the rare sequence "e + consonant" as a possibly legitimate
root in Hittite: "There is absolutely no reason why a lexical root of
Proto-Indo-European (or Proto-Indo-Hittite) cannot have the shape *eC-,
except
the wilful imposition by the researching scholar of the inferred
structure of a majority of lexical roots on a minority of them."
("Hitt. ga-ne-esh-+ and the Laryngeal Theory",
Indogermanische Forschungen,
1997, p.151, emphasis mine) The same openness to exceptions to the
statistical rule is verifiable in other languages, e.g. Chinese family
names are, as a rule, monosyllabic (the
Mao
in Mao Zedong), yet two-syllable names have also existed, though now
fallen in disuse (the
Sima
in Sima Qian). As a rule, Semitic verbal roots have a "skeleton" of
three consonants, yet a few with two or four consonants also exist.
But admittedly, both examples also illustrate a tendency of the
exception to disappear in favour of (or to conform itself to) the
majoritarian form.
Another point is that there may be a covert
petitio principii
at work here. Many assertions on what can or cannot be done in
Indo-Aryan are based on the assumption that Vedic Sanskrit is more or
less the mother of the whole IA group, it being the language of the
entry point whence the Aryan tribes populated a large part of India.
Thus, Witzel is sure that
Kosala
must be a loan (from Tibeto-Burman) because the sequence
-os-is
"not allowed in Sanskrit". (p.382) But first of all, what is more
ordinary in dialectal variation than an
s/sh
shift? In the present Hindi dialects of "Kosala" and "Videha" (eastern
Uttar Pradesh, Bihar) and in Bengali, Sanskrit
sh
routinely becomes
s
(Subhash
> Subhas, Ghosh > Ghose):
this could be a substratum influence, following Witzel, or it could
simply be a spontaneous dialectal variation.
What is more,
s
in such cases, and likewise other sound combinations deemed "not
allowed in Sanskrit", could also be the original form, in a dialect
which did not descend from Sanskrit. Indeed, in Shrikant Talageri's
reconstruction of ancient Indian history, Sanskrit is not the mother
of IA at all, there being IA dialects developing alongside Vedic
Sanskrit in India's interior. Just as Vedic tradition is but one among
several Indo-Aryan traditions, the traces of which are found in the
Puranas, Vedic Sanskrit is but one among a number of OIA dialects. The
progeny of the latter consists of the Indo-Aryan languages, especially
their so-called
deshi
vocabulary, words seemingly unrelated to Sanskrit, being neither
tatsama
(pure Sanskrit "citation" words) nor
tadbhava
(evolved words having a Sanskrit correlate). Thus, the
deshi
word
kuta,
"dog", is used in most NIA languages, as opposed to the Sanskrit word
shvan
(cfr. Greek
kuon,
English
hound),
used only in Singhalese and Konkani. As Talageri has pointed out, the
latter two languages both have a tradition of originating in the
northwest, not far from the Vedic heartland; they also use
tadbhava
words for "water" and "horse" whereas most other NIA languages use
deshi
words (pânî
c.q.
ghora).
Rather than to say that these
deshi
words are non-IE loans, they may often be native IA coinages which
just happen to be different from usage in the northwestern dialect
which became Vedic Sanskrit, and which was in some respects closer to
Iranian than to the IA dialects of India's interior. Likewise, these
inner-Indian IA dialects may have had phonological characteristics
different from those of Sanskrit and permitting certain combinations
and sounds patterns "not allowed in Sanskrit". By Witzel's reasoning,
the name
Ghose
would have to be Tibeto-Burman or otherwise non-IE, while we know that
it is Bengali and quite IE. This alternative possibility lessens the
necessity of a non-IE origin for odd-looking words.
6.7. Pre-IE substratum in Indo-Aryan: "para-Munda"
Since extinct language isolates like the hypothetical language X don't
tell us much except that they existed, the more interesting substratum
influence is the one attributed to Austro-Asiatic, more specifically
to its mainland Indian branch, Munda. In Witzel's view, this seems to
be the main influence, reaching far northwest to and beyond the entry
point of the Vedic Aryans in India, and definitely predominant in the
whole Ganga basin.
