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Access Statistics for Simon Loertscher

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Assessing the Performance of Simple Contracts Empirically: The Case of Percentage Fees 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 43
Assessing the Performance of Simple Contracts Empirically:The Case of Percentage Fees 0 0 1 9 1 1 7 80
Biased Experts, Costly Lies, and Binary Decisions 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 99
Biased experts, costly lies, and binary decisions 0 0 0 83 0 0 0 318
Competitive E?ects of Vertical Integration with Downstream Oligopsony and Oligopoly 0 0 0 164 0 0 0 260
Dynamic Location Games 0 0 1 71 0 0 4 240
False Alarm? Terror Alerts and Reelection 0 0 1 49 0 1 2 190
Fee Setting Intermediaries: On Real Estate Agents, Stock Brokers, and Auction Houses 0 0 1 94 0 0 2 780
Fee-Setting Mechanisms: On Optimal Pricing by Intermediaries and Indirect Taxation 0 0 2 22 0 0 4 94
Fee-Setting Mechanisms: On Optimal Pricing by Intermediaries and Indirect Taxation 0 0 0 35 0 0 1 77
Fee-Setting Mechanisms: On Optimal Pricing by Intermediaries and Indirect Taxation 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 58
Inefficient Policies and Incumbency Advantage 0 0 0 120 0 0 3 939
Inefficient Policies and Incumbency Advantage 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 238
Learning, public good provision, and the information trap 0 0 0 31 1 1 1 185
Market Structure and the Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration 0 0 0 128 0 0 3 188
Optimal Structure and Dissolution of Partnerships 0 0 0 12 1 1 1 37
Switching Costs, Firm Size, and Market Structure 0 0 0 139 0 0 1 877
The evolution of cheating in asymmetric contests 1 1 1 66 1 1 1 241
When is Seller Price Setting with Linear Fees Optimal for Intermediaries? 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 283
Total Working Papers 1 1 7 1,144 4 5 31 5,227

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Long Way Coming: Designing Centralized Markets with Privately Informed Buyers and Sellers 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 130
An Oligopoly Model for Analyzing and Evaluating (Re)-Assignments of Spectrum Licenses 0 0 0 8 1 1 1 55
Auctions and Economic Design 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 35
Auctions with bid credits and resale 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 38
Chain Stores, Consumer Mobility, and Market Structure 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 115
Club good intermediaries 0 1 1 4 2 5 26 100
For the Student: Matching and Economic Design 1 1 2 22 1 2 3 83
Global and local players in a model of spatial competition 0 0 1 12 0 0 3 55
Horizontally Differentiated Market Makers 0 0 0 50 0 1 4 192
Inefficient policies and incumbency advantage 0 0 0 43 0 1 2 177
Learning, public good provision, and the information trap 0 0 0 30 0 0 2 131
MARKET MAKING OLIGOPOLY* 0 0 0 28 0 0 1 96
Market structure and the competitive effects of vertical integration 0 1 3 34 0 2 8 123
On cheating, doping and whistleblowing 0 0 2 78 1 1 7 224
Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty 0 0 0 14 0 0 2 146
Rock–Scissors–Paper and evolutionarily stable strategies 0 0 1 21 0 0 6 93
Sequential location games 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 64
The ABC of complementary products mergers 0 0 2 20 0 0 4 116
Vertical mergers that eliminate double markups are procompetitive 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 61
Total Journal Articles 1 3 12 442 5 13 70 2,034

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Statistics updated 2024-07-03