So The New York Times has found six generals who want Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to resign. The peace party often makes a show of embracing the martial virtues, though they should be careful what they ask for. People often suspect a ruse, and the uniformed front men that come forward are not necessarily top quality.

 

In 1864, at the climax of the Civil War, the Democrats tried to unseat Abraham Lincoln with “the young Napoleon,” Gen. George B. McClellan. McClellan had commanded the Union’s armies, but chafed at the civilians under whom he served: He called Lincoln a “well-meaning baboon.” But what should McClellan have been called? This is what the historian John Keegan calls him: “vain, vainglorious, opinionated, worldly, self-satisfied, ostentatiously busy …. [H]e resembled [Douglas] MacArthur in his arrogance and George C. Marshall in his hauteur, [while lacking] the former’s dynamism and the latter’s strength of character …. ” Young Napoleon managed to carry only three states for the peace party. If the insurgents of the Confederacy had been able to vote, no doubt he would have done better.

 

Let us assume that Mr. Rumsfeld’s critics, and Mr. Rumsfeld himself, are all, all honorable men. Real philosophical issues divide them, which makes their dispute more than a catfight, and something other than the obvious protest of outraged experts against the bumbling of outsiders.

 

In the soft days before 9/11, Mr. Rumsfeld came to the Pentagon intent on transformation—making the military more high-tech, breaking down the barriers to inter-service cooperation. This is an old fight, for the Pentagon, like any corporation, must evolve to live; if it doesn’t, it becomes General Motors. Tail-kickers like Mr. Rumsfeld naturally acquire enemies, for reasons bad (people don’t like rocking the boat) and good (maybe the boat sails well as it is).

 

The transformed military toppled the Taliban government in quick time, using Special Forces on horseback and pilotless drones. Point to Mr. Rumsfeld. In Iraq, Baghdad fell in three weeks, but the war against the insurgency has lasted three years. Point to his critics? Mr. Rumsfeld’s great failing, in their eyes, was not sending in enough troops. If we had had more boots on the ground, so the indictment runs, the insurgency either would not have blossomed or could have been crushed. But this too is an issue with two sides. More boots can mean more firepower. But they can also mean more targets. More boots would also have meant a draft, which would mean more neophyte troops.

 

Our goal was always not to add Iraq to the American Raj, but to turn the country over to a stable, non-monstrous government. This required, first, forming such a government, and second, seeing that it could defend itself. Several national elections have been held, and all the factions are talking to each other, though they haven’t quite yet made a deal. (If you have bought a rug in a bazaar, you know you never shake hands until you are leaving the shop in disgust.) The new Iraqi Army has had a long birth. We disbanded the old one, to de-Baathify it, then reconstituted it too soon, whereupon it failed its first tests in the field. Now some real progress seems to be happening, which is why American casualties are going down (although they have increased in recent days), and Iraqi casualties are going up.