The word
Ganga
itself has long been given an Austro-Asiatic etymology, esp. linking
it with southern Chinese
kang/kiang/jiang,
supposedly also an Austro-Asiatic loan. The latter etymology has
recently been abandoned, with the pertinent proto-Austro-Asiatic root
being reconstructed as
*krang
and the Chinese word having a separate Sino-Tibetan origin (vide Zhang
Hongming: "Chinese etyma for river",
Journal of Chinese Linguistics,
Berkeley, Jan. 1998, p.1-47). Witzel now proposes to explain Ganga as
"a folk etymology for Munda
*gand"
(p.388), meaning "river", a general meaning it still has in some IA
languages. The folk etymology would be a reduplication of the root
*gam/ga,
"moving-moving", "swiftly flowing".
In some cases, a Munda etymology is supported by archaeological
evidence. Rice cultivation was developed in Southeast Asia, land of
origin of the Austro-Asiatic people, who brought it to the Indus
region by the late Harappan age. Therefore, it is not far-fetched to
derive Sanskrit
vrihi
from proto-Munda
*vari,
which exists in practically the same form in Austronesian languages
like Malagasy and Dayak, and reappears even in Japanese (uru-chi),
again pointing to Southeast-Asia as the origin and propagator in all
directions of the both the cultivation of rice and its name
*vari.
With para-Munda prefix, this may also be the origin of the Hindi word
câ-val,
"rice".
For Hindu nationalists, and for serious historians in general, all
this goes to confirm that the Munda tribals are not "aboriginals" (as
Christian missionaries have called them in an effort to set them
against their Indo-Aryan Hindu neighbours), but carriers and importers
of Southeast-Asian culture. Witzel himself acknowledges that "Munda
speakers immigrated", as this should explain why in Colin Masica's
list of agricultural loans in Hindi (which, in conformity with the
invasionist paradigm, is very generous in allotting non-IE origins to
Indo-Aryan words), Austro-Asiatic etymologies account for only 5.7%.
In borrowing Munda words, the Vedic Aryans clearly did not behave like
immigrants into Munda-speaking territory. This paucity of Munda
influence in the agricultural vocabulaty, soil-related par excellence,
should also caution us against reading Munda etymologies into the
equally soil-bound hydronyms,
e.g. there is no compelling reason for a Munda etymology for Shutudri
(Witzel diagnoses theusual Sanskritic interpretations as artificial
"popular etymology", p.374, but does not produce a convincing Munda
alternative) or Ganga, even when it is not impossible either.
The main pointer to a Munda connection seems to be a list of prefixes,
now no longer productive in the Munda languages, and not recognized or
used as prefixes by Vedic Sanskrit speakers. Thus, the initial
syllable of the ethnonym
Ki-râta
seems to be one in a series of non-IA and probably para-Munda prefixes
ka/ke/ki/kr
(p.365). On this basis, all words beginning with
k-become
suspected loans from "para-Munda", e.g. one might decide the question
"which was first?" between Sanskrit
karpâsa,
"cotton", and Munda
kapas:
the latter was first, signifying one of the textile manufacturing
processes pioneered by the Southeast-Asians, and the former, with its
typically Sanskrit-looking cluster
-rp-,
is but a hypersanskritized loan. This is not impossible, of course,
but not quite proven either.
An interesting little idea suggested by Prof. Witzel concerns an
alleged alternation
k/zero,
e.g. in the Greek rendering of the place-name and ethnonym
Kamboja
(eastern Afghanistan) as
Ambautai,
apparently based on a native pronunciation without
k-.
Citing Kuiper and others, Witzel asserts that "an interchange
k : zero
'points in the direction of Munda'" (p.362), though this "would be
rather surprising at this extreme western location". Indeed, it would
mean that not just Indo-Aryan but also other branches of Indo-Iranian
have been influenced by Munda, for
Kam-boja
seems to be an Iranian word, the latter part being the de-aspirated
Iranian equivalent of Skt.
bhoja,
"king" (Eric Pirart: "Historicité des forces du mal dans la
Rgvedasamhita",
Journal Asiatique
286.2, 1998, p.542; he also gives an Iranian etymology to Vedic
Agastya,
from
a-gasti,
from Iranian
gasta,
"ill-smelling, sin"). Well, if the Mundas could penetrate India as far
as the Indus, they could reach Kamboja too.
But the interesting point here is that the "interchange k : zero" is
attested in IE vocabulary far to the west of India and Afghanistan,
e.g.
ape
corresponding to Greek
kepos,
Sanskrit
kapi,
"monkey", or Latin
aper,
"boar", corresponding to Greek
kapros.
Gamkrelidze and Ivanov have tried to explain this through a Semitic
connection, with the phonological closeness (somewhere in the throat)
of
qof
and
'ayn.
But if the origin of this alternation must be sought in a Munda
connection, what does that say about the geographical origin of Latin
and Greek?
6.8. Munda and the AIT
Given Prof. Witzel's known invasionist presuppositions, we may suspect
a pro-Munda bias in his discussion of Vedic words with unclear
etymology. However, given the location of the different language
groups in India, it is entirely reasonable that Munda influence should
appear in the easternmost branch of IE, viz. Indo-Aryan. If both IE
and Munda were native to India, we might expect Munda influence in the
whole IE family (though India is a big place with room for non-neighbouring
languages), but since Munda is an immigrant language, we should not be
surprised to find it influencing only the stay-behind Indo-Aryan
branch of IE. This merely indicates a relative chronology: first
Indo-Aryan separated from the other branches of IE, and then it came
in contact with Munda.
So, if we provisionally accept the presence of Munda loans in Vedic
Sanskrit, we need not follow Witzel in accepting that this is a native
substratum influence in a superimposed foreign language. Shrikant
Talageri (The
Rg-Veda, a Historical Analysis,
forthcoming from Aditya Prakashan, Delhi) has argued that the Rg-Veda
shows a movement from the western Ganga basin to the Saraswati and
Indus basins. This implies that as an eastern dialect of PIE (with the
western dialects in the Indus basin soon to move out to central Asia
and beyond, and to its east only other IA dialects), pre-Vedic and
Vedic Sanskrit were more open to influences from the eastern
immigrants from Southeast Asia, the Mundas.
Therefore, the recognition of Munda (or likewise of Dravidian)
influence on Indo-Aryan is not really a problem for an Indian homeland
theory. Vedic Sanskrit is attested only since well after the
fragmentation of PIE. If it shows features including a vocabulary
borrowed from other Indian languages, this doesn't prove that
Indo-Aryan split off from the other IE languages in Central Asia, but
may indicate influences which reached northwestern India only after
the other PIE dialects had moved out to Central Asia.
7. Conclusion
From this all too brief survey of the most AIT-related arguments in
the Bronkhorst & Deshpande volume, we may conclude that the Aryan
invasion debate has really taken off at last. In spite of very minor
traces of theoritical or political bias, the contributing scholars
have really addressed the issue, and have really made an effort to
present non-invasionists with material challenging the Indian homeland
paradigm. The time for wailing about the colonial-missionary bias
underlying the invasionist paradigm is definitively past, for this
paradigm is now being given an articulate scholarly defence
increasingly based on first-hand knowledge of the rivalling
Indocentric model. In some respects, especially the linguistic angle,
the debate is also being taken to a very technical level, to which
non-invasionists will have to get used while continuing to develop
their own arguments.
But so far, any decisive evidence in favour of the AIT has not been
given. Or if I have missed something, I invite readers to point out
which fact has been presented in this book that is strictly
incompatible with an Indian homeland scenario.
Finally, it must be kept in mind that the contributors to the Aryan
invasion debate in this volume have generally sought to prove the AIT.
If they have not succeeded, it only means that the AIT has not been
proven, not that it has been disproven. Perhaps the proof is waiting
to be discovered, and the first failed attempt to find it has merely
postponed the discovery till such time when the invasionists really
mobilize their scholarly and scientific skills. For non-in-vasionists,
it would be wrong to sit back and enjoy the other party's failure, for
their own theory is still in need of proof positive. Rather, the time
has come to shift the focus from countering the argumentative basis of
the AIT to building a corpus of positive evidence for the alternative
out-of-India paradigm.
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